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In the aftermaths of Hurricanes Irene, in 2011, and Sandy, in 2012, New York City (NYC) has come to recognize the
critical need tobetter prepare for future stormsurges and to anticipate future trends, such as climate change and socio-
economic developments. The research presented in this report assesses the costs of six different flood management
strategies to anticipate long-term challenges theCity will face. The proposed strategies vary from increasing resilience
by upgrading building codes and introducing small scale protection measures, to creating green infrastructure as
buffer zones and large protective engineering works such as storm surge barriers. The initial investment costs of
alternative strategies vary between $11.6 and $23.1 bn, maximally. We show that a hybrid solution, combining
protection of critical infrastructure and resilience measures that can be upgraded over time, is least expensive.
However, with increasing risk in the future, storm surge barriers may become cost effective, as they can provide
protection to the largest areas in both New York and New Jersey.
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Jeroen Aerts, Wouter Botzen, and Hans de Moel
VU University Amsterdam, Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), De Boelelaan 1087 1081HV, Amsterdam
1.1 Introduction and goal
The devastating impact byHurricane Sandy showed
again that the metropolitan area of New York City
(NYC) is one of the most vulnerable cities to coastal
flooding around the globe (Nicholls et al., 2008;
Aerts et al., 2013; Kunz et al., 2013). Historical
flood events have shown that hurricanes and winter
storms (nor’easters) can have considerable impacts
on the city. NYC has been struck by 15 hurricanes
since the year 1815, with a maximum strength of
category 3 on the Saffir-Simpson scale (Gornitz
et al., 2002). Recently, Hurricane Irene almost
caused large-scale flooding in NYC, which served as
a wake-up call for the city’s flood risk management
(Aerts and Botzen, 2012). Flood risks are expected
to increase in the future, and a report of the
NYC Panel on Climate Change shows that sea
level rise is expected to increase the frequency of
coastal flooding in NYC and enlarge the potential
flood zones (NPCC, 2009). In addition, socio-
economic developments, such as population and
economic growth, will likely increase the potential
consequences of flooding. In the US, in 2003
approximately 153 million people—53% of the
nation’s population—lived in coastal counties, an
increase of 33 million people since 1980 (NOAA,
2005). NYC’s population is projected to continue
to grow from over 8.2 million in 2006 to 9.1 million
by 2030 (NYC-DCP, 2006).
Currently, the City of NY is looking for flood
adaptation measures that anticipate future trends
such as climate change and socio-economic devel-
opments (e.g. NYC-DCP, 2011). The issue of flood
management and its role in anticipating future chal-
lenges such as climate change and socio-economic
developments is very complex. There is no single
readily available flood management strategy appli-
cable to NYC. However, cities like NYC have de-
veloped the ability to adapt continuously to change
and to attract economic activity and investments
(Rosenzweig et al., 2010). One could say that cities
likeNYhave already been adapting to changing con-
ditions formany years or even centuries, as well as to
the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy and future risks.
Climate change is an additional challenge that needs
to be addressed in cities’ planning, investments and
regulations.
However, since the choices made today will
influence vulnerability to risks in the future, it is
important to evaluate proposed flood management
strategies in terms of their costs and benefits, and
how these cost and benefits evolve through time.
In this context, and given the uncertainty of future
developments, there is the need to keep all options
open. Because of the uncertainty of future scenar-
ios, one can never predict exactly how the futurewill
develop, and what measures will be needed. Hence,
climate-robust and flexible, no-regret or low-regret
measures should be examined. In addition, compli-
cated issues like policymaking, stakeholder involve-
ment, and financing new measures may hinder the
speedy implementation of adaptationmeasures and
may cut ambitious plans to more modest levels.
While flood risk is subject to a myriad of defini-
tions, we define risk as a function of hazard, expo-
sure, and vulnerability (Kron, 2002), as used in the
Global Assessment Report (GAR) of the United Na-
tions Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR,
2011) and the SREXreport of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2012).
Flood Risk = f (Hazard, Exposure,
and Vulnerability)
Hazard refers to the chance and characteristics of
the hazardous phenomenon itself (e.g. flood ex-
tent, flood depth); exposure refers to the loca-
tion and number of people or economic assets
in hazard-prone areas, and vulnerability refers to
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their susceptibility to suffer damage and loss; for
example, due to unsafe housing and living condi-
tions. All three elements can be altered by adapta-
tion (i.e. explicit risk management interventions).
For example, constructing a river-dike can reduce
risk by decreasing the chance of flooding (reduced
hazard). Spatial zoning regulations can reduce risk
by limiting the number of people or value of assets in
flood-prone areas (reduced exposure) (Burby et al.,
2000; Poussin et al., 2012). Building codes can re-
duce risk through vulnerability reduction (Thieken
et al., 2006) and insurance covers the residual risk
after all of those measures have been implemented
(Kunreuther, 2009; Paudel et al., 2012).
Using this general framework, this paper is de-
signed to gather and analyze available cost data on
adaptation methods and, by grouping these meth-
ods into alternative flood management strategies,
to provide some of the basis for decision-making
on adaptation to climate in New York City. A flood
management strategy in this study is defined as the
collection of measures (flood proofing, zoning, barri-
ers, levees, etc.) that is needed to lower flood risk. This
research considers a variety of possible measures,
and draws from the experiences of other areas and
coastal cities (e.g. Aerts et al., 2009, 2011). These
measures consist of various technical engineering
options, such as pumps, levees, and surge barriers,
to keep the water out of the City. Another domain
of solutions lies in lowering the vulnerability (or en-
hancing resilience) of the NYCwaterfront by imple-
menting new building codes and zoning regulations
that promote flood proofing of buildings or even
reallocate buildings in the flood zones. The residual
risk can be covered through flood insurance, and
therefore the role of the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) is important.
Themain goal of this full report is to assess the po-
tential construction and maintenance cost of differ-
ent flood management strategies. We will describe
measures and their costs for twomain strategies and
their derivates.
(1) Resilient Open City. This strategy consists
of measures that lower vulnerability by en-
hancing the building codes (elevation of
buildings and flood-proofing). Additionally,
tailored local-scale flood protection measures
can complement the strategy to protect crit-
ical infrastructure that falls outside building
code policies. Such flood protection measures
should have safety standards that are consis-
tent with providing protection against at least
the 1/100 year storm surge.
(2) Storm surge barriers. This strategy aims
to develop storm surge barriers and can
be complemented with additional protection
measures.
The strategies described in this special issue do not
provide the complete overview of all possible strate-
gies and theirmeasures, nor havewe assessed all cost
categories that pertain to these strategies. For exam-
ple, two issues are not included: economic benefits,
and the considerable administrative and planning
costs associated with climate adaptation. However,
the strategies outlined in this research provide a
range of possible visions and their associated costs
on flood riskmanagement solutions forNYC. These
strategies vary in their risk approach, from reducing
vulnerability to houses and infrastructure to pri-
oritizing large scale levees for protecting the City.
Within this range, a numberof combinationsof pro-
tection and resilience measures are possible, often
dependent on geographical situations in the areas
to be protected. The surge barrier strategies were
developed for a storm surge barrier conference in
2009 (Hill et al., 2013) and updated using expert
interviews with the experts that designed the barri-
ers. The other strategies were partly developed in a
series of bilateral expert consultations and seminars
(Appendix H) with stakeholders in the years 2011
and 2012 (and thus partly before the impact from
Hurricane Sandy). Within these meetings, the aim
was tofind strategies that reduceflood risk as the sin-
gle criterion. We do address other criteria that play
a role in developing flood management strategies,
such as environmental effects or socio-economic
factors but have not valued them in an economic
analysis. In addition, intangible factors may play a
role in developing strategies such as whether or not
the strategy adds value to the green infrastructure
of the City, which may enhance living conditions
(Nordenson, et al., 2010). All of these other crite-
ria were not quantified and must be considered in
follow-up studies in order toderive a comprehensive
idea of the advantages anddisadvantages of different
flood management strategies.
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All storm surge barrier strategies require cooper-
ation between government institutions in the states
of New York (NY) and New Jersey (NJ), since they
link to land of both states. Moreover, all three bar-
rier strategies protect people and economic assets
in parts of both the states of NY and NJ, and hence
benefits of investing in storm surge barriers pertain
to areas in both NYC and NJ.
All summary cost tables are in US$ 2012 values.
Indexing was applied using the Construction Cost
Index fromENR (EngineeringNews-Record, http://
enr.construction.com/economics). The CCI annual
escalation rate was set to 2.4%, on May 2nd 2013.
1.2 Description of different Flood
Management Strategies
Strategy 1,ResilientOpenCity aims at creating a re-
silient waterfront by keeping channels and estuaries
open as long as possible. This is achieved by en-
hancing building codes and zoning regulations and
some additional measures that reduce the vulner-
ability of buildings and infrastructure in the flood
zones, such as local levees. The floodproofing and
elevation measures will be implemented in flood
zones that are currently classified by FEMA as the
1/100, aswell as the 1/500 flood zones in order to an-
ticipate climate change (current building code poli-
cies only pertain to the current 1/100 flood zones).
Large-scale storm surge barriers are not considered.
The rationale behind this strategy is that it connects
well to current policies and governance structures.
Moreover, by investing in buildings and infrastruc-
ture, the flood adaptationmeasures add value to the
city. For example, through innovations such as green
(or soft) infrastructure (Nordenson et al., 2010), the
NYC waterfront will be developed into a resilient
coastal area against storm surges, which is also in-
creasingly attractive to citizens (NYC-DCP, 2011).
By only increasing resilience of buildings and infras-
tructure, parts of the city can still be flooded, but
it is assumed that flood damage will be lower com-
pared to the damage from a Hurricane like Sandy,
because of stricter building codes. Moreover, since
infrastructure will be protected, the economic losses
from a storm surge will be limited with relatively
minor business interruptions. The Resilient Open
City strategy has been divided into three alterna-
tives, Strategies 1a, 1b, and 1c.
Strategy 1a: Resilient Open City: upgrading
building codes
Strategy 1a Resilient Open City (Figure 1.1) aims
at estimating only the cost of various building
code measures in the 1/100 and 1/500 flood zones,
to lower the vulnerability of buildings. Measures
include:
a. 1/100 and 1/500 flood zone: elevation of the
base floor of houses (+2,+4 ft, or+6 ft) above
base flood elevation (BFE);
b. 1/100 and 1/500 flood zone: dry- and wet
floodproofing (lowering vulnerability) for dif-
ferent heights (+2, +4 ft, or +6 ft);
c. The measures are applied to existing and new
buildings.
Strategy 1b: Resilient Open City+: protecting
infrastructure
As in Strategy 1a, the Resilient Open City+ strategy
aims at implementing floodproofing and elevation
measures in zones that are currently classified as the
1/100 and the 1/500 flood zones. These measures
are applied to existing and new buildings. How-
ever, the ‘+’refers to additional measures needed to
protect critical infrastructure. Since a lot of vulner-
able infrastructure remains unprotected in Strategy
1a, Strategy 1b Resilient Open City+ (Figure 1.2),
aims at enhancing resilience of critical infrastruc-
ture, such as power-plants, subways, water treat-
ment plants, airports, etc. This is performed using
local scale adaptation measures that protect these
facilities. We use the proposed adaptation measures
and their costs provided by the infrastructure com-
panies and authorities, such as elevating or sealing
tunnel entrances, small scale levees or the hardening
of power lines. Large-scale storm surge barriers are
not considered. Measures include:
a. 1/100 and 1/500 flood zones: elevation of the
base floor of houses (+2 ft, +4 ft, or +6 ft)
above base flood elevation (BFE);
b. 1/100 and 1/500 flood zones: dry and wet
floodproofing (lowering vulnerability);
c. The measures are applied to existing and new
buildings;
d. Local-scale floodadaptationmeasures that en-
hance the resilience of critical infrastructure,
such as power plants, water treatment plants,
transport infrastructure andmedical facilities.
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Figure 1.1. Strategy 1a: Resilient Open City.
Strategy 1c: A Hybrid Solution
Strategy 1c (S1c, Figure 1.3) anticipates to the un-
certainty of future developments, and combines el-
ements of the Resilient Open City strategies and
some local scale protection measures from the
barrier strategies (S2a,b,c). Such a Hybrid Strat-
egy aims at keeping options open because of the
uncertainty of future scenarios. By keeping all op-
tions open, either (a) building codes can be further
enhanced in the future with additional local scale
protection measures or (b) storm surge barriers can
be developed.
Since in a potential barrier strategy, low lying
areas behind the barriers are still vulnerable to sea
level rise, additional protectionmeasures are needed
to protect these low lying areas. Hybrid Strategy
1c (S1c), therefore, starts implementing some lo-
cal flood protection measures, such as levees and
beach nourishment, that are also part of the storm
surge barrier strategy. Because these measures are
needed anyway, they can be referred to as ‘no re-
gret’ measures. In addition, the locations of future
storm surge barriers will remain open space (e.g.
park land) such that room is available for those
structures. The difference between the local adap-
tation measures in strategy 1b is that the no regret
measures in this strategy include levees locatedalong
the coastline, protecting all buildings and infrastruc-
ture behind the local levees, whereas in strategy 1b
adaptationmeasures refer tomeasures only targeted
at protecting particular infrastructure. By investing
in buildings and infrastructure, theflood adaptation
8
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Figure 1.2. Strategy 1b: Resilient Open City+.
measures add value to the city. For example through
innovations such as green infrastructure, the NYC
waterfront will be developed into a resilient coastal
area against storm surges, which is also increasingly
attractive to citizens (NYC-DCP, 2011). By only in-
creasing resilience of buildings and infrastructure,
parts of the city can still be flooded, but it is assumed
this damage will be minor compared to the damage
from a hurricane like Sandy. Moreover, since infras-
tructure will be protected, the economic losses from
a storm surge will be limited, with relatively minor
business interruptions.
For S1c, AHybrid Solution, only freeboard build-
ing code levels (maximum +4 ft) for new buildings
are required in the 1/100 A zone. Higher freeboard
levels for new buildings (maximum +6 ft) will be
applied in the 1/100 V zone. These building codes
only pertain to new structures in the 1/100 flood
zone and not in the 1/500 flood zone. In addition,
we apply wet flood proofing of +2 ft to existing
buildings in the 1/100 A zones. Measures include:
a. 1/100 A flood zone: elevation of the base floor
of new houses (+4 ft) above base flood el-
evation (BFE); wet floodproofing of existing
buildings of +2 ft;
b. 1/100 V flood zone: elevation of the base floor
of new houses (+6 ft) above base flood eleva-
tion (BFE);
c. No-regret measures that strengthen beaches
through sand nourishments in The
Rockaways;
d. Protect low lying areaswith levees, for example
in Red Hook, Hoboken, and Manhattan;
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences. 9
Flood management strategies for New York City Aerts et al.
Figure 1.3. Strategy 1c: A Hybrid Solution.
e. Infrastructure enhancements and protection;
and
f. Measures that minimize environmental im-
pacts: these pertain predominantly to main-
taining salt marshes and wetlands in the Ja-
maica Bay area.
Strategies 2a, 2b, 2c: Storm surge barriers
Strategies 2a, 2b, 2c, Storm surge barriers, aim
at lowering flood probabilities as the goal of the
measures is to withstand a flood with a certain de-
sign probability. Storm surge barriers do not pro-
tect people and assets against wind damage, nor do
they protect against inland flooding from precipita-
tion. All three strategies have different sets of storm
surge barriers at the core and, in addition, protective
measures that complement the barriers. These addi-
tional measures include levees, beach nourishment,
bulkhead upgrade, etc. (see e.g. Aerts et al., 2009).
The storm surge barrier strategies are adapted from
the proposals made during the 2009 Storm Surge
Barrier conference (Hill et al., 2013). Strategy 2a,
Environmental dynamics, consists of three barriers
that would work in concert to close off NYC from
the waterways and, in addition, aims to preserve the
wetland dynamics of Jamaica Bay. This strategy can
be expanded in Strategy 2b, Bay closed, by a fourth
barrier that closes off Jamaica Bay. Strategy 2c,
NJ-NY connect, replaces three barriers from Strat-
egy 2b and would reduce the length of the shore-
line considerably, thereby protecting a larger area.
In the flood protection strategies in this research,
10
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each individual protection measure must be de-
signed so that it can withstand what are called ‘de-
sign water levels’. We have selected a design water
level that belongs to a storm like Hurricane Sandy,
but assuming additional climate change effects. The
design water level is, therefore, composed of dif-
ferent components: maximum surge level belong-
ing to a future Sandy-type storm, wave height, and
sea level rise. Maximum surge height has been set
to a robust 20 ft above MSL. In addition, we pro-
pose here to heighten design levels due to future
sea level rise and an additional wave height to 25–
30 ft (7.5–10 m). It should be noted that storm
water levels vary spatially around New York (Orton
et al., 2012), although this effect is small compared
to the design level chosen in this study. Moore et
al. (1981) show, for instance, that water levels for
a 1/100 storm vary roughly between 8 ft (Jamaica
Bay) and 13 ft (East River between Queens and the
Bronx).
Strategy 2a: Environmental dynamics
This strategy starts as Strategy 2a (Figure 1.4), and
aims at maintaining the ecosystem dynamics of Ja-
maica Bay and its salt marshes. Landscape restora-
tion and stabilization is an important means to
maintain the ‘open’ system character of Jamaica Bay
in the long term. A ‘closed’ defense system pro-
vides protection for a larger area, but even if it
were to be equipped with gates to let water flow
through the structure, it would still be a partial
morphological and ecological barrier, thereby pos-
sibly losing (some) of their important ecological
areas (Dijkman, 2007). Therefore, this strategy is
Figure 1.4. Strategy 2a: Environmental dynamics.
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences. 11
Flood management strategies for New York City Aerts et al.
designed such that the lower NY Bay will remain
open, and the tidal currents of Jamaica Bay Inlet
will not be disturbed by a storm surge barrier. Three
storm surge barriers will be installed: at Arthur Kill,
Verrazano Narrows, and East River. The strategy,
furthermore, predominately uses measures that
maintain the character of the natural beaches with
periodic sand nourishment. Both Coney Island and
the Rockaways are not protected by storm surge bar-
riers, but their beaches will be nourished, backed by
a berm or artificially created dune of 25–30 ft. Salt
marches in Jamaica Bay will be stabilized and re-
stored periodically. The urban areas around Jamaica
Bay, aswell as JFK airportwill be protected by levees.
The design height for the levees in the Jamaica Bay
area are 2–3 ft lower compared to the regular design
level, since surge water levels in the Bay are generally
lower than those on the coast near the Rockaways
(Moore et al., 1981). Where levees are already in
place, they will be upgraded to the new design lev-
els. On the inside (landward side) of the protection
system (mainly Staten Island, Manhattan, Brooklyn
and the Bronx), low spots will be upgraded by +3
ft, through reinforcing bulkheads, levees, or landfill.
This is necessary to accommodate increasing water
levels caused by Hudson River discharge during the
closure of the barrier system.
Strategy 2b: Bay closed
The strategy continues in Strategy 2b (Figure 1.5)
when sea level surpasses +3 ft compared with
current MSL. At that point, according to this
strategy, it will no longer be viable to maintain
the Jamaica Bay wetlands and its salt marshes.
Figure 1.5. Strategy 2b: Bay closed.
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Figure 1.6. Strategy 2c: NY-NJ connect.
Hence, large-scale protectionworks andmarshland-
stabilizing activities in Jamaica Bay will be can-
celled and, instead, an additional storm surge bar-
rier will be installed across the Jamaica Bay Inlet. An
additional advantage is that Coney Island and the
Rockaways will be directly connected by road or
rail infrastructure. As in Strategy 2a, low spots on
the inside of the protection system (mainly Staten
Island, Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx), will
be upgraded by reinforcing bulkheads, levees, or by
landfill.
Strategy 2c: NY-NJ connect
The aim of this strategy is to reduce the length of
the coastline of the NYC area as much as possi-
ble. The rationale for this strategy is that, by doing
this, flood protection costs can be minimized. The
three barriers described in Strategy 2b (Arthur Kill,
Verrazano Narrows, and Jamaica Bay Inlet) are re-
placed by one large barrier that connects Sandy
Hook in NJ and the tip of the Rockaways in
Queens, NY. This strategy protects the largest area,
including parts of NJ. Apart from flood protec-
tion, the barrier will be constructed with road
and/or rail infrastructure that connects NJ with
NYC. As in Strategy 1c, lower spots (bulkheads, lev-
ees, or landfill) on the inside of the protection sys-
tem (mainly Staten Island, Manhattan, Brooklyn,
and the Bronx) will be elevated by +1–3 ft to
accommodate for rising water levels caused by
Hudson River peak discharges during a storm
event.
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences. 13
Flood management strategies for New York City Aerts et al.
Table 1.1. Total costs for all flood management strategies (all in $ 2012 values)
S1a. R. S1b R. S2a S2b Bay S2c NJ-NY
City City+ S1c Hybrida Env. Dyn. closed connect
Total cost NYC $0.5–4.4 bn $6.9–11.1 bn $6.4–7.6 bn $16.9–21.1 bn $15.9–21.8 bn $11.0–14.7 bn
Total cost NJ $0.2–2 bn $4 bn $4 bn $2 bn $2 bn
Total NJ-NYC $0.7–6.4 bn $10.9–15.1 bn $10.4–11.6 bn $18.9–23.1 bn $17.9–23.8 bn $11.0–14.7 bn
Maintenance protection 1 mln/yr $2 mln/yr $13.5 mln/yr 98.5 mln/yr 126 mln/yr 117.5 mln/yr
NJ-NYC
aCost estimates for Strategy 1c, Hybrid Solution, are described in Appendix L.
1.3 Total costs flood management
strategies
Table 1.1 summarizes the estimated overall costs
for the six different flood management strategies
for NYC, NJ, and the combination of NYC and NJ.
Detailed cost estimations of these strategies are pro-
vided in papers 2, 3, and 5 of this report. If we
focus on the strategies that include protection in-
frastructure, overall cost for NYC ranges between
$6.4–11.1 bn for the Resilient Open City Strategies
1b and 1c and $11–21.8 bn for storm surge bar-
rier Strategies 2a,b,c. When including costs for NJ,
the ranges become $10.4–15.1 and $11–23.8 bn for
the Strategies 1b,c and Strategies 2a,b,c, respectively.
This shows the cost ranges of theResilientOpenCity
strategy types are generally lower as compared to
Strategies 2a,b,c. Furthermore, yearly maintenance
costs are higher for the barrier strategies as com-
pared to Strategies 1b,c. The reason part of NJ is in-
cluded in the cost analyses is that thedifferentbarrier
strategies alsoprotectparts ofNJ (Raritan–Hoboken
area). In a comparative analysis of strategies (e.g. a
cost benefit analyses, CBA), benefits are often ex-
pressed as the reduced flood risk. Since the barriers
protect parts of NJ, benefits of reduced flood risk
are achieved both in NYC and parts of NJ. Hence, in
order to compare costs of storm surge barrier strate-
gies with Resilient Open City strategies, we need to
include costs for adaptation in NJ as well. Note that
the costs for the barriers strategies are theoretically
joint costs forNJ andNYCas they protect large parts
of both States. They are here listed under NYC, in
order to compare the order of magnitude of costs
with the building code costs for NYC.
1.4 Overall Cost of Resilient Open City
strategies
The costs for Strategy 1a are relatively low for NYC
($0.5–4.4 bn) and NYC-NJ ($0.7–6.4 bn). This is
due to the fact that measures only include those
that lower vulnerability of buildings, and not in-
frastructure. If we take the Strategy 1a, Open Re-
silient City, as a basis, we may add costs for mea-
sures that protect or upgrade (createmore resilience
of) the critical infrastructure. The total adaptation
cost for the various proposed infrastructure utili-
ties in NYC and the Hoboken–Raritan River areas
of New Jersey are estimated at $2.9–$6.4 bn (in total
$9.3 bn), which are lower than the total estimated
adaptation costs for the states of NJ (2012) and NY
(2012): $9 bn forNYand$7.4 bn forNJ, respectively,
adding up to $16.4 bn. Note, however, that these are
very preliminary estimates and, probably, some cost
categories for adaptation are missing. For exam-
ple, adaptationmeasures for parks and wetlands are
not included. These rough estimates, therefore, only
provide an indication of the potential size of the re-
quired budget for adaption. For NYC only the total
costs (building code + infrastructure) would be in
the range of $6.9–11.1 bn (Strategy 1b) and $6.4–
7.6 bn (Strategy 1c, Hybrid Solution). Strategy 1c
is cheaper compared to Strategy 1b, since building
codes only pertain to new buildings. Hybrid Strat-
egy 1c also implements protectionmeasures, and the
maintenance costs for these additional protections
have been set to $13.5 mln/yr.
The three main building code measures consid-
ered in this study—elevation, wet floodproofing,
and dry floodproofing—are consistent with actual
building code policies in NYC. We have estimated
the costs of the application of each measure for 2 ft,
4 ft, and 6 ft above the current height of the low-
est floor of the buildings. A distinction has been
made between the costs of applying the floodproof-
ing measure for all buildings in the 1/100 or 1/500
year flood zones. Current flood-resistant building
regulations apply only to the 1/100 year flood zone,
but given the expected increase in flood zones due
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to sea level rise it is relevant to explore floodproof-
ing strategies in the current 1/500 year flood zone.
A further distinction that we make is whether the
floodproofing measure is applied to existing or new
constructions.
The objective of elevating a house is to raise the
lowest floor in order to prevent floodwaters from
entering the living areas. The elevation of existing
buildings can entail leaving the house in its existing
position and constructing a new raised floor within
the house or by lifting the entire house, including
the floor. It is the costs of this latter method that are
examined in this study. The costs of thismeasure are
very substantial and range between $2.3 bn and $2.6
bn for the 1/100 flood zone and between $1.3 bn and
$1.5 bn for the 1/500 flood zone. The estimated ele-
vation costs for the 1/500 zone reflect only the costs
of elevation in that zone, anddonot include the costs
of elevating buildings in the 1/100 zone. The cost es-
timates for 4 ft and6 ft elevation arenotmuchhigher
than the 2 ft elevation costs, so if this measure were
implemented it is probably best to elevate to a high
level. However, overall the costs of elevating existing
buildings are very high, meaning that it is of interest
to explore other floodproofing strategies.Moreover,
we estimated costs for elevating new buildings that
have been projected to be newly built by the year
2040. The costs of this measure range between $80
mln and $230 mln for the 1/100 flood zone and be-
tween $30 mln and $100 mln for the 1/500 flood
zone. These costs are substantially lower than the
costs of elevating all existing buildings for two rea-
sons: (1) the number of projected new buildings
is only a small proportion of the existing building
stock; and (2) the average per building costs of el-
evating new building is much lower than elevating
existing buildings.
Wet floodproofing entails modifying parts of a
house so that floodwaters can enter but cause only
minimal damage to the house and its contents. In
our cost calculations we assumed that wet proof-
ing is undertaken when a building is substantially
renovated and finish materials need to be replaced
anyway. In that case, wet floodproofing costs include
adding wall openings for the entry and exit of flood-
waters, installing pumps, rearranging or relocating
utility systems, moving large appliances, and mak-
ing it easier to clean-up after floodwaters recede.
The costs of wet floodproofing all existing buildings
range between $250mln and $980mln for the 1/100
flood zone and between $150 mln and $590 mln for
the 1/500 flood zone. The costs of wet floodproof-
ing existing houses are substantially lower than the
costs of elevating these homes. Wet floodproofing
costs are more sensitive to the height up to which
the measures are applied than is the case for eleva-
tion. The costs of wet floodproofing new buildings
range between $65 mln and $260 mln for the 1/100
flood zone and between $30 mln and $110 mln for
the 1/500 flood zone.
Dry floodproofing a building means that the
flood-prone parts of the house have been made wa-
tertight, so that floodwaters cannot enter the build-
ing. The costs of dry floodproofing existing build-
ings range between $640 mln and $980 mln for
the 1/100 flood zone and between $380 mln and
$580 mln for the 1/500 flood zone. The costs of
dry flood-proofing existing houses are substantially
lower than the cost of elevating these houses. Dry
floodproofing is more costly than wet floodproof-
ing for floodproofing heights of 2 ft and 4 ft, but is
about the same forfloodproofingup to6 ft.The costs
of dry flood-proofing new buildings range between
$170 mln and $260 mln for the 1/100 flood zone
and between $70 mln and $110 mln for the 1/500
flood zone. The difference between the total costs of
floodproofing these new residential buildings com-
pared with existing buildings only arises because
of differences in the number of buildings that are
floodproofed.
Future research could examine how these build-
ing code strategies can bemade consistent with cur-
rent NFIP and NYC building code regulations; fea-
sibility of the elevation requirements in terms of
ensuring adequate building access for disabled peo-
ple and building connections with streets and utility
systems; effectiveness of these measures under a va-
riety of flood conditions; andNYCresident attitudes
toward the implementation of these floodproofing
measures.
1.5 Storm surge barriers strategies
The costs for the storm surge barrier strategies vary
from$16.9–$21.1 bn for Strategy 2a, Environmental
Dynamics, to $11.0–$14.7 bn for Strategy 2c, NJ–
NY Connect. The latter strategy is relatively cheap
since it contains less additional protectionmeasures.
The movable parts in a storm surge barrier (sluices,
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences. 15
Flood management strategies for New York City Aerts et al.
gates, etc.) largely determine costs of the barriers,
and empirical data on existing storm surge barriers
show the unit costs price of movable parts varies be-
tween $1.9 and $3.53 bn per km, depending on the
types of gates and sluices. Furthermore, the costs
of the additional measures are determined by the
required length of additional protection measures
(levees, beach strengthening, etc.) that complement
the storm surge barriers. With Strategy 2c, NJ-NY
Connect, the vulnerable coastline is shortened quite
dramatically, with the largest protected area in both
NJ and NYC behind the two barriers. This means
that additional costs are the lowest because fewer
additional protectionmeasures are needed. Further-
more, it will be interesting to assess the benefits (re-
duced flood risk) of Strategy 2c, since it protects the
largest parts ofNJ, compared to Strategies 2a and 2b.
The advantage of Strategies 2a and 2b (with Strategy
2b being a follow up of 2a) is that it aims at leaving
Jamaica Bay open as long a possible, without any
interference of a large barrier that hinders estuarine
flows and sediment transport. It can be an argument
to invest more in Strategy 2a (and later on 2b) in
order to protect the natural values of Jamaica Bay.
However, this needs detailed valuation studies to de-
termine the ecological values of Jamaica Bay, prefer-
ably expressing these values in monetary units. In
all areas that will be protected with storm surge bar-
riers, no building code measures are required, and
only additional protection measures are needed in
the low lying areas. These protection measures have
two purposes. (1) In the event of a storm surge, with
a closureof thebarriers, theHudsonandother tribu-
tary river still flow in theHudson Bay. BecauseHud-
sonwaterwill be trapped behind the barriers for 24–
48hours (thedurationof a stormsurge),water levels
on the landward side of the barrierswill risewith 1 ft.
(2) Sea level rise will increase vulnerability in the
protected areas. Since the barriers are open dur-
ing non-storm conditions, future sea levels will rise
through this open barrier system, thereby increasing
flood risk in low lying areas.
The cost estimates by engineering companies that
made the conceptual designs for the barriers are
generally lower than those made on the basis of em-
pirical unit cost prices. This can be explained by
the additional maintenance costs that were not in-
cluded in first cost estimates (e.g. East River barrier
design), contingencies thatwere not included in cost
estimates, possible surcharges on labor costs that are
generally higher in NYC as compared to other loca-
tions in the US, and the uncertainty of the length
of movable parts. For example, the total length of
movable parts in the Outer Harbor barrier in Strat-
egy 2c is 2 km.However, in the conceptual design, as
well as in recent expert meeting, the required length
of sluices might be longer due to possible flow dis-
turbances of tides. We have, therefore, increased the
length of movable parts to 3 km (on a total length
of 9.5 km).
The following fourmain issues related todevelop-
ing storm surge barriers need additional attention.
(1) Permitting and legislation; studies need to as-
sess what permits are needed. (2) Maintenance and
institutional issues; this refers to the issue who is
maintaining the barriers and who bears the costs
for maintenance. (3) Environmental issues; detailed
hydrological studies need to show the effect of bar-
riers on water quality, tidal current, and sediment
budgets, and impacts on environmental values in
Jamaica Bay and NY Harbor. (4) A barrier might
fail, and thus studies need to assess what reliability
is required (expressed in failure probability). The
higher the reliability, the higher will be the final
construction costs. These issues are open for future
research.
References
Aerts, J.C.J.H., Lin, N., Botzen, W.J.W., Emannuel, K. and de
Moel, H. (2013). Low probability flood-risk modeling for
New York City. Risk Analyses, 33(5): 772–788.
Aerts, J.C.J.H. and Botzen, W.J.W. (2012). Hurricane Irene: A
wake up call for New York City? Natural Hazards and Earth
System Sciences, 12: 1837–1840.
Aerts, J.C.J.H. and BotzenW.J. (2011). Flood-resilient waterfront
development in New York City: Bridging flood insurance,
building codes, and flood zoning. Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences, 1227(2011): 1–82.
Aerts, J.C.J.H., Major, David C., Bowman, Malcolm, Dircke, Piet
and Marfai, M.A. (2009). Connecting Delta Cities: Coastal
Cities, Flood Risk Management, and Adaptation to Climate
Change (Free University of Amsterdam Press, September,
2009).
Burby, R.J. (2000). Rising tide: The great Mississipi flood of 1927
and it changed America. Journal of the American Planning
Association, 66(3): 337–339.
Dijkman, J. (2007).ADutch perspective on coastal Louisiana flood
risk reduction and landscape stabilization. London: United
States Army – EUROPEAN RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE
US ARMY, 2007, 286.
16
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences.
Aerts et al. Flood management strategies for New York City
NPCC. (2009). Climate Risk Information. New York City
Panel onClimate Change (NPCC). http://www.nyc.gov/html/
om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf.
Gornitz, V., Couch, S. and Hartig, E. (2002) Impacts of sea level
rise in the New York City metropolitan area. Global and Plan-
etary Changes, 32: 61–88.
Hill, D., Bowman, M. and Khinda, J. (2013). Kindha, J.S. (2009)
Against the Deluge: Storm Surge Barriers to Protect New York
City. ASCE Proceedings of the 2009 Seminar and Exibition,
NewYorkCity 2009 (http://www.ascemetsection.org/content/
view/274/725/#2009)
IPCC (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disas-
ters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report
of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
New York.
Kron, W. (2002). Flood risk = hazard x exposure x vulnerability.
Water International, 30(1): 58–68.
Kunreuther,H.C. (2009). Reducing losses from catastrophic risks
through long-term insurance and mitigation. Social Research,
75(3): 819–854.
Kunz, M., Mu¨hr, B., Kunz-Plapp, T., Daniell, J.E., Khazai, B.,
Wenzel, F., Vannieuwenhuyse, M., Comes, T., Elmer, F.,
Schro¨ter, K., Fohringer, J., Mu¨nzberg, T., Lucas, C. and
Zschau, J. (2013). Investigation of superstorm Sandy 2012
in a multi-disciplinary approach. Natural Hazards and Earth
Systen Sciences, 1: 625–679, doi:10.5194/nhessd-1-625-2013.
Moore, Ch. I., Dendrow, S.A and Taylor, R.S. (1981). New York
City Insurance study, Report no. 7. Total Still water fre-
quency elevations implementation and results. Prepared for
NYCDEC, contract no. D-142683. Camp dresser andMcKee,
November 1981.
Nicholls, R.J., Hanson, S., Herweijer, C., Patmore, N.,
Hallegatte, S., Corfee-Morlot, J., Chaˆteau, J. and Muir-Wood,
R. (2008). Ranking port cities with high exposure and vulner-
ability to climate extremes: exposure estimates. Paris, France:
Organisation for Economic and Co-operative development
(OECD), 62 pp. (Environment Directorate Working Papers,
(ENV/WKP(2007)1)).
NJ (2012). http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/552012/
approved/20121128e.html
NOAA (2005). Population Trends Along the Coastal United
States: 1980–2008. http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/
mb/pdfs/1_front_matter_introduction.pdf
Nordenson, Guy, C. Seavitt and Adam Yarinsky, with S. Cassell,
L. Hodges, M. Koch, J. Smith, M. Tantala, and R. Veit (2010).
On theWater: Palisade Bay. New York: MetropolitanMuseum
of Art.
NYC-DCP (2006). New York City Population Projections by
Age/Sex and Borough, 2000–2030. The City of New York –
Department of City Planning, 2006.
NYC-DCP (2011). Vision 2020: New York City Comprehensive
Waterfront Plan. NewYork CityDepartment of City Planning,
New York.
NYS (2012) www.legislativegazette.com/Articles-Top_Stories-c-
2012-11-27-82276.113122-New-York-officials-seek-42B-to-
aid-in-Sandy-recovery.html
Orton, P., N., Georgas, A., Blumberg and J., Pullen (2012). De-
tailed Modeling of Recent Severe Storm Tides in Estuar-
ies of the New York City Region. J. Geophys. Res., 117(C9),
doi:10.1029/2012JC008220.
Paudel, Y., Aerts, J. and Botzen, W. (2012). Public private catas-
trophe insurance. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 37:
257–285.
Poussin, J., Ward, Ph. and Aerts, J.C.J.H. (2012). Flood risk and
Damage mitigation in the Meuse basin. Natural Hazards and
Earth System Sciences. In press.
Rosenzweig, C., Solecki, W., Hammer, S.A. and Mehrotra, S.
(2010). Cities lead the way in climate-change action. Nature,
467: 909–911.
Thieken, A.H., Petrow, T., Kreibich, H. and Merz, B.
(2006). Insurability and mitigation of flood losses in pri-
vate households in Germany. Risk Analysis, 26(2): 383–
395.
UNISDR (2011). GAR 2011. Global Assessment Report on Dis-
aster Risk Reduction. Revealing Risk, Redefining Development.
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Secretariat, Geneva.
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences. 17

Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. ISSN 0077-8923
ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Issue:Cost Estimates for Flood Resilience and Protection Strategies in New York City
2. Cost estimates of Strategy Open Resilient City
Wouter Botzen, Jeroen Aerts, and Hans de Moel
VU University Amsterdam, Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), De Boelelaan 1087, 1081HV Amsterdam
2.1 Introduction
An alternative flood risk management strategy for
installing storm surge barriers or other types of
floodwalls comprises the use of building codes to
make structures more resistant to flooding. These
building code strategies have a different influence on
the flood risk distribution than storm surge barriers
or other flood prevention measures. Flood preven-
tion aims to lower the probability that a damaging
flood occurs (hazard), while building code strate-
gies aim to limit the potential damage fromflooding
(vulnerability of the assets exposed). Several studies
have shown that considerable flood and storm dam-
age can be saved if more stringent building codes
are being adopted in the flood-prone regions in the
USA (Burby, 2006; Kunreuther et al., 2009). Aerts
and Botzen (2011) have discussed the usefulness of
upgrading flood-resistant building codes for NYC
in particular, but did not estimate the costs of such
strategies, as will be done here.
Here we examine the costs of implementing a
variety of flood-proofingmeasures that can be taken
at the building level. In particular, the average costs
of these flood-proofing measures will be estimated
per individual building type. This provides insight
into the average costs that homeowners incur if they
take such a measure. Moreover, the total cost of
implementing a specific flood-proofing strategy on
a flood zone level is estimated. These cost estimates
can be interpreted as the costs of implementing a
specificbuilding codepolicy forNYC.The reason for
providing these costs on the flood-zone level is that
current NYC flood-resistant building codes, as well
as the construction rules imposed by the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), are defined per
flood zone.
2.2 Current NYC flood-resistant building
codes
NYC flood-resistant building codes are discussed in
detail by Aerts and Botzen (2011), and are briefly
summarized here. Minimum building code stan-
dards in NYC have been designed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) because
NYC participates in the NFIP. This implies that
buildings in NYC have to comply with NFIP build-
ing regulations. Building codes apply to new struc-
tures and substantial improvements of structures
that exceed 50% of the value of the building before
the work started. Building code policies apply to the
1/100 year floodplains, which are the A and V zones
depicted on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps that are
designed by FEMA. V zones are coastal zones where
the impacts of flood velocity and waves on struc-
tures need to be considered in building regulations
(Nadal andZapata, 2010). Such impacts donot need
to be considered in A zones. The main requirement
by the NFIP is that new constructions in the 1/100
year floodplain need to be elevated to the Baseline
Flood Elevation (BFE), which equals the height of
the expected water level during a flood that occurs
on average once in 100 years.
The NYC Department of Buildings (DOB) can
propose building regulations that go beyond NFIP
requirements, which can come into effect after
approval by the City Council. Since 1983 NYC
flood-resistant building codes have become effec-
tive. These additional building code regulations for
NYC can be divided in three main categories: (1)
elevating buildings above the BFE, which is called
‘freeboard’; (2) wet floodproofing which aims to
minimize the damage once water enters the build-
ing; and (3)dryfloodproofingwhichaims toprevent
floodwaters from entering the building. Specific re-
quirements can differ per flood zone and building
type (Aerts and Botzen, 2011).
Consistent with the NFIP requirements, the NYC
building code stipulates that new buildings in
NYC have to be elevated to the BFE. These min-
imum elevation requirements apply to buildings
that pose a low hazard to human life (agricul-
ture, temporary buildings and storage facilities) and
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residential buildings. Stricter elevation require-
ments apply to certain building types that pose a
substantial hazard to human life in case of failure
(e.g. schools and power stations), and essential facil-
ities (e.g. hospitals, fire and police stations, shelters,
and facilities for national defense), which should,
respectively, be elevated by+1 ft and+2 ft higher in
the A zone. Building parts that lie below the level of
these elevation requirements in theA zone shouldbe
wet floodproofed. Alternatively, dry floodproofing
can be applied in the A zone, which should pre-
vent water from entering the building during floods
with water heights that are up to the elevation re-
quirements per building type. Currently, dry flood-
proofing is not an option for making buildings with
solely a residential use comply with building code
requirements, but this is allowed for other building
types. An advantage of dry floodproofing is that it
is possible to use building space below the BFE.
NYC building codes are stricter in V zones where
structures have to withstand high-velocity wave ac-
tion during floods. In V zones new buildings are ele-
vated on pilings or columns to ensure that waves can
flow underneath the building. The requirements for
elevation heights are the same as those inA zones for
buildings that pose a low hazard to human life and
residential buildings (namely, elevate to the BFE).
Elevation requirements for building types that pose
a substantial hazard to human life in case of failure
and essential facilities are for both types+1 ft above
the BFE if the floor is located parallel to the direction
of the waves, or +2 ft if this location is perpendicu-
lar. As in A zones, building parts located below these
elevation requirements should be wet floodproofed.
A difference with A zones is that wet floodproofing
of building types that pose a substantial hazard to
human life in case of failure and essential facilities
should be implemented up to +1 ft above the
elevation requirements. Current regulations do not
allow for dry floodproofing in V zones.
AfterHurricane Sandy, on31 January 2013Mayor
Bloomberg announcednewmeasures to allowhome
andproperty ownerswho are rebuilding tomeet up-
dated flood standards.a These measures include the
removal of the “zoning height penalty” as has been
proposed by Aerts and Botzen (2011). Before this
ahttp://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935
b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor
_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F
announcement, elevation of buildings was not al-
ways allowed by zoning regulations that put limits
on the height of a building. This zoning regulation
has been suspended by the Mayor using an emer-
gency executive order.Moreover, the emergency rule
requires that new construction or buildings with
substantial damage are built at least one foot above
the flood elevation that is currently required in the
building code. This means that “freeboard” has be-
come required for new residential buildings in the
1/100floodzone, ashasbeen recommendedbyAerts
and Botzen (2011).
Types of alternative flood-proofing strategies
per building type and flood zone
The costs of alternative flood-proofing strategies for
buildings are estimated for three main categories of
measures that are applied to a variety of building
types and flood zones, as Table 2.1 shows. This table
shows the kind of measures we study per building
type, for which we use the typology of occupancy
types for structures used in the HAZUS flood dam-
agemodel, which is themain flood riskmodel in the
USA (FEMA, 2009a). The three main measures—
elevation, wet floodproofing, and dry floodproofing
—are consistent with actual building codes poli-
cies in NYC (Section 1.1). The elevation of existing
buildings is only applicable to buildings that are
not too large to be lifted and, as Table 2.1 shows,
is therefore not applied in this study to large apart-
ment blocks and commercial building types. Wet
and dry floodproofing of existing buildings is ap-
plied to all building types. We realize that, in prac-
tice, the option of dry floodproofing of residential
buildings would currently not comply with NFIP
or NYC building code requirements. Nevertheless,
we include this floodproofing strategy in this re-
search since it is may be of interest to explore its
potential cost-effectiveness. For new constructions,
we assume that all three measures are applicable to
all residential building types. Floodproofing of new
commercial buildings is not studied here, since we
lack reliable projections of the future new commer-
cial building stock. In addition, we do not include
agriculture, industrial, religious, government, and
education structures in our study of floodproofing
measures because we lack reliable cost estimates for
%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2013a%
2Fpr044-13.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1
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Table 2.1. Combinations of studied floodproofing measures and HAZUS building types in NYC flood zones
HAZUS Flood-proofing Flood-proofing
of existing buildings of new buildings
(occupancy) Wet- Dry- Wet- Dry-
building class Description Elevation proofing proofing Elevation proofing proofing
Residential buildings
RES1 Single Family Dwelling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES2 Manuf. Housing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES3A Duplex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES3B Triplex/Quads Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES3C Multi-dwellings (5 to 9 units) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES3D Multi-dwellings (10 to 19 units) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES3E Multi-dwellings (20 to 49 units) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES3F Multi-dwellings (50+ units) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES4 Temporary Lodging Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES5 Institutional Dormitory Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RES6 Nursing Home Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commercial buildings
COM1 Retail Trade No Yes Yes No No No
COM2 Wholesale Trade No Yes Yes No No No
COM3 Personal and Repair Services No Yes Yes No No No
COM4 Professional/Technical Services No Yes Yes No No No
COM5 Banks No Yes Yes No No No
COM6 Hospital No Yes Yes No No No
COM7 Medical Office/Clinic No Yes Yes No No No
COM8 Entertainment & Recreation No Yes Yes No No No
COM9 Theaters No Yes Yes No No No
COM10 Parking No Yes Yes No No No
Applied in flood zone zone type: 1/100 A 1/100 A 1/100 A 1/100 A 1/100 A 1/100 A
and V zone, zone, and V zone, zone,
zone, and and zone, and and
and 1/500 1/500 1/500 and 1/500 1/500 1/500
applying suchmeasures to these building types.b We
feel that this exclusion does not limit the scope of
our study too much since these excluded buildings
comprise only about 10%of theNYC building stock
bIn terms of the HAZUS typology: IND1 (heavy indus-
trial), IND2 (light industrial), IND3 (food, drugs, and
chemicals), IND4(metals andminerals processing), IND5
(high technology), IND6 (construction), AGR1 (agri-
culture), REL1 (churches and other non-profit organi-
zations), GOV1 (general government services), GOV2
(emergency response), EDU1 (grade schools), and EDU2
(colleges and universities).
in the A and V zones. Elevation is applicable to both
A and V zones, while wet and dry floodproofing
is only studied for A zones since these stand-alone
measures are less effective to cope with high velocity
waves in V zones, especially if flood depths are high
(FEMA, 2009b).
Table 2.1 shows different heights of implemen-
tation of the measures, which reflect a stricter ap-
plication of current Building Code Regulations. We
now can explore the application of each measure
for 2 ft, 4 ft, and 6 ft above the current height of
existing buildings. It should be realized that, here,
this level of implementation is not explicitly related
to the BFE in a flood zone. In the case of existing
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buildings, the level of implementation implies that
theflood-proofingmeasurewill be appliedup to this
particular level (+2 ft, +4 ft, or +6 ft), in addition
to the current height of the building. For buildings
constructed after the 1983 Building Code came into
effect, this implies an additional height of flood-
proofing compared with the applied Building Code
standards (described in Section 2.2). For buildings
constructed before the 1983 Building Code came
into effect, this implies an application of flood-
proofing measures to buildings that are currently
not yet flood-proofed. Exceptions to this are rare
cases inwhichpre-1983buildingshavebeenbuilt ac-
cording to flood-resistant Building Code standards
because the buildings were substantially improvedc
and, therefore, in accordance with the Code, or in
which flood-proofing measures have already been
taken voluntarily. For new buildings the level of im-
plementation (+2 ft,+4 ft, or+6 ft) implies that the
flood-proofing measure is applied up to that level
in addition to the current height of the area where
the new building is being sited.
2.3 Cost estimates for elevation
Elevation of existing buildings
The objective of elevating a house is to raise the
lowest floor in order to prevent floodwaters from
entering the living areas. The elevation of existing
buildings can entail leaving the house in its existing
position and constructing a new raised floor within
the house or by lifting the entire house, including
the floor. It is the costs of this latter method that
are examined in this study. This method involves
separating a house from its foundations, raising the
house and temporarily supporting it, and creating
a new foundation or extending foundation below
the house. This method works well for houses that
were originally built on basement, crawlspace, and
cThis probably applies to few buildings because these
regulations for flood-proofing substantially-renovated
buildings are commonly side-stepped. These regulations
can be side-stepped easily by conducting improvements
to existing buildings in several phases, so that each phase
costs less than 50% of the market value of the building
before that construction phase started. For such renova-
tions, flood-resistant building codes do not apply (Aerts
and Botzen, 2011). Moreover, people rarely invest vol-
untarily in flood-proofing their homes, as discussed in
Kunreuther (1996) and Kunreuther et al. (2009).
Figure 2.1. A house that is elevated using a continuous wall
foundation (Source: FEMA, 2009b).
open foundations. The new foundation can consist
of continuous walls, separate piers, posts, columns,
or piles. Figure 2.1 shows an example of a house
that is substantially elevated using a continuous wall
foundation. If houses are built without a basement,
crawlspace, or open foundation, but instead have a
slab foundation, then both the house and the slab
can be lifted, or the house can be detached from
the slab and lifted and a new (elevated) slab can be
created.More details about these elevationmethods
can be found in FEMA (2009b).
Table 2.2 shows the approximate costs of elevat-
ing different building types, as reported in FEMA
(2009b). These costs are applicable to elevation on
both continuous wall and open foundations. These
costs include extending utilities and adding or ex-
tending staircases. These costs are for lifting houses.
If the house has a slab foundation, then it is assumed
that it is raised togetherwith thehouse.Adistinction
is made between elevation costs for houses with and
without a basement or crawlspace because elevation
costs are higher for houses with a slab-on grade.
Moreover, a distinction is made between the eleva-
tion of frame constructionsd and that of masonry
constructions,e since elevation costs are higher for
the latter.
The cost estimates shown in Table 2.2 are used for
estimating the average elevation costs per building
type for NYC, as well as the costs of implementing
the elevation of all buildings located in the current
NYC flood zones. This is done as follows.
dFrame constructions are walls constructed of wood or
light-gauge metal studs, with wood, vinyl, or aluminum
siding (FEMA, 2009b).
eMasonry constructions have walls constructed of brick,
stone, or concrete blocks (FEMA, 2009b).
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Table 2.2. Approximate costs of elevating a building
Cost in US$ Cost in US$ Cost in US$
per sq. ft. of the per sq. ft. of the per sq. ft. of the
building footprint building footprint building footprint
Construction type and foundation 2 feet elevation 4 feet elevation 8 feet elevation
Frame construction with a basement or crawlspace $29 $32 $37
Frame construction with a slab-on-grade $80 $83 $88
Masonry construction with a basement or crawlspace $60 $63 $68
Masonry construction with a slab-on-grade $88 $91 $96
Note: in 2009 US$ values.
Source: FEMA (2009b).
First, the MapPLUTO database was used to de-
rive average building footprints (surface areas) per
residential building class (according to the HAZUS
building typology in Table 2.1). This database con-
tains information on buildings in NYC on a de-
tailed spatial level.f Using the building count of the
HAZUS model, three census blocks per HAZUS
building class were selected containing mostly
(>85%) one of the building classes RES 1–RES 6.
The buildings located within these census blocks
in the MapPLUTO database were grouped and
counted according to type and then their surface
area was averaged. This resulted in a standard build-
ing footprint for each of the residential building
classes.
Second, the average building footprint per resi-
dential building type is multiplied by the number of
this particular type of buildings located in the A and
V flood zones, according to the building database
from the Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
of NYC. The result is the total number of square feet
of building footprints per residential housing type
in the A and V zones in NYC.
Third, using information from the HAZUS
database, a further subdivision of theHAZUSbuild-
ing classes (RES 1–RES 6) is made into masonry or
other construction types. In particular, the percent-
age ofmasonry and other housing types perHAZUS
building class is derived for the NYC flood zones.
These percentages are used to calculate per building
type how much of the total square feet of building
footprints in the A and V zones belong to masonry
buildings and how much belong to other building
types.
f It can be accessed via http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/
html/bytes/applbyte.shtml
Fourth, using information from the HAZUS
database, it has been derived what percentage of
NYC buildings on average have a basement. On av-
erage, 76% of the buildings have a basement and
24% do not. These percentages are used to calcu-
late per building type in the A and V flood zones
how much of the total square feet of building foot-
prints belong to: (1)masonry buildings with a base-
ment (2); masonry buildings without a basement;
(3) other buildings with a basement; and (4) other
buildings without a basement.
Fifth, the total square feet of building footprints
in different zones derived in step four are combined
with the elevation costs shown in Table 2.2 in or-
der to estimate the total costs of elevating exist-
ing buildings in the A and V zones by 2 ft, 4 ft,
and 8 ft. This is done by multiplying the total
square feet of footprints of masonry buildings with
basements by the corresponding cost estimates in
Table 2.2, and the total square feet of footprints of
masonry buildingswithout a basement ismultiplied
by the elevation costs ofmasonry constructionswith
a slab-on-grade, etc. It is assumed that the frame
construction elevation costs are representative for
non-masonry buildings. The total costs for 6 ft of
elevation are approximated by taking the average of
total elevation costs for a 4 ft and an 8 ft elevation.
A similar analysis as that described in the previous
steps was done for the 1 in 500 floodplain in NYC.
Table 2.3 shows the average elevation costs of
existing buildings for three main HAZUS build-
ing classes: namely, single family dwellings (RES1),
manufactured housing (RES2), and duplex hous-
ing (RES3A) and triples/quads housing (RES3B).
These costs are shown on the basis of the FEMA
(2009) cost estimates for the US, as well as for
a scaling-up of these cost estimates to reflect higher
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Table 2.3. Average costs per building of elevating existing buildings in NYC floodplains for building classes RES1,
RES2, RES3A, and RES3B, using FEMA (2009b) cost estimates (left columns), and scaled-up estimates that reflect
higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Costs based on FEMA per building category Costs scaled-up for NYC per building category
Elevation level RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+2 ft $33,239 $40,550 $41,337 $62,029 $44,208 $53,931 $54,978 $82,498
+4 ft $35,464 $43,499 $43,861 $65,816 $47,168 $57,854 $58,335 $87,535
+6 ft $37,319 $45,958 $45,964 $68,971 $49,634 $61,124 $61,132 $91,732
Table 2.4. Total costs of elevating existing buildings per flood zoneusingFEMA(2009b) cost estimates (left columns),
and scaled-up estimates that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Costs based on FEMA Costs scaled-up for NYC
per building category per building category
Elevation level 1/100 A and V zones 1/500 zone only 1/100 A and V zones 1/500 zone only
+2 ft $1,759,058,426 $1,001,969,917 $2,339,547,707 $1,332,619,990
+4 ft $1,872,497,344 $1,065,306,285 $2,490,421,468 $1,416,857,359
+6 ft $1,967,029,776 $1,118,086,591 $2,616,149,602 $1,487,055,166
NYC construction costs. To derive the latter, a scal-
ing factor of 1.33 was used. This factor reflects the
higher NYC construction costs compared with the
US average.g The increasing costs per residential
building class can be explained by the higher average
building footprint of these categories. The estimates
in Table 2.3 are consistent with the range $30,000–
$88,000,which represents the costs of actual projects
to elevate existing buildings as reported by Jones
et al. (2006).
Table 2.4 shows the costs of elevating all existing
buildings per flood zone for the different elevation
heights. The costs of this measure are very substan-
tial and range between $2.3 bn and $2.6 bn for the
1/100 flood zone and between $1.3 bn and $1.5 bn
for the 1/500 flood zone. The estimated elevation
costs for the 1/500 zone reflect only the costs of el-
evation in that zone, and do not include the costs
of elevating buildings in the 1/100 zone. The cost
estimates for 4 ft and 6 ft elevation are not much
higher than the 2 ft elevation costs, as is consistent
with the relation between per square feet footprint
costs and height shown in Table 2.2.
gThis estimation has been made by the Manhattan Re-
search Institute. NYC officials have confirmed its ade-
quacy in personal communication.
Elevation of new buildings
Moreover, we estimate costs for elevating newbuild-
ings that have been projected to be newly built by
the year 2040. This projection is based on popu-
lation growth estimates per Traffic Analysis Zone
(TAZ) developed by the NYC department of city
planning (NYC-DCP, 2011). The population pro-
jections are at the borough level (5 areas) and were
made spatially explicit by NYC-DCP to the level of
TAZ zones (1611 areas) using information on cur-
rent household distributions, the distance to subway
stations and existing building, and zoning plans.We
assumed growth in households to follow these pop-
ulation growth rates per TAZ zone and translated
them into new buildings using borough differenti-
ated percentages (as somenewhouseholdswill settle
in existing buildings) provided byNYC-DCP. Lastly,
every census block was attributed a growth in build-
ings similar to the TAZ zone it was located in, to de-
termine the increase in buildings. Only residential
buildings are assumed to increase in ourprojections,
whichmake up 90%of the existing building stock in
NYC. Overall, this results in an increase in residen-
tial buildings of 14% in the whole of NYC (723,000
to 825,000 buildings).
New buildings in flood zones have to be built at
the BFE level. Here, we examine the costs of building
higher than that level, which has been called ‘adding
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Table 2.5. Costs of 1 foot of elevation of new buildings with a pile or masonry pier foundation in US$ per square
foot of building footprint
Cost in US$ per sq. ft. Cost in US$ per sq. ft. Cost in US$ per sq. ft.
of building footprint of building footprint of building footprint
A zone (average Coastal A zone V zone (very
Type of building quality house) (good quality house) good quality house)
30 × 50, 1-storey, 1,500 sf. 0.17–0.33 0.23–0.45 0.27–0.54
30 × 50, 2-storey, 3,000 sf. 0.28–0.57 0.39–0.78 0.50–1.00
40 × 60, 1-storey, 2,400 sf. 0.15–0.31 0.21–0.42 0.25–0.50
40 × 60, 2-storey, 4,800 sf. 0.26–0.52 0.36–0.73 0.47–0.94
freeboard’. Jones et al. (2006) have estimated the
costs of adding freeboard for different foundations
types, and expressed these costs as a percentage of
the total building costs. This resulted in the follow-
ing estimates:
 The costs for adding freeboard for pile andma-
sonry pier foundations range between 0.25%
and 0.5% per foot of freeboard;
 The costs for adding freeboard for masonry
wall foundations range between 0.8% and
1.5% per foot of freeboard;
 The costs for adding freeboard for slab on fill
foundations range between 0.8% and 3% per
foot of freeboard.
These cost estimates of adding 1 ft freeboard can
be translated to costs per square foot of the building
footprint using the total building costs as reported
by Jones et al. (2006, p. 32) for four types of buildings
that are constructed in the A zone with either aver-
age or good quality materials, or in the V zone using
very good quality materials (to withstand wave im-
pacts). These results are shown inTables 2.5, 2.6, and
2.7. Masonry wall-and-fill foundations are not used
in V zones, which is why these elevation costs are
not provided for that zone. In V zones open foun-
dations are used. Open foundations consist of indi-
vidual structural members that support the houses
only at key points. In other words, no continuous
walls are created around the house in order to allow
water to flow underneath the house. These foun-
dations, which consist of piers, posts, columns, or
piles, are especially suitable for elevating houses in
areas with wave action and high velocity floods (V
zones). More details about these elevation methods
can be found in FEMA (2009b).
The cost estimates from Tables 2.5–2.7 are used
for estimating the costs of elevating new buildings.
These tables show that the costs per square foot of
building footprint are slightly higher for the ele-
vation of two storey buildings compared with one
storey buildings. Given the scarcity of space in NYC,
we expect that few new single storey buildings will
be constructed in NYC, so we use the elevation costs
of only two storey buildings in our cost estimations.
For the elevation of new buildings in the V zone,
the average of the observed cost range of $0.47–1.00
per square ft of building footprint in Table 2.5 was
used to estimate average costs of adding 2 ft, 4 ft, and
6 ft of freeboard for the different residential building
classes. The results are shown inTable 2.8.Moreover,
Table 2.6. Costs of 1 foot of elevation of new buildings with a masonry wall foundation in US$ per square foot of
building footprint
Cost in US$ per sq. ft. Cost in US$ per sq. ft.
of building footprint of building footprint
Type of building A zone (average quality house) Coastal A zone (good quality house)
30 × 50, 1-storey, 1,500 sf. 0.53–1.00 0.72–1.35
30 × 50, 2-storey, 3,000 sf. 0.91–1.70 1.25–2.34
40 × 60, 1-storey, 2,400 sf. 0.49–0.92 0.67–1.26
40 × 60, 2-storey, 4,800 sf. 0.84–1.57 1.16–2.18
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Table 2.7. Costs of 1 foot of elevation of new buildings with a fill foundation in US$ per square foot of building
footprint
Cost in US$ per sq. ft. Cost in US$ per sq. ft.
of building footprint of building footprint
Type of building A zone (average quality house) Coastal A zone (good quality house)
30 × 50, 1-storey,1,500 sf. 0.53–2.00 0.72–2.70
30 × 50, 2-storey, 3,000 sf. 0.90–3.40 1.25–4.68
40 × 60, 1-storey, 2,400 sf. 0.49–1.84 0.67–2.51
40 × 60, 2-storey, 4,800 sf. 0.84–3.15 1.16–4.37
Table 2.8. Average costs per building of elevating new buildings in the V zone for building classes RES1, RES2,
RES3A, and RES3B, using the Jones et al. (2006) cost estimates (left columns) and scaled-up estimates that reflect
higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Cost based on Jones et al. Cost scaled-up for
per building category NYC per building category
Elevation level RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+ 2 ft $1,090 $1,445 $1,237 $1,856 $1,450 $1,922 $1,645 $2,468
+ 4 ft $2,181 $2,891 $2,473 $3,711 $2,901 $3,845 $3,289 $4,936
+ 6 ft $3,271 $4,336 $3,710 $5,567 $4,351 $5,767 $4,934 $7,404
Table 2.9 shows the total costs of elevating all new
buildings in the V zone, which have been estimated
using the same procedure.
For elevation of new buildings in the A and the
1/500 zones we used the average of the costs in
Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 for high quality foundations
for coastal A zones, which results in cost per ft of
freeboard of $1.72 per ft of building footprint. The
lower cost estimates for average quality foundations
in A zones are regarded as less realistic for NYC and
are, therefore, not applied here. Table 2.10 shows
the estimated average costs of adding 2 ft, 4 ft, and
6 ft of freeboard to new buildings for the different
residential building classes in the 1/100 (excluding
V) and 1/500 zones. Moreover, Table 2.11 shows
the total costs of elevating all new buildings in the
1/100 (excluding V) and 1/500 zones. The costs of
this measure range between $77 mln and $231 mln
for the 1/100 flood zone and between $33 mln and
$98 mln for the 1/500 flood zone. These costs are
substantially lower than the costs of elevating all ex-
isting buildings for two reasons: (1) the number of
projected new buildings is only a small proportion
of the existing building stock; and (2) the average
per building costs of elevating new building is much
lower than elevating existing buildings.
2.4 Cost estimates of wet floodproofing
Wet floodproofing entails modifying parts of a
house so that floodwaters can enter but cause only
minimal damage to the house and its contents.
Figure 2.2 shows an example of a wet floodproofed
building. By allowing water to flow into the house,
hydrostatic pressures exerted by water inside and
outside the house can be equalized, which mini-
mizes the risks that the walls of the house collapse.
Table 2.9. Total costs of elevating all new residential buildings in theV zoneusing the Jones et al. (2006) cost estimates
(left columns), and scaled-up estimates that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Elevation level Cost based on Jones et al. Cost scaled for NYC
+ 2 ft $1,175,989 $1,564,065
+ 4 ft $2,351,978 $3,128,131
+ 6 ft $3,527,967 $4,692,196
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Table 2.10. Average costs per building of elevating new buildings in the 1/100 A and 1/500 zones for building classes
RES1, RES2, RES3A, and RES3B, using the Jones et al. (2006) cost estimates (left columns), and scaled-up estimates
that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Cost based on Jones et al. Cost scaled-up for
per building category NYC per building category
Elevation level RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+2 ft $2,553 $3,384 $2,895 $4,344 $3,396 $4,501 $3,851 $5,778
+4 ft $5,106 $6,768 $5,790 $8,689 $6,791 $9,002 $7,701 $11,556
+6 ft $7,659 $10,152 $8,686 $13,033 $10,187 $13,502 $11,552 $17,334
Table 2.11. Total cost of elevating all new residential buildings in the 1/100A and 1/500 zones using Jones et al. (2006)
cost estimates (left columns), and scaled-up estimates that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Cost based on Jones et al. Cost scaled for NYC
per building category per building category
Elevation level 1/100 A zones 1/500 zone only 1/100 A zones 1/500 zone only
+2 ft $57,991,533 $24,439,155 $77,128,739 $32,504,076
+4 ft $115,983,066 $48,878,310 $154,257,478 $65,008,153
+6 ft $173,974,599 $73,317,465 $231,386,216 $97,512,229
Allowing floodwaters to enter the house implies that
finishes and constructions below potential water
heights should be made resistant to flood damage.
For example, service equipment (e.g. utility instal-
lations) should be built above flood levels, and walls
should be built using water-resistant building ma-
terials. Moreover, it is advised not to use the flood-
prone parts of the house in a way that high-value
goods are exposed to flooding (e.g. in a sauna or
kitchen). Valuable items should be moved to spaces
above potential floodwaters.
Table 2.12 shows the approximate costs of wet
floodproofing buildings. These costs have been es-
timated by FEMA (2009b), and include adding wall
openings for the entry and exit of floodwaters, in-
Figure 2.2. Example of a wet floodproofed building (Source:
FEMA, 2009b).
stalling pumps, rearranging or relocating utility sys-
tems, moving large appliances, and making it easier
to clean up after floodwaters recede. The cost esti-
mates in Table 2.12 are applicable to both frame or
masonry type of buildings and are provided for wet
flood-proofing up to 2 ft, 4 ft, and 8 ft. These cost
estimates do not include the costs of the removal
of all non-flood damage-resistant materials in ex-
isting buildings or replacing finish materials with
flood damage-resistant materials. A description of
these flood damage-resistantmaterials can be found
in FEMA (2008). We do not include the additional
costs of installing these materials in our cost esti-
mates of the strategy of wet floodproofing houses
in NYC since it is assumed that wet proofing is un-
dertaken when a building is substantially renovated
and finish materials need to be replaced anyway.
The cost estimates shown in Table 2.12 are used
for estimating the costs of wet floodproofing per
building type for NYC, as well as the costs of wet
floodproofing all existing buildings located in the
current NYC flood zones.
First, the MapPLUTO database was used to de-
rive average building footprints (surface areas) per
residential building class (according to the HAZUS
building typology in Table 2.1), by following the
methodology that was described in Section 2.3. A
different approach had to be followed to estimate
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Table 2.12. Costs of wet flood-proofing buildings per foot of wet-proofing height
Cost in $ per sq. ft. Cost in $ per sq. ft. Cost in $ per sq. ft.
Existing foundation of the building footprint of the building footprint of the building footprint
of a frame or 2 foot above basement 4 foot above basement 8 foot above basement
masonry building floor or LAGa floor or LAGa floor or LAGa
Basement $2.90 $6.00 $17.00
Crawlspace $2.20 $5.60 Not available
Notes: In 2009 US$ values.
aLAG stands for lowest adjacent grade, which is the elevation of the lowest ground surface that touches any of the
exterior walls of a building. Source: FEMA (2009b).
the averagebuilding footprints of commercial build-
ing classes.h This was done as follows. We first esti-
mated the ratio FA/BF of total floor area (FA) (from
an NYC-OEM database) to the building footprint
(BF) for each residential buildings type. Then us-
ing a regression analysis the relation between this
ratio and the total floor area has been estimated.
Next, the results of this regression equation were
used to estimate this ratio (FA/BF) for commercial
building type on the basis of the total floor area per
commercial building type that we obtained from
OEM. Finally, on the basis of these ratios, the aver-
age building footprint of commercial building types
was derived.
Second, the average building footprints per build-
ing type were multiplied by the number of this par-
ticular type of buildings that are located in flood
zones, according to the building database from
NYC-OEM. The result is the total number of square
feet of building footprints per residential and com-
mercial building types in the 1/100 A and 1/500
zones in NYC.
Third, the total square feet of building footprints
derived in step two were combined with the costs
of wet floodproofing shown in Table 2.12 in order
to estimate the total costs of wet proofing existing
buildings in the 1/100 A and 1/500 flood zones with
wet-proofing levels of 2 ft, 4 ft, and 8 ft. This is done
by multiplying the total square feet of the build-
ings in the flood zones with the corresponding cost
hThe reason for this is that there are no census blocks in the
MapPLUTO database that contain almost only buildings
of one particular commercial class type from which the
average footprint could be computed.
estimates in Table 2.12 for wet floodproofing build-
ings with a basement. We used the cost estimates
for buildings with basements and not crawlspaces,
because most NYC buildings have a basement. Al-
though this may result in a slight over-estimation of
the costs, differences between the two cost estimates
are small as Table 2.12 shows. Another more prag-
matic reason for this choice is that cost estimates for
8 ft wet proofing of buildings with a crawlspace are
not available. The total costs for 6 ft of wet flood-
proofing are approximated by taking the average of
the total wet flood-proofing costs for the 4 ft and
8 ft levels.
Table 2.13 shows the average wet floodproofing
costs of existing buildings for three main hous-
ing types: namely, single family dwellings (RES1),
manufactured housing (RES2), and duplex housing
(RES3A) and triples/quads housing (RES3B). These
costs are shown on the basis of the FEMA (2009b)
cost estimates for the US, as well as for a scaling-up
of these cost estimates to reflect higher NYC con-
struction costs. As in Section 2.3, a scaling factor of
1.33 has been used to derive the latter.
Table 2.14 shows the costs of wet floodproofing
all existing buildings per flood zone for the differ-
ent heights if wet-proofing measures are taken. The
costs of this measure range between $250 mln and
$980mln for the 1/100 flood zone and between $150
mln and $590 mln for the 1/500 flood zone. The es-
timated wet floodproofing costs for the 1/500 zone
reflect only the costs of wet floodproofing in that
zone, and do not include the costs of wet flood-
proofing buildings in the 1/100 zone. The costs of
wet floodproofing existing houses are substantially
lower than the cost of elevating these homes. Wet
floodproofing costs are more sensitive to the height
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Table 2.13. Average costs per building of wet floodproofing houses in NYC floodplains for building classes RES1,
RES2, RES3A, and RES3B, using FEMA (2009) cost estimates (left columns), and scaled-up estimates that reflect
higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Costs based on FEMA per building category Costs scaled-up for NYC per building category
Wet flood-
proofing level RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+2 ft $2,151 $2,851 $2,440 $3,661 $2,861 $3,792 $3,245 $4,869
+4 ft $4,451 $5,900 $5,047 $7,574 $5,920 $7,846 $6,713 $10,073
+6 ft $8,531 $11,307 $9,674 $14,517 $11,346 $15,039 $12,867 $19,307
Table 2.14. Total costs of wet floodproofing existing buildings per flood zone using FEMA (2009b) cost estimates
(left columns), and scaled-up estimates that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Cost based on FEMA Cost scaled-up for NYC
per building category per building category
Wet flood-
proofing level 1/100 A zone 1/500 zone only 1/100 A zone 1/500 zone only
+2 ft $185,726,393 $111,250,098 $247,016,103 $147,962,631
+4 ft $384,261,503 $230,172,617 $511,067,799 $306,129,581
+6 ft $736,501,214 $441,164,183 $979,546,614 $586,748,363
up to which the measures are applied than is the
case for elevation.
The same methodology has been applied to es-
timate the total costs of wet floodproofing all new
residential buildings that are expected to be newly
built until the year 2040. The cost estimates of
this strategy are shown in Table 2.15. The costs
of wet floodproofing new buildings range between
$65 mln and $258 mln for the 1/100 flood zone
and between $27 mln and $109 mln for the 1/500
flood zone. The difference between the total costs of
flood-proofing these new residential buildings com-
pared with existing buildings only arises because of
differences in the number of buildings that are
flood-proofed. In other words, the costs of wet
floodproofing new buildings in Table 2.16 are lower
than those costs for existing buildings because the
number of about to be built residential buildings is
lower than the current building stock.
2.5 Cost estimates for dry floodproofing
Dry floodproofing a building means that the flood-
prone parts of the house have been made water-
tight, so that floodwaters cannot enter the building
(FEMA, 2009b). Figure 2.3 shows an example of a
dry floodproofed building. A building can be made
watertight by sealingwallswithwaterproof coatings,
impermeablemembranes, or supplemental layers of
masonry or concrete. Doors and other openings of
the building in flood-prone parts of the building
must be protected by permanent or removable flood
shields. Backflow valves must be installed in sewer
lines and drains to prevent floodwaters from enter-
ing the building via the sewer system. However, dry
floodproofing may not be effective in all flood con-
ditions. For example, high flood depths may create
pressure on the walls of the building which may
cause the building to collapse. The reason is that if
Table 2.15. Total costs of wet floodproofing new buildings per flood zone using FEMA (2009b) cost estimates (left
columns), and scaled-up estimates that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Cost based on FEMA Cost scaled-up for NYC
per building category per building category
Wet flood-
proofing level 1/100 A zone 1/500 zone only 1/100 A zone 1/500 zone only
+2 ft $48,864,536 $20,592,799 $64,989,833 $27,388,423
+4 ft $101,099,040 $42,605,791 $134,461,724 $56,665,702
+6 ft $193,773,161 $81,661,099 $257,718,304 $108,609,262
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Table 2.16. Approximate costs of elements of a dry floodproofing project
Type of dry floodproofing measure Costs are expressed per Cost in US$
Sprayed-on cement (above grade)a Linear foot of wall covered $16.80
Waterproof membrane (above grade)a Linear foot of wall covered $5.70
Asphalt (two coats on foundation up to 2 feet below grade) Linear foot of wall covered $12.00
Drainage line around perimeter of the house Linear foot $31
Plumbing check valve Each $1,060
Sump and sump pump (with backup battery) Lump sum $1,710
Metal flood shield Linear foot of shield surface $375
Wooden flood shield Linear foot of shield surface $117
aCement, membrane and asphalt are alternative sealant methods (source: FEMA, 2009b).
dryproofing is applied then pressure on walls from
water rising up on the outside of the building is not
balanced by water inside the house. This is a real
risk in the case of frame constructions, but less of a
problem if buildings are constructed with masonry
walls (FEMA, 2009b). Moreover, buoyancy forces
may damage the building, especially if flood depths
are high and the buildings are not heavy enough to
withstand buoyancy. Because of these risks of dam-
age to walls at high flood depths, FEMA (2009b)
advises that dry floodproofing in the USA should
be applied only up to a flood depth of 3 feet. Never-
theless, we examined the dry floodproofing strategy
for NYC up to a height of 6 feet, as we do for the
other flood-proofing strategy. It is relevant to study
dry floodproofing in NYC for locations with higher
flood depths than 3 feet because, in general, build-
ings in New York are heavier and have a stronger
construction than is usual in the US. This implies
that in NYC the risk of building collapse in the case
of dry floodproofing at high flood depths may be
less of a problem.i Further research should examine
inmore detail the effectiveness of dry floodproofing
NYC construction types under a variety of flooding
conditions, and in particular, flood depths.
Table 2.16 shows the costs of dry floodproofing
houses up to a level of 3 feet, as has been approx-
imated by FEMA (2009b) for a variety of cost ele-
ments of a dry floodproofing project. The total costs
per house will depend on the size of the house, the
depth of floodwaters for which the dry-proofing is
undertaken, the types of sealants and shield mate-
rials that are used, the number of plumbing lines
i This was confirmed bymeans of consultations with NYC
building specialists.
Figure 2.3. Example of a dry floodproofed building (Source:
FEMA (2009b).
that have to be protected, and the number of door
openings that have to be covered by shields.
The cost estimates shown in Table 2.16 are used
for estimating the average dry floodproofing costs
per building type for NYC, as well as the costs of
implementing dry floodproofing of all buildings lo-
cated in the current NYC flood zones. This is done
as follows.
First, the MapPLUTO database was used to de-
rive average building footprints (surface areas) per
residential building class (according to the HAZUS
building typology in Table 2.1), using the method
that was explained in Section 2.3. This resulted in
a standard building footprint for each of the res-
idential building classes. The method outlined in
Section 2.4 was used to derive building footprints of
the commercial building classes. Unlike wet flood-
proofing and elevation, dry floodproofing costs are
not dependent on the building footprint, but in-
stead depend on the perimeter (linear feet of walls
covered) of the building. Therefore, for each build-
ing class the average perimeter was calculated from
the average footprint per building class.j
j The perimeter of the buildingswas derived by taking four
times the square root of the footprints (4*
√
footprint).
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Table 2.17. Average costs per building of dry floodproofing houses in NYC floodplains up to 3 ft for building classes
RES1, RES2, RES3A, and RES3B, using FEMA (2009b) cost estimates
Costs based on FEMA per building category
Dry flood-
proofing level RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+3 ft $9,361 $10,519 $9,858 $11,691
Second, the average perimeter per building type
is multiplied by the number of the particular type
of buildings concerned that are located in the 1/100
A and 1/500 flood zones, according to the building
database from NYC-OEM. The result is the total
linear feet of building perimeter per building type
separately for the 1/100 A and 1/500 flood zones in
NYC.
Third, the information obtained in the second
step was combined with the cost information in
Table 2.16, which was done as follows. As Table 2.16
shows, sealing costs dependent on whether cement,
a water-proof membrane, or asphalt is used. Con-
sultations with NYC building experts revealed that
cement is rarely used for dry-proofing buildings in
NYC, and that mostly water-proof membranes or
asphalt are used. Therefore, we took the average
costs of these latter two methods ($8.85 per lin. ft)
as average sealant costs. Adding to this amount the
costs of a drainage line results in an average cost
of installing sealing and drainage of $39.85 per lin-
ear foot of a house perimeter. It is assumed that 6
linear feet of flood shields are needed to dry flood-
proof a single-family dwelling (RES1).k For deriv-
ing the costs of flood shields, the higher cost esti-
mate for metal flood shields in Table 2.16 was used
($375 per lin. ft.), rather than the lower costs of
wooden shields.l This results in an average cost of
flood shields per single-family dwelling of $2,250.
The other building types are typically larger than
single-family dwellings, which implies that these
buildings probably have more openings that need
to be shielded. Average flood shield costs for these
buildings are assumed to increase proportionally
with their average perimeter size relative to the av-
kThis is consistent with having, on average, two door-
openings per single family home.
l NYC building experts have confirmed that wooden flood
shields arenot commonlyused; thus it ismore appropriate
to use the costs of metal shields.
erage perimeter of single-family houses; that is, the
shielding costs of building typeX are 2250× average
perimeter building X/average perimeter of a single-
family house. It is assumed that every building needs
one sump pump that costs on average $1,710 per
building. Moreover, it is assumed that one set of
plumbing check valves is installed per single-family
house for a cost of $1,060, while for the other build-
ing types this cost is assumed to increase, on average,
proportionally to their relative perimeter size; that
is, 1060 × average perimeter of building X/average
perimeter of a single-family house. In other words,
larger buildings are, on average, likely to have more
connections to the sewer system, which results in
higher costs for installing backflow valves. Finally,
the total costs of dry floodproofing buildings in the
NYC floodplains are estimated by multiplying the
total number of linear feet of a building’s perimeter
by the average sealing and drainage costs per linear
square foot ($39.85), and by adding the costs for
sump pumps, check values, and flood shields per
building per building type, which are multiplied by
the corresponding total number of building types
in a flood zone according to the NYC-OEM build-
ing database. Average dry floodproofing costs per
building type are obtained by dividing the total dry-
proofing cost per building type by the total number
of buildings of this particular type. The resulting
average dry floodproofing costs for four main resi-
dential building classes is shown in Table 2.17.
The costs in Table 2.17 are shown for a height
of dry floodproofing of 3 ft, as is consistent with
the FEMA (2009b) cost estimates that served as in-
put for these calculations. These cost estimates are
adjusted for dry floodproofing heights of 2 ft, 4 ft,
and 6 ft, using the following approach. The cost
for check valves, the sump pump, and the drainage
system used to remove floodwaters leaking in the
house are taken as fixed costs per house, and do
not depend on the desired dry proofing height.
However, sealing costs and costs for flood shields
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Table 2.18. Average costs per building of dry floodproofing houses in NYC floodplains up to 2 ft, 4 ft, and 6 ft for
building classes RES1, RES2, RES3A, and RES3B, using FEMA (2009b) cost estimates (left columns), and scaled-up
estimates that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Costs based on FEMA per building category Costs scaled-up for NYC per building category
Dry flood-
proofing level RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+2 ft $8,290 $9,286 $8,717 $10,294 $11,026 $12,350 $11,594 $13,690
+4 ft $10,433 $11,753 $10,999 $13,089 $13,876 $15,631 $14,629 $17,408
+6 ft $12,576 $14,220 $13,281 $15,884 $16,726 $18,912 $17,664 $21,126
are assumed to increase with the desired height of
dry floodproofing. The costs of sealing and flood
shields for dry-proofing of 2 ft, 4 ft, and 6 ft are
computed by multiplying the costs for 3 ft by a
factor of, respectively, 2/3, 4/3, and 2. Table 2.18
shows the resulting average dry floodproofing costs
of existingbuildings for threehousing types: namely,
single family dwellings (RES1),manufacturedhous-
ing (RES2), and duplex housing (RES3A) and
triples/quads housing (RES3B). These costs are
shown on the basis of the FEMA (2009b) cost es-
timates for the USA, as well as for a scaling-up of
these cost estimates to reflect higher NYC construc-
tion costs, as was done in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
Table 2.19 shows the costs of dry floodproof-
ing all existing buildings per flood zone for the
different heights after dry-proofing measures are
taken. The costs of this measure range between $640
mln and $980 mln for the 1/100 flood zone and be-
tween $380 mln and $580 mln for the 1/500 flood
zone. The estimated dry floodproofing costs for the
1/500 zone reflect only the costs of elevation in that
zone, and do not include the costs of dry flood-
proofing buildings in the 1/100 zone. The costs
of dry floodproofing existing houses are substan-
tially lower than the cost of elevating these houses.
Dry floodproofing is more costly than wet flood-
proofing for flood-proofing heights of 2 ft and 4 ft,
but is about the same for flood-proofing up to 6 ft.
The same methodology has been applied to es-
timate the total costs of dry floodproofing all new
residential buildings that are expected to be newly
built until the year 2040. The cost estimates of this
strategy are shown in Table 2.20. The costs of dry
flood-proofing new buildings range between $170
mln and $260 mln for the 1/100 flood zone and
between $70 mln and $110 mln for the 1/500 flood
zone. Thedifference between the total costs of flood-
proofing these new residential buildings compared
with existing buildings only arises because of dif-
ferences in the number of buildings that are flood
proofed. In other words, the cost of dry floodproof-
ing new buildings in Table 2.20 are lower than those
costs for existing buildings because the number of
about to-be-built residential buildings is lower than
the current building stock.
2.6 Summary: costs of Strategy 1a, Open
resilient City
Table 2.21 summarizes the costs for Strategy 1a
Open resilient City. The table shows the total costs
for elevating, wet floodproofing, and dry flood-
proofing all buildings (existing or new). Of course,
it is not realistic to elevate all existing building, nor
is it feasible to dry proof all buildings. Nevertheless,
the table provides interesting insight into the order
of magnitude of the total costs for implementing
building codes, which lies between $0.5 bn for ‘wet
Table 2.19. Total costs of dry floodproofing existing buildings per flood zone using FEMA (2009b) cost estimates
(left columns), and scaled-up estimates that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Cost based on FEMA Cost scaled-up for NYC
per building category per building category
Dry flood-
proofing level 1/100 A zone 1/500 zone only 1/100 A zone 1/500 zone only
+2 ft $477,753,289 $283,873,352 $635,411,874 $377,551,559
+4 ft $606,025,771 $360,299,296 $806,014,276 $479,198,064
+6 ft $734,298,253 $436,725,240 $976,616,677 $580,844,570
32
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–37 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences.
Botzen et al. Flood management strategies for New York City
Table 2.20. Total costs of dry floodproofing new buildings per flood zone using FEMA (2009b) cost estimates (left
columns), and scaled-up estimates that reflect higher NYC construction costs (right columns)
Cost based on FEMA Cost scaled-up for NYC
per building category per building category
Dry flood-
proofing level 1/100 A zone 1/500 zone only 1/100 A zone 1/500 zone only
+2 ft $128,759,576 $53,869,990 $171,250,236 $71,647,087
+4 ft $163,258,937 $68,376,561 $217,134,387 $90,940,826
+6 ft $197,758,299 $82,883,131 $263,018,537 $110,234,565
floodproofing +2 ft’ to $4.4 bn for ‘elevating all
buildings with +6 ft’.
2.7 Cost estimates of Strategy Open
Resilient City+
Flood adaptation costs for critical
infrastructure
The Resilient Open City+ strategy aims at imple-
menting floodproofing and elevation measures in
zones that are currently classified as the 1/100 and
the 1/500 flood zones. These measures are applied
to existing and new buildings; again, the ‘+’refers
to additional measures needed to protect critical in-
frastructure. Since a lot of vulnerable infrastructure
remains unprotected in Strategy 1a, Strategy 1b Re-
silient Open City+ aims at enhancing resilience of
critical infrastructure, such as power-plants, sub-
ways, water treatment plants, airports, etc. This is
performed using local scale adaptation measures
that protect these facilities.
We use the proposed adaptation measures and
their costs provided by the infrastructure companies
and authorities, such as elevating or sealing tunnel
entrances, small scale levees or the hardening of
power lines. Large-scale storm surge barriers are
not considered. Table 2.22 provides an overview
of adaptation cost for the various proposed
infrastructure utilities in NYC and the Hoboken –
Raritan River areas of New Jersey. The total costs are
estimated at $2.9 –$8.4 bn (total: $11.3 bn), which
are lower than the total estimated adaptation costs
for the states of NJ (2012) and NY (2012): $9 bn for
Table 2.21. Summary of all building code costs for NYC of Strategy 1a Open resilient City (in $ 2012 values)
[Costs $ bn] [Costs $ bn] [Costs $ bn]
Elevation 1/100 A and V zones 1/500 zone only Total
Existing buildings +2 ft,+4 ft, +6 ft $2.3–$2.6 bn $1.3–$1.5 bn $2.6–$4.1 bn
New buildings +2 ft,+4 ft, +6 ft $0.08 – $0.2 bn $0.03–$0.1 bn $0.1–$0.3 bn
Total $2.7–$4.4 bn
Total ($ 2012 values) $2.9–$4.7 bna
Wet floodproofing
Existing buildings +2 ft,+4 ft, +6 ft $0.25–$1 bn $0.15–$0.6 bn $0.4–$1.6 bn
New buildings +2 ft,+4 ft, +6 ft $0.06–$0.26 bn $0.03–$0.1 bn $0.09–$0.36 bn
Total $0.5–$1.96 bn
Total ($ 2012 values) $0.5–$2.0 bna
Dry floodproofing
Existing buildings +2 ft,+4 ft, +6 ft $0.6–$1 bn $0.4–$0.6 bn $1–$1.6 bn
New buildings +2 ft,+4 ft, +6 ft $0.17–$0.26 bn $0.07–$0.1 bn $0.24–$0.36 bn
Total $1.24–$2 bn
Total ($ 2012 values) $1.3–$2.1 bna
aAll summary cost tables are in US$ 2012 values. Indexing was applied using the Construction Cost Index from ENR
(Engineering News-Record, http://enr.construction.com/economics). The CCI annual growth rate was set to 2.4%, on
May 2nd 2013.
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Table 2.22. Overview of adaptation costs for various utility companies for NYC and the Hudson coasts of NJ (all in
$ 2012 values)
Power utilities
Flood adaptation
Name of utility company State measures [$bn 2012] Adaptation description
PSE&G NJ 1–2 a Protect substation, relocate wire underground, etc
Consolidated Edison NY 1.25 c raising sub stations, local barriers, pumps, relocate
wire underground
Long Island Power Authority NY >0.5b Reinforced foundations, Higher strength steel
infrastructure, undergrounding new transmission
lines, New flood resistant substation equipment
Jersey Central Power & Light NY >0.2 a , i new substation building, new circuits, replacing
underground cables
Transport infrastructure
Flood adaptation
Name of utility company State measures [$bn 2012] Adaptation description
MTA NY ∼2 g ,k , l e.g. protect floodgates at tunnel entrances, vertical
roll-down doors, vent closures, inflatable bladders,
replace copper wires, upsized fixed pumps
NJ Transit Rail NJ 0.35–0.8f ,h Flood control Hoboken, Secaucus Junction and Bay
Head stations, seawall, protect electrical
substations
PAUTH. NY-NJ/PATH NJ-NY >0.1 Steel gates in tunnels, Move control panels to higher
elevation, new pumps, seawalld ,e ,k
Amtrak NY-NJ 0.27h design of a high-density signaling system, Rebuilding
the Kearney, N.J., electrical substation
Other
Flood adaptation
Name of utility company State measures [$bn 2012] Adaptation description
Waste water treatment 0.61–0.81 j Flood protection, power backup systems
and drinking water (no climate change addressed)
Health center N/A Install secondary power supplies
TOTAL NYC/NJ $9.3 bn ($2.9 bn, NJ+ $6.4 bn, NYC)
ahttp://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/01/10/rate-counsel-urges-utilities-to-take-cost-benefit-approach-to-grid-
upgrades/
bhttp://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/dec/20/state-officials-mull-end-lipa/
chttp://www.coned.com/documents/2013-rate-filings/$1-Billion-Storm-Investments.pdf
dhttp://hoboken.patch.com/articles/port-authority-estimates-sandy-damage-at-300m
ehttp://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2013/02/nj_transit_and_developer_lcor.html
fhttp://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/03/13/nj-transit-approves-17-million-to-continue-post-sandy-repairs/
ghttp://www.ny1.com/content/politics/political_news/176904/mta-gets-high-praise-from-council-at-sandy-response-
hearing
hhttp://www.progressiverailroading.com/amtrak/news/PostHurricane-Sandy-Amtrak-requests-336-million-in-
emergency-funds-New-Jersey-Transit-estimates-damage-at-400-million-33592#
ihttps://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/fecorp/newsroom/news_releases/jcp-l-to-invest--200-million-in-2013-to-
enhance-customer-service.html
jhttp://mediamatters.org/blog/2013/01/04/fox-news-bogus-hunt-for-pork-in-sandy-bill-cont/192035
khttp://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mta-exploring-inflatable-expandable-devices-seal-tunnels-article-1.1208561
lhttp://www.cityandstateny.com/storm-proofing-the-mta/
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Table 2.23. Summary of costs for Strategy 1b Open Resilient City+ (all in $2012 valuesa)
Wet flood- Dry flood
Elevation Proofing Proofing
[$ bn] [$ bn] [$ bn]
Cost applying building codes NYC $2.9–$4.7 bn $0.5–$2.0 bn $1.3–$2.1 bn
Costs infrastructure measures NYC $6.4 bn $6.4 bn $6.4 bn
Total Costs Strategy 1b, Resilient City+ (NYC) $9.3–$11.1 bn $6.9–$8.4 bn $7.7–$8.5 bn
Costs infrastructure measures NJ $3 bn $3 bn
Costs applying building codes NJ $$1 bn $1 bn $1 bn
Grant Total NJ+NYC Strategy 1b, Resilient City+ $11.3–13.1 $10.9–12.4 bn $11.7–12.5 bn
aAll summary cost tables are in US$ 2012 values. Indexing was applied using the Construction Cost Index from ENR
(Engineering News-Record, http://enr.construction.com/economics). The CCI annual escalation rate was set to 2.4%,
on May 2nd 2013.
NYS and $7.4 bn for NJ, respectively, adding up
to a total of $16.4 bn. Note, however, that these
are very preliminary estimates, and probably some
cost categories for adaptation are missing. For ex-
ample, adaptation measures for parks and wetlands
are not included. These rough estimates, therefore,
only provide an indication of the potential size of
the required budget for adaption, and we can as-
sume the adaptation costs for protecting and re-
silience measures of infrastructure in the NYC-NJ
Hudson area lies somewhere between $11.3 bn and
$16.4 bn.
Power utilities. In response to the storm, Con Edi-
son is exploring approximately $1 bn in storm pro-
tection measures that include (ConEd, 2013): re-
configuring network boundaries, separating flood
and non-flood areas ($100 mln), relocating over-
head lines underground ($200 mln), hardening
electric and steam production facilities with new
walls and flood barriers ($165 mln), and protect-
ing 13 substations in low-lying areas against floods
($240 mln). These efforts are all expected to take 3
years of construction works. Additional flood pro-
tection costs for PSE&G, to protect substations lo-
cated in coastal flood zones are estimated at $1–2
bn. On top of the hundreds of millions spent on
Hurricane Sandy relief and repair efforts, JCP&L
has announced plans to invest nearly $200 mln in
2013 to expand and strengthen its existing infras-
tructure. Planned projects include a new substation,
building new circuits, replacing underground ca-
bles, inspecting and replacing utility poles, and on-
going vegetationmanagement programs (Firstener-
gycorp, 2013).
Before Hurricane Sandy, LIPA launched a flood
adaptation program of $500 mln over 20 years
to prepare the utility network for (future) flood-
ing (LIPA, 2012). The program aimed at minimiz-
ing damage caused by severe storms, and creat-
ing more resilience by minimizing outage times.
Concrete proposed measures to reduce the elec-
trical transmission and distribution system ex-
posure to flooding include: equipment reposi-
tioning to mitigate flooding issues, reinforcing
foundations to support critical equipment, and
undergrounding new transmission lines.
Transport.While repairing damaged tunnels, tracks
signals, and stations, adaptation measures can be
implemented to increase resilience. For example,
floodadaptationplans inHobokenarebeing consid-
ered, and the NJ government has proposed building
a local seawall to preventflooding andupgrading the
Hoboken terminal with flood prevention measures.
The MTA and Port Authority are considering gates
to close tunnels in case of a storm or, alternatively,
inflatable plugs (NYD, 2012) that can seal tunnels
entrances in case of a flood event. Inflatable plugs
cost about $0.4 bn each. The costs of steel gates cost
about $45mln per tunnel (NYD, 2012). Other mea-
sures include elevating subway entrances and ven-
tilation grates, hardening electric equipment and
signals, increasing pumping capacity, and installing
local flood protection measures.
It is difficult to estimate the additional adaptation
costs for the transport organization as the MTA.
Some adaptation costs for the MTA will be main-
streamed in the clean up and restoration costs that
are estimate at $5.1 bn (CaS, 2013). On the Federal
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scale, ‘ . . . half of the $10.9 bn of the federal budget
of Sandy repairs, is earmarked for projects aimed at
reducing future damage, hence beyond just repair-
ing the systems.’ (CaS, 2013). We, therefore, take
a conservative estimate of 40% from the estimated
MTA repair costs, labeled as the additional adap-
tation costs, for proofing MTA facilities for future
flood risk, estimated at ∼$2 bn.
Other. For waste water and drinking water infras-
tructure, cost estimates for repair and cleaningwaste
and pollution, and for improving drinking water,
are estimated at $0.61–$0.81 bn for the states of NY
and NJ (MM, 2013). However, these estimates do
not take into account the impact of future climate
change. For the whole of the US, climate adaptation
measures for drinking water and waste water facil-
ities would cost between $448 and $944 bn up to
2050 (MM, 2013).
Summary costs of Strategy 1b Open Resilient
City+
Table 2.23 summarizes the costs of Strategy 1bOpen
Resilient City+. The table adds the range of costs for
building codemeasures for all buildings (existing or
new) with costs for protecting infrastructure. The
table shows the order of magnitude of the total costs
for implementing building codes with the adapta-
tion cost for upgrading infrastructure. The range of
costs lies between $10.9 and $13.1 bn, dependent on
the combination of measures.
These figures are without adaptation costs in the
NJ Hoboken–Raritan river area. The total cost for
adaptation in NJ is estimated by the State of NJ at
$7.4 bn (NJ, 2012). Note that these cost are not la-
beled ‘adaptation’ but ‘mitigation and prevention
costs’. Table 2.23 shows the total cost of adaptation
measures for infrastructure only. For the Hoboken–
Raritan area in NJ these costs are estimated at
$2.9 bn. Furthermore, we also need an estimate
of the costs of implementing building codes in the
NJ area. Using the USGS NLCD land cover dataset
(USGS, 2001), we have compared the urban area
flooded in NJ counties (Bergen, Hudson, Essex,
Union, Middlesex, andMonmouth) with the urban
area of NYC flooded by Hurricane Sandy. The total
developed area flooded by Sandy in NYC boroughs
and NJ counties was calculated (see Appendix K).
The results show that inNJ around128km2 of urban
area was affected, compared to 96 km2 in NYC. This
indicates that in NJ roughly 1.33 times the amount
of urban area is at risk compared to NYC. Assuming
similar types of buildings in NJ and in NYC, this
would mean that the costs of implementing build-
ing codes in NJ will be about 1.33 times the cost
of implementing them in NYC. However, because
there is much uncertainty around these numbers,
we assume a conservative estimate of the adaptation
costs for implementing enhanced building codes in
NJ to be $1 bn. Adding adaptation costs for infras-
tructure with the cost for building codes results in
total adaptation costs for NJ of $4 bn. This lies well
within the range of the total estimated adaptation
costs for the whole Sate of NJ of $7.4 bn (NJ, 2012),
whereas our estimate of $4 bn only pertains to the
area in NJ that would be protected by storm surge
barriers.
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Developing a floodmanagement strategy that either
aims at enhancing building codes (Strategy 1b, c,
Resilient City) or relies on storm surge barriers
(Strategies 2a,b, and c), is not sufficient; additional
flood protection measured are needed to fully pro-
tect the NYC and NJ. There are numerous exam-
ples measures appropriate for protecting the NYC
coastline, but these need to be tailored with de-
signs that address numerous guidelines and bound-
ary and permit requirements. Such detailed analyses
are not feasible in the present research, and there-
forewehave categorized themain typesof additional
flood protectionmeasures as those that can comple-
ment either theResilientOpenCity Strategy to anew
Hybrid Strategy 1c or the storm surge barrier strate-
gies. We have broadly indicated where those mea-
sures couldbe implemented (SeeAppendix I). These
flood protection categories are linked to two shore-
line characteristics: (1) geomorphological charac-
teristics of the coastline and (2) urban density and
land-use type. The combination ofmorphology and
land use types broadly characterizes the coastline in
10 different segment types, which can be linked to
the flood protection measure that is required for
each coastal segment. The coastal morphological
types and land use types are listed in Appendix I.
As with the cost estimate of storm surge barriers,
many factors determine the final maintenance and
construction costs of additional flood protection
measures, such asfloodwalls, dams, andbeachnour-
ishment. Similarly, costs also depend on planning
and engineering costs, material costs, labor costs,
and costs for permits, management, and mainte-
nance.
3.1 Floodwalls
The T-wall and the L-wall are pile-founded struc-
tures that consist of a reinforced concrete wall and
a base with steel pile cut-off (Figure 3.1). Steel or
concrete piles are placed towards the protected and
flood sides and are the main components that sup-
port the concrete wall and base. The purpose of the
steel sheet piling is to provide a seepage cut-off be-
neath the wall. T-walls are typically considered for
a floodwall system in cases where there is a poten-
tial for barge or boat impact, or where there is a
potential for foundation instability due to hydraulic
loading (USACE, 2008).
Bos (2008) provides the costs of different types of
concrete floodwalls for theNewOrleans East polder.
The costs were derived from historical construc-
tion costs (Table 3.1). Note that the construction
costs of levees or floodwalls are differently priced
than the construction costs of storm surge barriers.
Levees are initially built for a shorter lifetime than
barriers and need an upgrade every 10–30 years.
A barrier has a lifetime of 100–150 years. An up-
grade of the levees is applied, at the end of each
decade, to keep pace with the rising sea (Wei-Shiuen
and Mendelsohn, 2005). It is assumed that this
methodof dynamic adaptation ismost profitable for
NYC because the construction costs are spread over
years.
3.2 Earth filled and armored dikes in
high-density urban areas
A dike is defined as an earth-filled levee body with
a seal of stone or asphalt. This design can cope with
considerable wave overtopping without the risk of
a levee breach. The flexible asphalt increases the
costs of the levee system, but also reduces the risk
of a breach during storm and overtopping condi-
tions. Dijkman et al. (2007) selects a levee design
with slopes of 1:6 at the surge side. Such a slope is
cost-effective for wave energy dissipation. The inner
slope chosen is at 1:4, which is a safe value consider-
ing overflow and soil mechanical stability (Hillen
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Figure 3.1. Two types of floodwalls applied in New Orleans (adapted from Nelson, 2010).
et al., 2010). Studies by Dijkman (2007), Hillen
et al. (2010), and Jonkman et al. (2013) provide an
overview of alternative levee costs for New Orleans
and other locations. A reinforced dike is similar to
an earthen dike, except that it is constructed of hori-
zontal layers of earthwrappedwithwoven geotextile
or steel sheet piles for added support. Reinforcement
allows for steeper side slopes, allowing less fill and a
smaller footprint. The reinforcement also provides
for erosion resistance on the side slopes.
Dijkman (2007) determined unit cost prices for
New Orleans levees to be €5 mln to €8 mln per
kilometer for a meter (3 ft) dike heightening. Up-
grading existing dikes is seen as construction costs
because the costs are not yearly and the levees have
to be reconstructed in a sense. Dijkman (2007) es-
timated the price for upgrading existing dikes at
$27.1mln/km. A complete new 30 ft hurricane levee
in water for New Orleans cost between $40 and
$85 mln/ km depending on the height of the levee
(Dijkman, 2007).
Annual dikemaintenance costs per linear kilome-
ter of dikes are reported to range from $0.028 mln
in Vietnam (Hillen 2008) and US$ 0.14 mln in
the Netherlands (Hillen et al., 2010). The variabil-
ity in costs is largely because maintenance in the
Netherlands is well organized and has high political
priority. This is not the case in many other coun-
tries where maintenance programs are less rigor-
ous. To a lesser extent, local factors such as labor
and material costs influence the maintenance costs.
3.3 Retrofitting bulkheads in high-density
urban areas
In many locations, the NYC shoreline is fortified
with wooden bulkheads, essentially retaining walls
Table 3.1. Costs for T-walls and L-walls (adapted from Bos, 2008)
costs in M€/km
per m
Type of floodwall $/Ft €/m M€/km height (m) heightening
7-Foot High L-Wall with 6-Foot Wide Monoliths 3200 7874 7.87 2.13 3.7
8-Foot High T-Wall with 8-Foot Wide Monoliths 3400 8366 8.37 2.44 3.43
10-Foot High T-Wall with 8-Foot Wide Monoliths 4100 10089 10 09 3.05 3.31
12-Foot High T-Wall with 11-Foot Wide Monoliths 5100 12549 12.55 3.66 3.43
14-Foot High L-Wall with 11-Foot Wide Monoliths 6300 15502 15.50 4.27 3.63
16-Foot High L-Wall with 11-Foot Wide Monoliths 7000 17224 17.22 4.88 3.53
18-Foot High L-Wall with 13-Foot Wide Monoliths 8300 20423 20.42 5.49 3.72
20-Foot High T-Wall with 14-Foot Wide Monoliths 9900 24360 24.36 6.1 3.99
22-Foot High T-Wall with 16-Foot Wide Monoliths 10800 26575 26.58 6.71 3.96
24-Foot High T-Wall with 17-Foot Wide Monoliths 12202 30020 30.02 7.32 4.1
26-Foot High L-Wall with 6-Foot Wide Monoliths 14600 35925 35.93 7.92 4.54
28-Foot High L-Wall with 6-Foot Wide Monoliths 15500 38140 38.14 8.53 4.47
30-Foot High L-Wall with 6-Foot Wide Monoliths 16800 41339 41.34 9.14 4.52
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Figure 3.2. Example of vinyl bulkheads (adapted from
Ecobuilders, 2012).
that are generally made of steel or wood, and stretch
10–20 ft below the water surface and at least 4
feet above. They were built to prevent soil erosion
and flooding, and to maintain sufficient navigation
width. Many of the bulkheads are more than 50
years old and bulkheads are often in poor condition.
Many sections will require replacement because of
age, oxidation, and damage through collision with
ice and floating debris. The replaced bulkheads will
often be higher than the old construction, and can
be made of wood or vinyl (Figure 3.2) or concrete.
Wooden bulkheads are usually the least expensive,
and consist of pilings being driven for the supports.
In some areas, bulkheads are replaced by armored
grades. An example is the shoreline stabilization
project at Floyd Bennett Field. This shore had an old
bulkhead located in Jamaica Bay, Brooklyn, and the
goal of the project was to prevent future erosion of
the coastline by installing a new stone embankment.
The existing steel sheet pile bulkhead was removed
and replaced by a grading of the bank slope. After
the removal and grading, stone protection was de-
veloped on the graded bank (Figure 3.3). The costs
of this project were estimated at >$400,000 (2010
values) (DEC, 1997).
We apply a unit cost range between $10 and $41
mln/km,dependingonwhether the retrofittedbulk-
head is developed in low- or high-density urban ar-
eas. Themaximum number is derived from the unit
cost price of L-shaped floodwalls of 30 ft. because
bulkheads are often located in high-density urban
areas with high-value property, and retrofitting is a
combination of fill and developing a floodwall.
3.4 Mixed highway and floodwall in
high-density urban areas
This measure partly elevates existing roads along
the coastline to create a road on top of a levee.
This measure may disturb a large ground area be-
cause the road prism could extend considerably
to either side of the existing road embankment
(Figure 3.4). As with the earthen dike, the wa-
ter side of the embankment would need to
incorporate armoring measures to address poten-
tial erosion and scour. Additionally, the design
would need to incorporate measures, such as a
precast-concrete open-bottom culverts, to convey
storm water and allow pedestrian and wildlife
passage.
Another option is to elevate the road on stilts,
without a fill, and create space underneath the road,
for example, for car parking and storage; the water
side of the elevated roads needs to be closed with
a floodwall. An example for such an option is the
FDR drive in Manhattan (Figure 3.5), for which
several plans have been developed, such as the East
River Blue Way plan (www.eastriverblueway.org).
We apply a unit cost price of $70 and $80 mln/km,
which is about twice the price of a high L shaped
floodwall.
3.5 Mix of levees and landfill in medium
to highly-urbanized areas
Coastal areas with medium to high density built
up areas, mixed land use (varying from residential
to commercial or industrial), and overall hardened
straits or bulkheads comprise a common coastal
type in NYC. For example, the East River side of
Brooklyn, the South Bronx, and parts of western
Staten Island are examples of such a coastal type.
Fordevelopingcoastal protectionmeasures, detailed
studies are needed to determine the most optimal
solution. In some areas, old bulkheads will be re-
placed, or shorelines will be strengthened. Some
areas have buildings on the shore, and a small
floodwall is needed to prevent floodwaters enter-
ing the land. An example of a design where a
small scale levee has been integrated in the wa-
ter front is presented in Figure 3.6. Other areas
are either more open or need simple landfill. Al-
though this mixed class of flood protection encom-
passes a mix of measures, we here apply a relatively
high unit cost price of $50 mln/km, which is much
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Figure 3.3. New graded bank protected by stones replaced the old steel bulkhead at Floyd Bennett Field, Jamaica Bay, Brooklyn
(source: Ap Construction, 2012).
higher than the unit cost price of upgrading a levee
estimated by Dijkman (2007) of $27.1 mln/km.
However, since this is medium-to-high urban
density area land prices are higher, and there is
a lack of space to develop levees and the possible
retrofitting of existing buildings to incorporate the
levee system.
3.6 Earth filled dikes in low-density urban
areas
Low-density urban areas with relatively large areas
of green space and wetlands can be protected with
a combination of relatively cheap earth-filled levees
(e.g. Nordenson et al., 2010). As it is expected that
flow velocities are low in these areas, a seal of stone
or asphalt is not necessary to prevent erosion. The
design has shallow grades to allow for themaximum
environmental values.We apply a lowunit cost price
of $10 mln/km
3.7 Beach nourishment
Ocean currents move sand from Montauk Point in
the east towardNYCin thewest,whichoverall causes
coastal erosion. According to Leatherman and Allan
(1985), most of the Long Island southern coasts
have been eroding over the period 1834–1979, with
some exceptions where groins or jetties have been
installed. Coastal erosion also occurs in the north-
ern part of the New Jersey shores, from Sandy Hook
to Asbury Park. Historic mean erosion rates were
about 2.6 ft/yr (0.8 m/yr) between 1836 and 1985
(Gornitz, 2000). Some research also suggests that
a seawall and groin complex near Sea Bright (NJ)
has increased erosion rates at Sandy Hook (Psuty
Figure 3.4. Highway with sheet pile floodwall (Left); elevated cantilevered highway (Right) (source: WSDT, 2012).
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Figure 3.5. WXY proposes transformation of Manhattan’s East River waterfront, with tidal pools and salt marshes creating a soft
edge for the waterfront (source: WXY architects; www.eastriverblueway.org).
and Namikas, 1991). Most of the southern coasts of
Long Island (Rockaways, Coney Island) and New
Jersey consist of flood-exposed barrier islands.
For these areas, beach nourishment already is a
frequently implemented measure to restore sandy
parts in order to protect the city from floodwaters
(Gornitz et al, 2002). Sand comes from offshore
sand bars, usually within several kilometers of the
beach, at depths of around 10–20 m below present
mean sea level. The sand is closely matched with
the original beach sand, in terms of mean grain size
and overall size distribution. The U.S. Army Corps
Figure 3.6. A proposed pedestrian and bicycle bridge at 14th Street forms a security and flood barrier for a substation while
connecting to the waterfront (source: WXY architects).
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of Engineers uses a methodology to estimate the
volumes of sand needed to nourish a beach. This
volume depends on beach profiles, profile depth,
and the length of the shoreline. Especially during
the last 10–20 years, nourishment projects have
increased because of increased availability of fed-
eral funds, and shifts in management from hard
shoreline protection to nourishment. The lifetime
of a beach nourishment project ranges between 25–
50 years, with initial and periodic costs. About
81 mlnm3 (106 mln cy) of sand has been nourished
onNYbeaches in theperiod1960–2007 (WC, 2012).
Groins, jetties, or breakwaters can be co-developed
with beach nourishment and have the goal to reduce
wave impact.
Future beach nourishment is necessary to antici-
pate climate changeand sea level rise.Gornitz (2000)
reports that the erosion rates for NY beaches could
increase 3 to 6 times by the 2050s, and 4 to 10 times
by the 2080s, relative to the 2000s. To compensate
for these losses, Gornitz (2000) calculates that an
increase of 4.4–18.7%, and 5.4–25.6% of additional
sand volumes would be needed by the 2050s and
2080s, respectively, to offset increased erosion. A
possible challenge is the limited availability of sand
to meet future demands.
The USACE (2006) reports on beach nourish-
ment costs for Long Beach Island, with a length of
18,000 ft (5830 meters). The plan includes rede-
veloping a berm with a width of 33 m (∼110 ft)
at an elevation of 3.3 m (10 ft) with a dune crest
of 5 m (15 ft) in elevation (all to NDVG). The to-
tal sand fill quantity is 2.17 mln m3 (2.85 mln cy),
including overfill and tolerance, and will add be-
tween 30–130 m (100–400 ft) of new beach to the
existing beach at NDVG. Periodic nourishment, es-
timated at $0.41 mln m3 ($0.54 mln cy) every 5
years (∼ $3.5 mln) is planned in order to main-
tain the new beach profile. The total costs of the
sand fill are estimated at $18.6 mln, excluding new
groins, bulkheads, and sea walls. When including
12 new groins and reconditioning existing groins,
the total costs may rise to $42.4 mln for the 5.8 km
of coastline. These totals include contingencies of
15%.When taking the $18.6mln as a lower estimate
and the $42.4 mln as a higher estimate, the total ini-
tial coasts of this nourishment can be estimated at
$3.2–7.3 mln/km, with a lifetime of 30 years and
additional yearly costs of $0.6 mln/km. The vol-
ume cost of nourishment sand is $7–18/cy (USACE,
2006).
Valverde et al. (1999) studied the nourishment
on the US East coast. In the period 1960–1996
$1.3 bn was spent on nourishment projects, funded
by both federal and non-federal sources. For the
future, Aerts et al. (2009) have roughly estimated
the volumes of sand necessary for beach nourish-
ment in NYC sandy coasts, for a sea level rise of
∼20 cm and an accelerated sea level rise of 80 cm,
with 4 and 17 mln m3/yr of sand, respectively. At an
average price of $8/m3 ($10/cy) this would result in
$3.2–13.6 bn over a period of 100 years. Leatherman
(1989), however, concludes that the cost of beach
nourishment for New York from a 50 to 200 cm rise
in sea level by 2100 is estimated to be $0.7–2.6 bn,
which is considerably lower.
Nourishment with hidden dike
In order to additionally protect nourished beaches,
Athow (1976) suggests not only nourishing beaches
in the Rockaways but backing this up by a floodwall
in order to prevent erosion and withstand future
hurricanes. Such a technique has been recently ap-
plied in the coastal city of Noordwijk in the Nether-
lands. The dunes at this location will be extended
by adding new sand from the sea bottom until he
beach reaches an elevation of +8.5–10 m (+25–
30 ft) above MSL. However, a new dike will be
placed inside this new system of dunes. Addition-
ally, the beaches in front of the dunes will be nour-
ished to raise the coastline, creating a smooth tran-
sition from the widened dunes to the existing beach
(SEO, 2006). The ‘dike in dune’ project in Noord-
wijk (Figure 3.7) costs about €45 mln (2006 values)
for dune widening and a ‘hidden levee’ within the
dunewith a lengthof 1.1 km(0.7mile). Theunit cost
price is, hence, $45mln/km, without periodic beach
nourishment to maintain the beach and the dune
profile.
3.8 Nature restoration and augmentation
Jamaica Bay remains one of the largest and most
productive coastal ecosystems in the Northeastern
United States, and includes the largest tidal wet-
land complex in the New York Metropolitan Area
(Figure 3.8). The area is important for migrating
birds and more than eighty fish species (USDI,
2007). JamaicaBay’s tidalmarshes alsoprovideflood
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Figure 3.7. Model of a dike within a dune and beach strengthening project in the beach resort Noordwijk in theNetherlands (Top)
(Adapted from: http://www.kustvisie.nl/noordwijk.php). Photo of the dike within dune project in Noordwijk, just after completion
(Bottom) (adapted from: http://www.hooijmans-noordwijk.nl/keuze/dijkaanzee.html).
protection for nearbybusinesses and residences, and
play an important role in buffering flood inunda-
tion volumes and in reducing wave impacts during
extreme flood events.
It has been recognized that Jamaica Bay’s tidal
wetlands are rapidly disappearing, and that between
1924 and 1999 half of the Bay’s vegetated marsh
islands disappeared (USDI, 2007). From analyses
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Figure 3.8. Area where wetland restoration measures can be
implemented in combination with traditional levee and flood-
walls: Jamaica Bay Unit of the Gateway National Recreation
Area (source; http://www.digplanet.com/wiki/Jamaica_Bay_
Wildlife_Refuge).
of satellite imagery, it appears that on the marsh
islands tidal creeks are expanding and vegetated
areas are transforming first into mud flats and then
to sand flats as they disappear. The reason for this
trend is probably a combination of a reduced in-
flowof sediment through the channelingof overland
flow into sewers, and the hardening of the coastline
that also reduces sediment flows in combination
with increased nutrient flow from four major water
treatment plants. Already, marsh island restoration
is being seen as an important measure to balance
out marsh island loss. Such measures are continu-
ously needed in the future to preserve the natural
values.
Wetland and salt marsh restoration can be effec-
tive for stabilizing existing wetlands because they
serve as flood protection and shoreline erosion con-
trol for theBay’s surroundinghomes andbusinesses.
They dissipate wave energy, minimize storm surge,
and provide flood-risk reduction benefits. The idea
behind marshland stabilization is to stabilize the
wetlands through preventing further degradation
and, in addition, creating new wetlands. The mea-
sures include mechanical supply of sediment to
the marshland islands for a longer time period.
This sediment is used for plugging and filling the
marshlands (restoration) or separating open water
into compartments in order to reduce wind fetch
and, thereby, limit the erosion process (stabilizing)
(Figure 3.9). Small cranes and barges bring sedi-
ment into the area, e.g. from the foreshore. On top
of the sand fill, the accumulation of plant detri-
tus will naturally add another half an inch per year
Figure 3.9. Overview of which fetch reduction measures and canal plugging for marshland stabilization (left). Fill and the
development of small ridge or levees to reduce flood impacts (right). Adapted from Dijkman, 2007.
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Table 3.2. Summary table with overview of costs for different flood protection measures (all in $ 2012 values)
LEVEE FILL
Total Cost per meter Maintenance Costs Maintenance
costs heightening costs levee Fill Costs costs marshland
($ mln/km) ($ mln/km) ($ mln /km) ($/cy) ($mln/m2) ($ mln /m2)
1 Flood T-wall (24 ft) 15–30a 4.5a 0.1b
1 Flood L-wall (30 ft) 30–50a 4.7a 0.1b
2 Dike 27a 8a 0.1b
2 Hurricane dike 65b 9 b 0.1b
3 (Retrofit-) bulkhead 41 8a 0.1b
4 Mix highway & floodwall 70–80 0.2b
5 Mixed levee 50 8a 0.2
6 Flood protection low density 10 4a 0.05b
7 Beach nourishment 7 0.1d 12
7 Hidden levee + nourishment 30–45 8a 0.1
8 Marshland stabilization 3.6b 0.07b
9 Land-fill 50c
aBos (2008).
bDijkman (2007).
cPersonal com. Perkins (Appendix H).
dUSACE (2006).
(Dijkman, 2007). This work will be continued ev-
ery year during the forthcoming decades in order
to achieve a new natural equilibrium that will sus-
tain itself despite sea level rise. In order to minimize
the impact from waves and surges, surge reduction
measures can be implemented, for example, at reg-
ular intervals (roughly every few miles) culverts are
built in a traditional levee or ridge-levees to allow
water, sediment and nutrient exchange (Figure 3.9).
Currently, the U.S. Army Corps is working in
the Jamaica Bay area with the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, the National Park Ser-
vice (Gateway), the New York City Department
of Environmental Protection, the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, Na-
tional Resources Conservation Service, and theNew
York/New Jersey Harbor Estuary Program. For ex-
ample, to restore Yellow Bar Hassock marsh island,
375,000 cubic yards of dredged sand was pumped
on the island to maintain the proper elevations of
the marsh island. The sand was dredged from the
Ambrose Channel (See Section 4.4), part of the
Army Corps’ New York/New Jersey Harbor Deep-
ening Project. Usually, this sand is dumped into the
ocean; but instead it is now used for marshland
restoration.
Dijkman (2007) estimates that marshland stabi-
lization andmarshland creation for theNewOrleans
area costs between $1.9 and $3.6/m2.
3.9 Landfill of parkland in high-density
urban area
This measure refers to (partly) elevating parkland
and other low density areas to create an elevated
waterfront, but with a very shallow grade, so the
views of the waterfront remain, as well as accessi-
bility. An example of such an area is Battery Park,
where these requirements are important. Landfill is
expensive, because of the transport costs of bringing
fillmaterial into urban areas. Prices of alternative fill
materials, other than sand, depend onmarket prices
and availability. Price can go up to $50/cy.
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4.1 Introduction
Here, we provide an overview of the existing storm
surge barrier designs that were presented at the
2009 conference ‘Against the Deluge: Storm Surge
Barriers to Protect New York City’ (Hill et al.,
2013). Each of these designs is discussed using
criteria for a conceptual barrier design by Dircke
et al. (2011). Furthermore, we provide an overview
of the construction and maintenance costs of ex-
isting barriers. Finally, an overview of required ad-
ditional protection measures and their associated
costs is presented.
In March 2009, the conference “Against the del-
uge: Storm Surge Barriers to Protect NewYork City”
was organized in NYC. A key issue discussed dur-
ing this conference was to explore the feasibility of
developing storm surge barriers to protect the city
from flooding in times of high water levels. Storm
surgebarriers or closuredams are engineering struc-
tures in rivers or estuaries to protect urbanized areas
with high values of economic assets from flooding.
Storm surge barriers can have movable gates to al-
low for shipping and tidal flows, which are closed
during an extreme flooding event. Non-navigable
barriers only allow for the inflow and outflow of
water discharge. Closure dams are fixed structures
that permanently close off a river mouth or estu-
ary, and with such a structure water is discharged
through, or pumped over, a closure dam. Since
storm surge barriers are expensive, most existing
storm surge barriers were implemented after a flood
disaster occurred. After a flood event, risk percep-
tions are generally high (Botzen et al., 2009) and
policy makers can more easily justify large expenses
for flood protection to the public. For example, the
ThamesBarrier in theUKand theDeltaWorks in the
Netherlands were developed after themajor flood in
1953. Themost recent barrierswere installed inNew
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (e.g. Dircke
et al., 2011; Hillen et al., 2010).
Storm surge barriers have a number of advantages
and disadvantages that are important to recognize.
An advantage, for example, is that in the event of a
permanent closure of estuaries through construct-
ing a barrier the length of the coastline is reduced.
Therefore, the required height of floodwalls behind
the barrier can be reduced, which reduces the cost
for the heightening or maintenance of the levees
behind the barrier (Hillen et al., 2010). Moreover,
a barrier system can provide a comprehensive pro-
tection of all the buildings and infrastructure in the
City, and prevent flood casualties. This is in contrast
to Building Code measures which are often targeted
only at certain specific structures (Aerts and Botzen,
2011). In addition, a multiple barriers system that
closes different parts of an estuary or lagoon may
be used to provide environmental benefits by in-
creased capacity to flush the estuary area. This is
achieved by independently opening and closing dif-
ferent barriers, depending on factors like tide and
wind direction. By closing the barriers, the abil-
ity of the wind to drive water out of the lagoon
is enhanced, which increases the turnover of wa-
ter and disperses pollutants (Linham and Nicholls,
2010).
Themaindisadvantagesof abarrier systemare the
huge construction and maintenance costs. In addi-
tion,movable barriers also require simultaneous in-
vestment in flood warning systems, which provides
information on when to close the barrier (Linham
and Nicholls, 2010). Furthermore, the morphology
and environmental values of the estuary or river
system can be affected in terms of interrupted water
salinity, temperature, suspended matter, and nutri-
ents (Munaretto et al., 2012). The latter issue could
play a role in designing a barrier system for the NYC
Harbor area.However, the salinity regimeof thehar-
bor and sediment flow dynamics could be altered by
installing the barriers, which is likely to impact fish
and shellfish distribution (Swanson et al., 2009).
Another indirect effect on flood risk management is
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Figure 4.1. New York City and surrounding waters.
that flood risk perceptions and investment in dam-
age preventionmaydecrease after barriers have been
installed, which can cause a steady increase in the
exposure to flooding behind the barriers system as
a result of economic growth. This has been called
“the levee effect” and implies that additional flood
risk management and awareness strategies may be
needed to prevent extensive flood damage if a bar-
rier system fails during extreme flood conditions
(Botzen et al., 2012).
4.2 Geographical and hydrological
characteristics
Hydrological considerations for barriers
Numerous descriptive and modeling studies have
described the hydrology and hydrodynamic circula-
tion of theHudson Estuary, theNYHarbor area and
the NY Bight (for an overview, see Blumberg et al.,
1999). The New York Harbor (Figure 4.1) is located
at the mouth of the Hudson River, which discharges
to the ocean via New York Bay and the Verrazano
Narrows. This area is bounded by Brooklyn in the
east and Staten Island in the west. The second con-
nection of the Hudson River/New York Bay to the
Atlantic Ocean is via the East River and Long Island
Sound.
Long Island Sound (LIS) is an estuary of about
165 km with a mean depth of 20 m (Table 4.1).
Its main opening to the Atlantic Ocean lies to the
east, with a tidal transport of about 40,000 m3/s
(Bowman, 1977). The estuary has a serious wa-
ter quality problem in the summer due to high-
nutrient wastewater discharges into the upper East
River (Bowman, 1977; NYC-DEP, 2008). The lower
East River, from the Battery (Lower Manhattan) to
Hell Gate, connectsNewYorkHarborwith thewest-
ern LIS and is also shaped by tidal currents. The
East River is about 12 km long and is narrower
and deeper than the LIS estuary. The upper East
River, which is about 13.5 km in length, is shal-
lower and wider than the lower East River. It en-
compasses several bays and islands and has a ship-
ping channel with an average depth of about 11
m below mean low water (MLW). In the northeast
of Manhattan, the Harlem River connects the East
River at Hell Gate to the Hudson River at Spuyten
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Table 4.1. Overview of hydraulic conditions of important rivers, channels, and estuaries
Long Island
Sound (between Arthur
Whitestone and Lower Kill,
Freshwater Throgs Neck East Harlem Perth Rockaway Ambrose
inflow Bridges) River River Amboy Narrows inlet Channel
Mean depth in m and
(ft)b ,e
20/(61) 11/(33) 12/(36) 30/(90)
Max. Depth of channel in
m and (ft)d ,e
∼34/(109) 7/(20) 16/(48) 33/(102) 7/(20) 17/(53)
Distance across channel
inm
750–1500 850 ∼180 500 – 750 1600–1800 1700
Volume of tidal transport
in m3/sa
40,000 6,700 330 41,000
Max. Tidal current in
m3/sc ,g
1–2.6 1.5–1.8 1.1–1.3 1.1–2.4 2.2–3.0 1.4–2.6
Mean discharge of
Hudson in m3/sg
600
Mean discharge of other
fresh water sources
in m3/sg
114
aBowman (1977) Nutrient distributions and transport in Long Island Sound. Est. Coastal Mar. Sci. 5: 531–548.
bJay, D.A. & M.J. Bowman (1975) The physical oceanography and water quality of New York Harbor and western Long
Island Sound. Mar. Sci. Res. Center. Tech. Rep. #23. State University of New York, Stony Brook, NY. pp. 71.
cUSCoast andGeodetic Survey (1956)Tidal CurrentCharts,NewYorkHarbor.USDepartment ofCommerce, Rockville,
MD.
dHugh S. Lacy1, Anthony DeVito, and Athena C. De Nivo (2009) Geotechnical Aspects of Three Storm Surge Barrier
Sites to Protect New York City from Flooding. in ASCE Proceedings of the 2009 Seminar Against the Deluge: Storm Surge
Barriers to Protect New York City.
eRonan, A.D. (2009) Student Designs of Storm Surge barriers for theNewYorkMetropolitan Area, inASCE Proceedings
of the 2009 Seminar Against the Deluge: Storm Surge Barriers to Protect New York City.
fAtlantic Boating Almanac (2004), Vol. 2: Cape Cod, MA to Sandy Hook, NJ.
gBlumberg et al. (1999).
Duyvil. The Harlem River is about 11 km in length.
Other important waterways are the Kill Van Kull
waterway (to the west of Staten Island), which be-
comes the Arthur Kill between Upper New York
Bay and Raritan Bay. It is both a commercial and
recreational waterway (Figure 4.1). In the outerNew
YorkBay, theAmbroseChannel is themain shipping
channel between Sandy Hook (NJ) and the Rock-
aways, Queens. The channel has a depth of about
∼20 m.
The highest freshwater inflow to the NY Bay area
is provided by the Hudson River. The river has a
length of 507 km that originates at Lake Tear of the
Clouds in the Adirondack Mountains and drains
a watershed of about 35,000 km2. The long-term
annual mean discharge is about 600 m3/s, with a
peak discharge in April (meanmonthly flow∼1,200
m3/s). Minimum flows occur in August (discharge
∼190m3/s).The largest recordedmonthlydischarge
was 1,900 m3/s, measured in 1960. The Hudson
River has an average depth of 10–15 m (Geyer
and Chant, 2006) and is influenced by the ocean
tide, which can propagate upstream about 300 km.
Other fresh water sources are from water treatment
plants and storm-water runoffs (e.g. Rosenzweig
et al., 2007). Blumberg et al. (1999) estimated a
runoff of 114m3/s, from 110 effluents of wastewater
treatment plants in their hydrodynamic modeling
framework. Additional runoff can be produced by
rainfall runoff.
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Estuarine circulation and environmental
issues
The current regime of the Hudson estuary is a par-
tially mixed estuary, influenced by the tidal mixing
of fresh and salt waters. Although the vertical gradi-
ent varies considerably during the neap and spring
tides, there is always a horizontal salinity gradient
(Geyer and Chant, 2006). Even during slow flow
conditions, the horizontal gradient drives salt water
to penetrate 70 km north of NY harbor (Geyer and
Chant, 2006). Furthermore, the horizontal salt wa-
ter gradient drives the estuarine circulation, which
is characterized by a deep landward flow at the
bottom (against the direction of the river flow)
and a seaward flow of water at the surface (Bow-
man, 1977; Geyer and Chant, 2006). This gravita-
tional circulation is an important issue to consider
when designing storm surge barriers. As the circula-
tion is essential to biological productivity (e.g. fish
migration) and the flushing characteristics of the
harbor, surge barriers should be designed so that
their influence on the circulation is minimal (NYC-
DEP, 2008). Blumberg et al. (1999) simulated the
annual circulation pattern of the NY harbor area
(Figure 4.2), with net flows defined as the differ-
ence between the surface layer flow (Qu) and the
lower layer flow (Ql). Figure 4.2 shows a general
Figure 4.2. Annual circulation pattern in New YorkHarbor in
1988–1989 (Adapted from Blumberg et al., 1999).
flow from the Hudson in the NY Bay area, as well
as a net flow from Long Island Sound into the NY
Bay area. The net flow continues through the Nar-
rows into the NY Bight (Blumberg et al., 1999).
Once outside the Sandy Hook–Rockaways transect
(Figure 4.1), the estuarine flow forms a coastal cur-
rent that flows south along the New Jersey Coast
(Blumberg et al., 1999). In addition, it is important
to note the 3-hour difference in Long Island Sound
low/high tides andNewYorkHarbor low/high tides.
This time difference leads to large hydraulic gradi-
ents and, hence, the large currents of > ∼2 m3/s in
the East River and over 3 m3/s at Hell Gate (Figure
4.1) at the junction of the East and Harlem Rivers
(Table 4.1).
The harbor receives a significant sediment load
from theHudson River with an average of 1mln t/yr
(Hydroqual, 2007). Siltation problems occur in the
lower Hudson estuary where the river widens as it
empties intoNewYorkHarbor and LowerNewYork
Bay. Furthermore, on the southern coast of Long Is-
land, a westwardmigration of sand and a northward
migration along theNew Jersey coast contribute fur-
ther sedimentation problems to the NY Bay area,
which requires periodic dredging to maintain the
depth of navigation channels. In relation to this is-
sue, there are problems with the disposal of dredged
material containing pollutants. Tidal currents drive
sediment transport, which could be changed by in-
stalling storm surge barriers, especially if sills are
placed in deep channels, serving as foundations for
moveable barrier gates (Bowman, 2009).
It is important to note that the proposed storm
surge barriers and their foundations must be de-
signed towithstand thewater pressure load reversals
in circulation, which will occur when a large storm
leaves the region. The barriersmust also be designed
to accommodate tide levels, which were formerly
high at storm surge but will reverse and become ex-
tremely low. Also, design water levels must consider
the water impounded upstream due to the Hudson
River flow.
Geological considerations for barrier design
The selection of the specific foundation types for
storm surge barriers will depend on the soil condi-
tions and allowable bearing pressures of geological
formations at the chosen locations. In addition, the
design loads from the tide gate structure, including
overturning moments, tensions, and mass stability,
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will influence the final design of a barrier. Other de-
sign aspects to consider are under-seepage, seismic
loading and liquefaction, environmental considera-
tions, vessel impact, and ice developing in the river
during the winter months.
Deep foundations are most likely the best op-
tion to support the tide gates because such founda-
tions are applicable in deep water and to the weak
soil conditions at locations where storm surge bar-
riers have been proposed (Lacy et al., 2009). Such
foundations can consist of piles, caissons, large pris-
matic, or cylindrical caisson walls sunk with inter-
nal dredge. In addition, anchor pilings or underwa-
ter slope stones are needed to stabilize the concrete
sills or bases. Stone-faced embankments that are
founded on competent material may be suitable for
on-shore portions and limited shallow water sec-
tions if a permanent constriction of river flow is
permitted.
4.3 Design water levels for barriers
and levees
Storm surge protectionmeasures, such as surge bar-
riers and levees, are needed to attain a certain pro-
tection level for NYC. This section describes the
estimated required height of the barriers and levees
system needed to withstand waterlevels that are as-
sociated with the conditions of a future hurricane
3, thus, including climate change and sea level rise
(e.g. Lin et al., 2012). In order to determine the re-
quired height of the flood protection measures, we
first need to determine the design water level. The
design water level is composed of different com-
ponents, which together determine the necessary
height of the protection system: storm surge level+
sea level rise + wave overtopping + barrier effect +
river discharge.
Waterlevels outside the barrier system
Storm surge water levels. There are several studies
that have estimated surge levels for a future 1/100
hurricane for NYC above mean sea level condi-
tions (e.g. Lin et al., 2010; Lin et al, 2012; Moore
et al., 1981). Simulations with the ADCIRC model
by Lin et al. (2012) show that the 1/1,000 (ex-
ceedance probability P = 0.001), 1/500 (P = 0.002),
1/100 (P = 0.01), and 1/50 (P = 0.02) storms at the
Battery result in storm tide heights of, respectively,
3.48 m (11.4 ft), 3.12 m (10.2 ft), 2.03 m (6.7 ft),
and 1.61 m (5.3 ft) This storm tide corresponds to
Figure 4.3. Location of calculation nodes of Moore et al.
(1981) inside and outside Jamaica Bay.
the total water level above mean sea level, includ-
ing the storm surge, and the astronomical tide. The
effect of wave run/up and riverine flow is small in
NYC, and thus not considered by Lin et al. (2012).
Their estimates are somewhat lower compared with
the often quoted figures reported first by Moore et
al. (1981), who estimate water levels of 2.62 m and
3.26 m (compared with NAVD88) for 1/100 and
1/500 year events, respectively. The most extreme
water level measured in the NYC area at the Battery
was due to hybrid storm Sandy in October 2012,
measuring 11.3 ft (3.4 m) above NAVD88 (mean
sea level), considerable higher than the recorded
previous highest water levels dating back to 1992
and 2011 (Hurricane Irene) with about 1.3 m.
For the Jamaica Bay area, design water levels have
to be adjusted, since existing research shows that
storm surge levels are lower than surge levels along
the coastlines of the Rockaways or Coney Island
(e.g. Moore et al., 1981). Figure 4.3 shows several
nodes from Moore et al. (1981) inside, and outside
Jamaica Bay, and Table 4.2 shows the stillwater levels
for thesenodes for various returnperiods (relative to
NGVD, an old datum). In general, surge elevations
are about 0.45m(1.5 ft) lower in JamaicaBay (nodes
with numbers >100) for a 1/10 storm and up to
1 m (∼3 ft) lower for a 1/1000 storm.We, therefore,
assume that the design heights for levees in the
Jamaica Bay area, in a strategy that aims at a
continued open access to the ocean through the
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Table 4.2. Stillwater levels (ft NGVD) for the calculation nodes of Moore et al. (1981)
Nodes/
return time 10 50 100 200 500 1000
7 7.3 9 9.7 10.7 12.2 13.3
8 7.3 9 9.7 10.7 12.2 13.2
9 7.4 9 9.8 10.8 12.2 13.3
10 7.4 9.1 9.9 10.8 12.3 13.4
109 5.7 7.1 7.8 8.6 9.7 10.6
110 5.8 7.1 7.8 8.6 9.7 10.6
113 6.1 7.3 8.1 8.8 9.9 10.8
114 5.9 7.2 8 8.7 9.8 10.7
117 5.8 7.2 7.9 8.6 9.7 10.6
134 5.9 7.2 7.9 8.7 9.7 10.6
118 5.8 7.2 7.9 8.6 9.7 10.6
Rockaway inlet, can be about 0.7 m (∼2 ft) lower as
compared with levees or dunes along the Rockaway
coastline. The design level inside Jamaica Bay will
be ∼6–7 m (∼18–22 ft).
Sea level rise
Climate change and sea level rise scenarios havebeen
extensively described by the NPCC (2009). Climate
change projections indicate that, by the end of the
century, NYC may face an increase in baseline rain-
fall of 5–10% and a rise in sea level of at least 0.31–
0.58m (12–23 inches) (NPCC, 2010). The rise in sea
level is very uncertain, and sea level rise may be con-
siderably higher if ice caps, such as theGreenland Ice
Sheet,meltmore rapidly than currentmodel studies
project. For such a scenario, NPCC (2010) provides
a ‘rapid ice melt sea level scenario’ of 1.0–1.4 m
(41–55 inches).
Rising water levels through barrier closure. The
additional surge water levels, outside the barrier
system, caused by the closure of the barriers are
confirmed by several studies. Kim et al. (2009) has
studied the effects of a surge barrier by assuming
a wind field for Hurricane Donna, which came
ashore on Long Island as a Category 1 hurricane
in 1960 (see Appendix E). They used the Estuarine
hydrodynamic model called the Coastal and Ocean
Model (ECOMSED), which is a three-dimensional,
time-dependent, estuarine, and coastal circulation
model that was originally developed by Blumberg
and Mellor (1987). When using Strategy 2b (see
paper 1), water-levels outside the barriers would
rise by +0.2 m at Sandy Hook up to 0.14 m at
Willets Points near the western end of Long Island
Sound. Bowman et al. (2005) simulated rising wa-
ter levels for Strategy 2a (see paper 1) assuming
a synthetic storm that has 1.6 times the strength of
Hurricane Floyd in 1999. Using the ADCIRChydro-
dynamic model water levels rose by +0.3 m outside
the closed East River barrier and only +0.04 m up
to 0.08 m rise in water levels at the Narrows Barrier.
The assumption of adding 0.3 m (+1 ft) of water
due to the barrier closure seems to fall well within
the range of simulated water levels.
Wave overtopping and leakage.During storm con-
ditions, wave overtopping and leakage may cause
some rise in water levels behind the flood protec-
tion system in the absence of a system failure. The
additional elevation of storm surge barriers or levees
may reduce the effects of wave overtopping. How-
ever, most existing studies on designing storm surge
barriers and levee systems for NYC have neglected
the effect of wave overtopping.
Tidal influence. Even though tidal ranges vary
across the shores of NYC and tidal dynamics vary
through time, we here assume that an average tidal
range has a peak of+1m (3 ft) abovemean sea level.
Water-levels inside the flood protection
system
The water levels on the inside (landward side) of the
barrier system may also rise through rainfall and
river runoff behind the closed barriers. Bowman
et al. (2005) have examined the peak runoff for
the New York City harbor during the passage of a
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Figure 4.4. Rising water levels behind the closed barrier system at the Battery in relation to the hours of barrier closure (adapted
from Bowman et al., 2005).
synthetically simulated version of Hurricane Floyd,
which passed through the area in 1999. A small
runoff peak of 0.36 m (14 inches) high appears, and
occurred a few hours after the peak surge levels had
dropped. This small peak can be attributed to the ef-
fect of rainfall runoff fromNew Jersey rivers directly
into the waterways. Hereafter, another small runoff
peakof 0.14m(6 inches) lasts for about 21/2 days, and
could be attributed to the runoff from the Hudson
River. Bowman et al. (2005) applied different meth-
ods to calculate the effects from runoff behind the
closed barrier system on water levels. When assum-
ing a closure of 20 hours, and weather conditions
that belonged to Hurricane Floyd, they estimate a
rise in water level inside the barriers of about 0.3 m
(12 inches). If the barriers were closed much longer,
then water levels would not significantly rise, as
Figure 4.4 shows (Bowman et al., 2005).
Final design water levels
If all maximum values of the components that de-
termine surge water levels during extreme storm
conditions are added up, then we arrive at a re-
quired height for the protection system of at least
5–6 m (15–18 ft). However, most barrier designs
prepared for the 2009 storm sure barrier confer-
ence have taken a higher design water level of 6.7 m
(20 ft) as a basis, which was based on information
by NYC-OEM (2009). In addition, almost all bar-
rier designs have added another 2–3 ft of water level
for sea level rise, and 1–2 ft was added to account
for rising waters outside the barrier when it closes.
Some designs added another 2–3 ft to accommodate
wave overtopping (Table 4.1). This results in barrier
designs with a total height between 7.5–10 m (25–
30 ft), which seems to be a very robust elevation for
a design protection level of 1/100.
We, therefore, assume that all other flooddefenses
that need to be installed in conjunction with the
barriers systems also must have a design elevation
of 7.5–10m (25–30 ft). This is higher than the surge
height simulations by Lin et al. (2012) and Horton
et al. (2010). Nevertheless, this design elevation can
be justified because it anticipates rising water levels
due to sea level rise, effects of closed barriers, wave
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impacts, and spillover, which are all not included
in the simulations by Lin et al. (2012) and Horton
et al. (2010). Furthermore, the assumption of a de-
sign height of 7.5–10m (25–30 ft), seems reasonable
when reviewing older flood protection systems and
barriers that have been built in the area. For ex-
ample, the design water levels of the New Bedford
HurricaneBarrier is∼8.6m(20.5 ft) abovemean sea
level, andwas determined by adding a 5.8m (17.4 ft)
surge to a coincident mean high water level of 1 m
(3.1 ft).
4.4 Designs of storm surge barriers and
additional measures
The description of storm surge barriers to protect
NYC from flooding are based on the conceptual de-
signs that were made for the conference ‘Against the
Deluge, Storm Surge Barriers to Protect NYC from
Flooding’ (Hill et al., 2013). The designs were made
by different engineering firms: Parsons Brincker-
hoff, US; CampDresser&McKee, US;Halcrow,UK;
and Arcadis, the Netherlands. The barrier located
at the Rockaway Inlet, which has been proposed
to protect JFK Airport, has not yet been designed
by an engineering firm; only rough designs were
made by freshman students from the Cooper Union
(Ronan, 2009) and older designs are described by
Athow (1976).
Table 4.3 shows the main design criteria that
have been outlined by Dircke et al. (2011). Based
on these criteria, the next section briefly summa-
rizes the characteristics and considerations for each
barrier design. The most important function of
storm surge barriers is retaining high water lev-
els in times of storm. Furthermore they allow ac-
cess for shipping and to some degree, for the dis-
charge of water and/or ice. In addition, environ-
mental, ecological and social impacts can play a
role and should be addressed in a barrier design.
The design criteria are listed in Table 4.3. Section 3
provides a global overview of additional protection
measures for NYC coastlines that are not protected
by each of the two barrier strategies. These mea-
sures include, for example, levees, bulkheads and
beach nourishment. These measures need to be de-
veloped such that they achieve a protection stan-
dard that is equal to the protection standard of the
barriers.
Arthur Kill storm surge barrier
Figure 4.5 shows the conceptual design of the
ArthurKill barrier,made byCampDresser&McKee
(Murphy and Schoettle, 2009). The Arthur Kill
barrier has a span of approximately 500 m
(0.31mile), and contains two navigational locks and
multiple flow control gates.
Hydraulic boundary conditions & safety. Arthur
Kill is a commercial and recreationalwaterway influ-
enced by the tide that runs betweenUpperNewYork
Bay and Raritan Bay. Murphy and Schoettle (2009)
based their design on hydraulic loadings of a Cat-
egory 3 hurricane, with an associated surge height
of 4.39 m (14.4 ft). Several other factors that were
used to determine the required height of the bar-
rier: splash of the overtopping of waves of +2.43 m
(+8.0 ft) and localized tidal elevation of 1.68 m
(+5.5 ft). This results in a minimum elevation of
the barrier of approximately 8.53 m (28 ft) (Mur-
phy and Schoettle, 2009). Swinging tidal gates are
incorporated in the barrier to allow for the passage
of the tidal flow. In terms of safety and reliability,
there is a potential for an electrical power failure
during the event of a hurricane. To ensure contin-
ued operation of the barrier during such a failure,
equipment will be available to provide emergency
power. The design will have to meet the require-
ments to withstand a magnitude 5 earthquake that
occurs once in every 100 years.
Navigation
The channel hasmoderate to heavy commercial and
recreationalmarine travel, and is classified as a “nav-
igable waterway” by the United States Coast Guard
(USCG). For this reason, the design is such that
it incorporates a dual lock structure. This enables
transportation for vessels through the barrier even
if the barrier is closed (Murphy and Schoettle 2009).
The locks are designed such that they enable to pass
an S-Class Container Ship, the largest ship with ap-
proximate dimensions of 335 m (1,100 ft) in length,
a beam width of 42.6 m (140 ft), and a depth of
10.7m (35 ft). A smaller parallel lock can be used by
other vessels.
Siting
The location for the Arthur Kill barrier was chosen
south of the Outerbridge Crossing (Appendix 1).
At this site, grades of the coastline rise rapidly near
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Table 4.3. Description of the main design criteria for the four NYC storm surge barriers (Dircke et al., 2011). ‘N/A’
means the criteria has not been addressed in the design
Barriers
Arthur Kill Verrazano Upper East River NY-NJ Outer Harbor
Main gate type Lock with gate Sliding rotating sector gates Flap gates Floating rotating sector gates
Design Category Design criteria
Hydraulic
boundary
Current surge water level
(1/100)
4.39 m (+14.4 ft) 6.4 m (+21 ft) 6.71 m (+22 ft)
conditions &
Safety
Sea level rise scenario N/A 0.9 m (+3 ft) 0.61 m (+2 ft)
Current and waves 2.42 m (+8 ft) Gates in parked position must
be largely unaffected by
waves and flow.
Tidal influence on elevation High water: 1.68 m (+5.5 ft) Normal tide: 0.9 m (+3 ft)
Effect of closing barrier N/A 0.3 m (+1 ft) 0.61 m (+2 ft) N/A
Overtopping and leaking Overtopping not permitted,
additional height of barrier
is partly based on
overtopping
Overtopping and leaking
permitted.
Overtopping has negligible
effect on water level.
Overtopping and leaking
permitted.
Hydraulic head 7.6 m (+25 ft) 7.4 m (24 ft)
Total height 8.53 m (+28 ft) 8.53 m (+28 ft) 8.23 m (+27 ft) 10 m (+30 ft)
Reverse flow/head conditions N/A Discharge of the Hudson-,
Passaic and Hackensack
Rivers.
N/A Discharge of the Hudson-,
Passaic Raritan- and
Hackensack Rivers.
Water depth >10 m Yes Yes Yes Yes
Span 500 m (0.31 mile) 1,820 m (1.13 mile) 1,360 m (0.84 mile) 9,540 m (5.92 miles)
Reliability Emergency power during
power-failure
Structural reliability: 10−4/yr Proven technology
Ship colliding N/A Addressed for further study Minimal impact: Flap gates lie
at bottom
Wind sensitivity N/A N/A Minimal impact: Flap gates lie
at bottom
Gates must withstand high
winds.
Earthquake Resist earthquake of a
magnitude 5
N/A N/A
Discharge of ice Discharge of ice needs further
investigation
Minimal: Flap gates lie at
bottom
Closure time Reliable as it is a proven
technology
Closure reliability: 10−3/yr Reliable as it is a proven
technology
Reliable as it is a proven
technology similar to St
Petersburg barrier
Navigation Clearance height Unlimited clearance Unlimited clearance Unlimited clearance Unlimited clearance
Clearance width 42.8 m (160 ft) 262 m (860 feet) No limitations Width: 200 m (600 ft)
Tidal current Current flow velocity due to
tidal variation: 1.4 -2 knots
Sufficient wet cross section to
reduce increasing flow
velocities
No interuption
Siting Geology Substructures in bedrock.
Research needed to assess
under-seapage.
Foundation in deep sand
deposits. Measures
reducing under-seapage
needed.
Deep foundations necessary.
Prevention of seapage.
Road/ railway Pedestrian and bicycling
linkage. Location near
important transportation
hubs.
Not a requirement due to
nearby bridge
Not a requirement due to
nearby bridges
Potentially facilitate an
alternative transport route.
Environment Impact upon landscape Steep shore gradients at the
sides
Little impact: parks at both
sides of barrier
Additional levees needed Great impact
Sediment Barrier will have impact on
sediment flow
Provide sediment transport Siltation of sill may cause
maintenance problems
1 mln tonnes sediment each
year. Onshore wave pattern
produce continual drift of
material. Both should be
taken into account.
Erosion Sediment aggradation and
degradation will be
modified
N/A No interruption of sediment
flow
Water quality Loss of flow will create a
modification of the
nutrient flux.
Sufficient wet cross section set
at 50% of current wet cross
section
Could improve through gate
operation
Decline of tidal flow should
be minimized and if
necessary stimulated by
active gate management.
Fish passage Research needed on barrier
impact on federally- and
state-listed fish and
wildlife.
N/A No interruption Barrier openings should be
adequate for the passage of
organisms.
Jurisdiction Probably joint ownership by
NJ and NY
N/A N/A
Continued
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Table 4.3. Continued
Barriers
Arthur Kill Verrazano Upper East River NY-NJ Outer Harbor
Main gate type Lock with gate Sliding rotating sector gates Flap gates Floating rotating sector gates
Other Corrosion/salt conditions N/A Must be durable in marine
environment. Replacement
of gates and hydraulic
cylinders every 30–40 years
Appropriate selection of
materials to resist corrosion
Safety/terrorism N/A N/A N/A N/A
Maintenance Favorable/proven technology
(Dircke et al, 2011)
All three types of gates are
relatively easy to maintain
Replacement of gates and
hydraulic cylinders every
30–40 years
the shores in both Tottenville and Perth Amboy, so
additional levees are not necessary to prevent flood-
ing on the sides. Furthermore, the selected location
provides a broad area of protection behind the bar-
rier. Locations more to the north of the channel
would have less impact onmarine traffic, but would
have left a substantial area of Staten Island and
New Jersey unprotected. Deep foundations will be
Figure 4.5. Location of the Arthur Kill barrier (top). Design of the Arthur Kill barrier with lock (down-left) and tidal gates
(down-right) (source: Camp Dresser & McKee).
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required at this location, requiring the bedrock or
be supported by piles driven into the bedrock (Lacy
et al., 2009). A deep cutoff may be needed to prevent
underseepage failure and to ensure sediment is not
conveyed from below the structures.
Environment
The design addresses issues such as loss of flow,
which could createmodificationof the nutrient flux,
sediment flow and stagnation of water. This is the
reason for installing tidal gates. Furthermore, the
barrier location is known for the presence of feder-
ally and state-listed fish and wildlife. Although no
disturbance of wildlife through the barrier is fore-
seen, further exploration on the subsurface in both
Arthur Kill channel and on the shores is necessary.
A cutoff wall is needed to ensure sediment is not
conveyed from below the structures.
Social issues and legislation
The Arthur Kill barrier would require extensive en-
vironmental permitting, involving an environmen-
tal assessment under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). Regulatory agencies that are
likely to be involvedwould be theUSEnvironmental
Protection Agency, the New York City Department
of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP), the New
York State Department of Environmental Conser-
vation (NYSDEC), New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJDEP), theUSArmyCorps
of Engineers (USACE), USCoast Guard, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the
US Fish and Wildlife Service.
Transport, infrastructure and other issues
The concept of the barrier includes a pedestrian
and a bike lane. The enhanced mobility between
Staten Island and New Jersey can increase com-
mercial and recreational development. The nearby
Tottenville Train Station provides access to Man-
hattan via the Staten Island Ferry. Maintenance
should include testing the opening and closing of
the gates and locks, sediment removal, debris re-
moval, testing the emergency power supply, and
testing of the navigational lighting. Narrowing of
the Arthur Kill with a barrier will increase flow ve-
locity caused by tidal variations. This is expected to
exceed 2 knots (∼4 m3/s) and can then possibly be
used for power generation (Murphy and Schoettle,
2009).
Figure 4.6. An artist’s impression of the Verrazano Narrows
barrier (source: ARCADIS, Jansen and Dircke, 2009).
Verrazano Narrows storm surge barrier
This conceptual design on the Verrazano Narrows
storm surge barrier (Figure 4.6) was made by the
engineering firmArcadis (Jansen andDircke, 2009).
This design is a combination of sliding sector gates
and lifting gates types, which have already been used
in the Netherlands. The structure has a total span of
approximately 1,820 m (6,000 ft).
Hydraulic boundary conditions and safety
TheVerrazanoNarrows is a tidal-influenced straight
that separates Staten Island and Brooklyn. The Ver-
razano barrier is designed to withstand a surge gen-
erated by a category 3 hurricane, with a correspond-
ing height of 6.4 m (+21 ft). To determine the re-
quired height of the barrier several other factors
were taken into account: an additional elevation of
0.9 m (+3 ft) for normal tide, an expected sea level
rise for the next 100 years of 0.9 m (+3 ft), and the
effect of closing the Narrows of 0.3 m (+1 ft) addi-
tional rising water levels outside the barrier. Arcadis
designed the barrier in a way that overtopping and
leaking is reduced to a minimum, allowing a maxi-
mum water level behind the barrier of 2.13 m (7 ft)
above mean water level. Janssen and Dircke (2009)
made a simple calculation to estimate the volume
of water storage behind the barrier by multiplying
the surface of the NY Bay area (1.5 × 109 ft2) by 7
ft of allowed rising water level. They estimate that
50% of this storage will be used by river discharge
and other freshwater sources. The other 50% can
be used to store leakage from the three barriers that
close the Bay area. The hydraulic head is based on a
water level difference of 7.6 m (25 ft).
Other functions that have been addressed in the
conceptual design are the allowance of free dis-
charge of river water and ice and the prevention of
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–68 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences. 59
Flood management strategies for New York City Aerts et al.
Table 4.4. Specifications of the movable parts of the Verrazano Narrows barrier
Depth Width Height
Sliding sector gates 19.8 m 262 m Unlimited
2 lifting gates 12.2 m 50.3 m 29.5 m
16 lifting gates 12.2 m 39.6 m 13.7 m
the interruption of transported sediment as much
as possible. These functions require an adequate
wet cross section and flow opening. The wet cross-
section is set at 14,399 m2 (155,000 ft2). Ship col-
lision is a serious threat for barriers that are sit-
uated in heavily trafficked waterways: a solution
for this problem has yet to be designed. Failure
of the closure procedure deserves serious attention
in the final design with a reliability of 10−3 per
closure.
Navigation
The Narrows is a busy and important waterway,
which forms the main connection for shipping
between New York Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. The
barrier was designed to allow for navigation by the
world’s largest container ship, The Emma Maesk,
which needs a minimum depth of 20 m (66 ft), a
minimum width of main gate opening of 262 m
(860 ft) needed for safe passage, and an unlimited
clearance height. A set of sliding sector gates is de-
signed to provide passage for such ships. To facilitate
passage for smaller ships two additional gates are
provided. The specifications of themovable parts of
the barrier can be seen in Table 4.4.
A general problem is the potential for a signifi-
cant increase in the flow velocity in the proximity
of the openings in the barrier. This is caused by
the bottle-neck that the permanent barrier creates,
despite its sluice gates (Lacy et al., 2009). Any de-
sign should seek to maintain a maximum degree
of openness, in order to limit the potential for an
increase in current velocity. For this reason, Jansen
and Dircke (2009) minimized increase flow veloci-
ties through theopeningsbyproviding sufficientwet
cross-section. The danger of ship collisions should
be further investigated, as the sector gates are sen-
sitive to these collisions. If future research indicates
that the collision risks are too high, then a floating
sector gate or flap gates have to be selected instead
of sliding sector gates.
Siting
Jansen and Dircke (2009) selected a location north
of the Verrazano Bridge because of the availabil-
ity of (non-urbanized) parkland at both shores and
more favorable topography (steep shores), which
minimized the need for land-based levees. In addi-
tion, Lacy et al. (2009) argue that the existing bridge
piers and stone protection berms would provide a
good start for the barrier system at this location.
This location would also be an option according to
Jansen and Dircke (2009), who propose two other
alignments in this area, including one close to the
Verrazano Bridge. The other alignments are half a
mile to the north of the Verrazano Bridge (as in the
current design) and close to a mile north of the Ver-
razano Bridge. The foundations for the barrier will
be embedded in deep sand deposits overlying the
hard Gardiners Clay formation (Figure 4.7). Deep
cutoff sheeting or other means will be necessary to
blockunder seepage below thebarrier structure, and
to avoid failure during extreme tidal surges (Lacy
et al., 2009).
Environment
A decrease in tidal flows because of the new storm
surge barrier will most likely have an influence on
the water quality in the bay. The precise conse-
quences are difficult to predict, and additional re-
search is needed. To provide sufficient tidal flow, the
wet cross-section of the barrier design is set at 50%
of thepresentwet cross section.This is accomplished
by a large number of lifting gates that together with
the sector gates provide a large wet cross-section. It
is estimated that the tidal volume will be reduced by
approximately 5%.
Transport, infrastructure, and other issues
A transportation route is not seen as necessary
because the barrier is located half a mile North
of the Verrazano Bridge. The maintenance of the
movable parts of the barrier is very important to
60
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–68 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences.
Aerts et al. Flood management strategies for New York City
Figure 4.7. The Narrows Geological Section with the main pillars of the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge close to the proposed storm
surge barrier location (adapted from Lacy et al., 2009).
sustain a closure reliability of 10−3. The selected gate
types of the barrier are relatively easy to maintain.
Additional studies are necessary to determine the
precise requirements for the wet cross-section and
shipping dimensions. Several other factors, like soil
condition, current, waves during a hurricane and
the maximum design water level in the NY harbor
can influence the design of the barrier, and have to
be further investigated.
East River storm surge barrier
The conceptual design of the East River storm
surge barrier (Figure 4.8) was developed by Par-
sons Brinckerhoff (Abrahams, 2009). The design
uses hydraulic operating flap gates and has a span of
approximately 1,360 m (4541 ft).
Hydraulic boundary conditions and safety. The
design of the barrier is based on a hurricane re-
turn period of 100 years. This corresponds to an
expected sea level rise of 6.71 m (+22 ft). With an
additional 2 ft for sea level rise caused by climate
change and another 0.61 m (2 ft) for water pushed
up against the barrier, the total height of the barrier
is 8.23 m (27 ft). The wave height is not incor-
porated in this calculation and overtopping water
during a storm is anticipated to have a negligible
effect on the East River water level. Each flap gate
has a width of 30m (∼90 ft), so, in total, 90 gates are
Figure 4.8. Design of the East River storm surge barrier (source: Parsons Brinckerhoff, Abrahams, 2009).
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needed to span the Upper East River. Future studies
may look at lower designed barriers that allowmore
overtopping, resulting in lower construction costs
(Abrahams, 2009).
Navigation. The waterway is heavily trafficked by
commercially (large) vessels and by recreational
boats. The gates would be operated by hydraulic
cylinders that would normally lie under water in
their closed position, and, therefore, have aminimal
impact on marine traffic navigation. The gate ele-
ments can be fabricated off-site and will be floated
in place. In this way there would be minimal impact
to marine navigation during construction works
(Abrahams, 2009).
Siting. The East River is a 25.6 km (16 miles) long
tidal estuary that extends from the southern tip of
Manhattan Island to Throgs Neck to the North of
Long Island. The main channel at the barrier loca-
tion is about 10–12 m (∼40 ft) deep at low water,
and varies between 300–1400 m wide. The Upper
East River bathymetry show a high variability of
water depths and channel widths and the siting of
the barrier is a tradeoff between, on the one hand, a
narrow channel, but a less protected area, or, on the
other hand, deeper water and a wider channel but
a larger protected area. Further East from Throgs
Neck, the channel is too wide, and a barrier would
be too costly. Abrahams (2009), therefore, selects a
location between the Whitestone and Throgs Neck
Bridges (betweenQueens and the Bronx) as the pre-
ferred location for the barrier. This site is confirmed
by alternative siting by Ronan (2009). The water-
way close to both bridges is characterized by water
depths between 21 and 24 m (70–80 ft), depths that
would significantly complicate the design and con-
struction of a barrier. However, between these two
locations, the river widens and the water depths are
more uniform and shallow, with maximum depths
of approximately 12 m (40 ft), matching the mini-
mum navigation channel depth (Abrahams, 2009).
A barrier further south near Wards Island might
be considered, but this would leave most of the
East River unprotected, including LaGuardia Air-
port and Rikers Island (with the location of a jail
with 15,000 inmates).
Appendix A shows the possible barrier location
extending between Willets Point/Fort Totten and
Throgs Point. Gradients rise rapidly near the shore
at Willets Point/Fort Totten, while at Throgs Point,
a land-based barrier would have to extend some dis-
tance inland before reaching higher ground. A cut
off may be needed on land in the low-lying eleva-
tions area between Willets Point/Fort Totten and
Bayside, Queens. Abrahams (2009) stressed that the
selection of this site was based on a very conceptual
level of analysis as a potential crossing site. Consid-
erable further analysis is needed to address many
additional requirements.
The geology varies across the Long Island Sound,
and the barriers placed on the Queens side would
likely need to have different foundations from the
Bronx side. Near the Throgs Neck Bridge, the foun-
dations will require support beneath the very deep
soft organic clay deposit below most of the cross-
ing. In areas where the sand and gravel deposit is
at a shallow depth, a deep cutoff will be needed to
prevent under-seepage failure during a storm event.
Local ground improvements may be required, as
well as a hydraulic cutoff to prevent piping failure
(Lacy et al., 2009).
Environment. One beneficial aspect of the bar-
rier could be its function to increase water quality
through flushing the water of NYC harbor. The East
River is a tidal estuary that is characterized by hav-
ing poor water quality due to the lack of flushing
action, particularly in the summer. Bowman (1977)
and Hill (1994) report that there is a potential ben-
efit if the tide gates could be installed in the East
River in order to only allow tidal flow southward
from Long Island Sound to New York Harbor. This
suggests that a tidal barrier on the East River would
be used to flush the harbor system to increase water
quality.
Transport, infrastructure and other issues. A
transportation route is not regarded as an impor-
tant side function of the barrier, because the barrier
is located in between two bridges. In terms of main-
tenance, the perimeters of the gates can be sealed for
maintenance, so it would be possible to de-water the
area below the gates formaintenance. The hydraulic
cylinders as well as the gates have to be replaced
every 30–40 years (see also Van der Meer, 2006). A
possible alternative are inflatable flap gates, as are
being developed in Venice (Figure 4.9). This design
is, however, also more costly. Although this pro-
posed concept is based on current proven technol-
ogy, the locationand impacts of anEastRiverBarrier
will require significant additional study. Moreover,
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Figure 4.9. Artist impression of the inflatable flap gates of the
Venice-MOSE barrier (source: www.boxbarrier.com).
Van der Meer (2006) states that the stability of hy-
draulic driven gates is greater than inflatable gates
and, therefore, is more suitable to protect the city
from larger differences in storm surge levels.
The Jamaica Bay storm surge barrier
Strategy 2b builds on Strategy 2a by developing a
fourth barrier (Figure 4.10) at the entrance of Ja-
maica Bay to protect JFK Airport. A barrier at the
Rockaway Inlet would have a span of about 1730 m
(1.08 mile), and would be difficult to construct be-
cause the elevation of the nearby Rockaway beach
(∼3 m/10 ft) is lower than the elevation of a Cate-
gory 3 Hurricane storm surge (8 m/26 ft)). Without
additional floodwall protection, the barrier would
do little to protect all of the communities around
Jamaica Bay as well as John F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport (Ronan et al., 2009). In addition, the
southern shoreofBrooklyn, includingConey Island,
would not be protected by the proposed Rockaway
Inlet and Verrazano barriers. Here also, additional
floodwalls or shore protection enhancements are
necessary to protect the same area as in Strategy
2a. Additional protection works are needed further
East, for areas on Long Island, or Nassau.
Figure 4.10. Possible location for Jamaica Bay barrier designs (left) (adapted from Athow, 1976). A possible design for a Jamaica
Bay barrier (right), with an ungated navigation channel and tide gates on the flanks of the channel (adapted from Leendertse and
Liu, 1975).
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In 1968, The Army Corps of Engineers proposed
an 18 ft high and 12 ft wide “hurricane barrier”
across the Rockaway Inlet. The wall has a few gates
that create a 600-foot opening for navigation. The
cost of this design was roughly estimated at US$
200 mln (2010 values) (PANYC, 1968). An exten-
sive study by Athow (1976), using both physical
and mathematical models, evaluated various bar-
rier designs on their (a) effect on water levels in-
side Jamaica Bay, (b) flow velocities at the navi-
gable gates, and (c) effects on waterquality in the
Bay. Tests involved barrier designs with 35 and 40
gates, as well as an (ungated) navigable opening of
200–300 ft. Depending on the width of the ungated
opening and the depth of the sill in the navigation
channel, surge heights in the Bay were reduced by
2–3 ft, using the 1950 hurricane conditions as in-
put for the simulations (see also Appendix G).
The maximum surge height during that event was
+8.4 ft above msl (Athow, 1976). Furthermore,
some designs did change the tide phase character-
istics of the Bay, and flow velocities in the Rock-
away Inlet were increased. In addition, Leendertse
and Liu (1975) reviewed the same barrier de-
signs on their effect on water quality in the Bay
area. They concluded that barriers would not have
a significant impact on chloride concentrations
or biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), although,
the circulation is affected by the various barrier
designs.
Very preliminary conceptual designs were dis-
cussed in Ronan (2009). Some ideas addressed the
need for a barrierwhichminimizes the visual impact
because of the low-lying surrounding landscape. For
this, a fully-submerged barrier similar to the one
being constructed in Venice would be an option,
but such a design was considered too expensive.
Other ideas for a design suggested installing an off-
shore energy dissipation device instead of a barrier
(Ronan, 2009). Another idea is to develop a new
bridge-barrier connecting the western end of the
Rockaway peninsula to the Coney Island peninsula.
The bridge-barrier consists of 78 piers, ranging in
height from 16–45 m and spaced at 60 m intervals,
that house 154 horizontal radial gates and support a
four-lane roadway. The axes about which the gates
pivot are embedded in the channel bedbetween each
pair of piers (Ronan, 2009).
In addition to the barrier, a pivoting boardwalk
could be designed along the entire length of the
RockawayPeninsula toprotect the existing coastline.
The boardwalk is approximately 19 km (12 miles)
long and 10 m (36 ft) wide. In the event of storm
surge, the boardwalk segments are ‘pivoted to an
angle of 60◦ from the horizontal and supported by
a series of gears and support members stored in
underground vaults along its length’. The protective
boardwalk should be connected to the Verrazano
Barrier (Ronan, 2009).
New-York New-Jersey Outer Harbor storm
surge barrier
The conceptual design of the NY-NJ Outer
Harbor barrier (Figure 4.11), was developed by
the engineering company Halcrow (Padron and
Forsyth, 2009). The barrier has a span of approx-
imately 9.5 km (5.94 miles). The largest part of the
barrier, approximately 7.5 km (4.69 miles), consists
of a land-based berm. The remainingmovable parts
are two sets of floating radius sector gates, a lifting
gate, and non navigational tidal sluices.
Hydraulic boundary conditions & Safety. The
Outer Harbor barrier will protect the entire New
York estuary, and will replace the three smaller gates
in the Arthur Kill, Verrazano Narrows and Rock-
away Inlet. The most important advantage of this
design is that it protects a larger area of New York
City against floods. The barrier is designed to with-
stand a Category 3 Hurricane with a surge defense
height of 9 m (30 ft). With an average depth of 15 m
(50 ft) below mean sea level, the overall height of
the barrier is about 10 m (30 ft). The gates must
withstand high winds and large waves. The design
includes floating rotating sector gates to allow for
shipping and easy maintenance. However, a disad-
vantage of the floating gates is that they are sensitive
todynamicwave forces andflow-inducedoscillation
(Padron and Forsyth, 2009).
Navigation. The New York Bight, between Sandy
Hook and the Rockaway Peninsula, is the princi-
pal entrance to New York City Harbor, and is one
of the busiest waterways in the US. Two channels
pass through the Bight. The main channel, Am-
brose Channel, is about 600 m (2,000 ft) wide and
15 m (50 ft) deep at mean low water. The sec-
ond channel, called the Sandy Hook Channel, is
less deep, with a depth of about 10 m (33 ft) and
being used by smaller boats. The design consists
of two sets of floating radius sector gates, which
64
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Figure 4.11. Causeway over sluice and barrier system (Top); navigable floating sector gates at the Ambrose channel (bottom)
(source: CH2 m).
allows for a large gate span and no clearance height
limitations, which can close of the Ambrose Chan-
nel. The width of each of those main gates is 182
m (600 ft). The vertical lifting gates that close off
the Sandy Hook channel have the disadvantage
that they have a limited clearance height for ship-
ping. Considering the importance ofNewYorkHar-
bor, it is critical that during construction and op-
eration the barrier does not interfere with vessel
traffic.
Siting. To span from Sandy Hook to Rockaway
without the use of embankments seems almost in-
feasible. There are several options to connect the
navigable parts of storm surge barriers. When con-
sidering currents and wave climate in the New York
OuterHarbor, only anarmor rockor concrete armor
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Figure 4.12. Plan showing the extent of the causeway and berms forming the gateway barrier (adapted from Padron and Forsyth,
2009).
units are feasible options to connect the moveable
parts of the barrier. Comparing these two alterna-
tives, this design uses armor rock to reduce costs.
It is assumed that construction material would be
brought into the New York area via sea, either by
barge or ship (Padron and Forsyth, 2009). Consid-
ering the significant length of land areas either side
of the proposed barrier, then levees, berms, or the
raising of existing highways would be required to
increase the land elevation sufficiently high to avoid
flooding at the rear ends of the barrier. However, the
barrier system is not intended to fully prevent flood-
ing across its flanks in the event of a severe surge
event.
Environment. The construction of a new barrier
will have a significant effect on tidal flows and affect
current patterns. Water quality may be affected and
siltation patterns may change. Recreational usage
may be impacted to some extent. To alleviate these
effects, studies would be required to determine the
wet cross-section of the barrier. Decline of tidal flow
should be minimized, and can be positively stimu-
lated by active gate management. Sluices in sets of
10, each about 24.3 m (80 ft) wide, are incorpo-
rated in the barrier design to provide the required
capacity. An influence on the hydrodynamics of the
harbor is the Hudson River, which does not only
supply river water, but also around 1million tons of
sediment each year. In addition, coastal sand trans-
port produces a continual littoral drift of material
from Montauk Point to Rockaway (east to west).
Therefore, additional research is needed to deter-
mine the feasibility of the barrier to increase the
flushing capacity of the barrier. For example, partial
closing of the barrier could force currents to flush
parts of NY Bay. In addition, new inlets through the
sand bars of the Rockaways and Sandy Hook could
operate in concert with the operation of sluices to
enhance flushing capacity.
Transport/ infrastructure and other. A combina-
tion of a road along the causeway andpartly through
tunnels will be constructed. This would provide
access for personnel and maintenance. This road
would also act as an additional river crossing for
citizens of New York. The sector gates are stored in
dry docks, allowing all maintenance to be carried
out in dry conditions. The lifting gate has the ad-
vantage that when lifted out of the water, the gate is
66
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easily accessible for maintenance. An option would
be to develop a tunnel all the way under the barrier
system that would be covered by a dike. This would
save construction material for the dike.
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5. Cost estimates of Storm Surge barriers for NYC and NJ
Jeroen Aerts,1 Malcolm Bowman,2 Wouter Botzen,1 and Hans de Moel1
1VU University Amsterdam, Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), De Boelelaan 1087, 1081HV Amsterdam. 2Stony Brook
University, Marine Sciences Research Center, 215 Endeavour Hall, Stony Brook, NY 11794-5000
5.1 Construction cost of existing storm
surge barriers
The costs of storm surge barriers can broadly be di-
vided into three main categories. The first category
is the one-time construction costs of the barriers.
The second category is the periodic costs of mainte-
nance and operation. The third category is the costs
of additional protection measures, such as levees
or beach nourishment. Here we discuss each of the
main cost categories using data from existing storm
surge barriers and protection works.
There are many factors that influence the con-
struction costs of storm surge barriers, and each
location has its own functional requirements that
determine the final design of a barrier, and hence the
cost. Hillen et al. (2010), Jonkman et al. (2013) and
Dircke et al. (2011) state that the construction costs
of a storm surge barrier are largely determined by its
share of the movable parts of the design: more gates
or a shipping lock can sharply increase the costs. Fur-
thermore, geographical and hydrodynamic require-
ments, such as ‘span’ or ‘hydraulic head’, determine,
respectively, the size and the required strength of
the design, andmay also increase costs (Hillen et al.,
2010).
Table 5.1 shows an overview of existing
storm surge barriers around the globe with
their specific construction and maintenance costs.
Table 5.1 shows that barriers with a large span
or a higher number of movable parts are indeed
the most expensive barriers, ranging from about
$80 mln for a small barrier in Stamford, USA, to
$6.9 bn for the large St. Petersburg barrier in Rus-
sia. Using the information from Table 5.1, the cost
per unit meter width has been estimated at be-
tween $0.04 and $2.37 mln/m. The range is de-
pendent on span and gate types. For example,
floating rotating sector gates, such as those which
have been used for the Maeslantkering in Rotter-
dam (the Netherlands) or the St Petersburg barrier
(Russia), are more expensive than vertical lifting
gates. This range is a bit wider compared with
the results by Jonkman et al. (2013) and Hillen
et al. (2010), who estimated a unit construction
cost range of between $0.5 and $2.7 mln/m. How-
ever, they did not include the smaller barriers in the
U.S, which are apparently relatively cheap per unit
meter.
Furthermore, note that some cost figures include
additional floodwalls that aremuch cheaper per unit
width as compared with the unit meter cost of the
movable parts of the barriers. For example, the to-
tal length of the St. Petersburg barrier is 25.4 km
with a total cost of the project of around $6.9 bn.
However, only 1700 m of the total barrier project
consist of movable parts, such as gates and sluices.
For barriers where the span of the movable parts is
smaller than the total span, we subtract the cost for
the dam from the total costs. For the older US hur-
ricane barriers we can extract the cost for the dam
by looking at the difference between the Fox Point
hurricane barrier and the New Bedford storm surge
barrier. Both have a span of the movable parts of
50 m. The total construction costs are $87.6 and
$110.9 mln, respectively. The difference is ∼$23
mln, which can be attributed to the length of the
New Bedford storm surge barrier, which has a 2.3
km longer dam as compared with the Fox point
barrier. The unit cost price for this dam is thus
$23/2.3km = $10 mln/km. For the newer barriers
(constructed after 1990), we use the cost prices by
Dijkman (2007) and Bos (2008) of $85 mln/km for
a Hurricane Dike. For the IHNC barrier, we use the
unit cost price from Bos (2008) for a 30 ft wall of
$50 mln/km.
If we examine the distribution of the construc-
tion cost of the IHNC barrier developed in NewOr-
leans (Arcadis, 2006; Figure 5.1), it appears that 68%
of the total construction costs have been allocated
to constructing the lock with gates. This estimate
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Figure 5.1. Main construction cost categories of the storm
surge barrier in New Orleans (adapted from Arcadis, 2006).
is somewhat lower than the estimate of 80% pro-
vided by Padron and Forsyth (2009). We, therefore,
also calculated the cost per unit meter width of only
the movable parts. This number was then divided
by the span of the movable parts. The price range
per unit meter is less between $0.71 mln/m for the
inflatable rubber dam of Ramspol to $3.53 mln/m
for the IHNC barrier in New Orleans. From
Table 5.1, it follows that the most expensive bar-
riers are the structures with sector gates ($2.37–
3.53 mln/m), except for the older New Bedford bar-
rier. However, there are some exceptions to this,
such as the Ems Barrier. Flap gate structures, like
the MOSE barrier in Venice and the Stamford bar-
rier, have a unit cost price of $1.9–2$ mln/m. For
vertical lifting gates (without a sluice combina-
tion), prices per unit km vary more between $1.15–
2.18 mln/km.
Research by Hillen et al. (2010), using data from
existing barriers, state that functional requirements
‘span’ and ‘head’ have the largest influence on the
total construction costs. In order to have an idea of
which functional requirements have a large influ-
ence, we conducted an OLS regression in SPSS (Ap-
pendix C). Several functional requirements such as
‘span’, ‘hydraulic head’, and ‘navigation width’, were
included as explanatory variables in the regression,
in order to estimate their influence on total costs.
This analysis shows a significant correlationbetween
the ‘span of movable parts’ of the barriers and the
cost of the movable parts. A multiple linear regres-
sionwith thepredictors ‘head’ and ‘span’ ofmovable
parts shows that 90% (r2 = 0.901) of the variance
in the cost of movable parts can be explained with
these two independent variables.
Figure 5.2. Distributionofcost categoriesof themovableparts
of the IHNC storm surge barrier in NewOrleans (adapted from
Arcadis, 2006).
Because the number of observations is low in
this regression analysis, it is too premature to es-
timate future costs of barriers from these relations
with span and head, but one could conclude that a
wider span and head means higher costs, although
costs can vary depending on the gate type and other
functional requirements. For example, with respect
to the gate type, barriers with a lot of steel structure,
such as floating rotating sector gates used in Rotter-
dam or St. Petersburg, are more costly. In addition,
deep navigation channels and extreme storm condi-
tionsmay lead to gate types that are required towith-
stand high pressure gradients caused by the differ-
ence between the surge level outside the barrier and
the inner water levels (‘hydraulic head’). Some gates
which are relatively cheaper, such as mitre gates, are
from an engineering point of view often not feasible
solutions in these conditions, and a barrier design
will most probably use more expensive lifting gates
or sector gates.
If othermain cost categories for the IHNCbarrier
in New Orleans are examined, then it appears that
management, design, and the placement of coffer-
dams each represent 14%, 12%, and 5% of the total
construction costs, respectively (Figure 5.2). When
further breaking down the costs of the navigation
structure of the IHNC barrier in New Orleans,
the largest share of all cost sub-categories can be
attributed to the steel sector gates. For example,
the two steel door sector gates of the IHNC barrier
need 8,500 tons of structural steel at $10,500/ton
(2006 values). Including 25% contingencies, the
costs for the gates amount to $111 mln, around
72
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36% of the cost ($313 mln) of the whole navigable
gate structure.
5.2 Maintenance and operational costs of
existing storm surge barriers
The maintenance of storm surge barriers pertains
predominantly to conserving the gates, the hy-
draulic components, the electronic system, and the
computer system to lift or close the gates. In ad-
dition, costs need to be reserved for personnel to
operate the barrier and for conducting periodical
inspections. Maintenance costs are dependent on
the type, size, and location of a barrier. For example,
if a barrier is (partly) situated under water, with, for
instance, flap gates,maintenance will include efforts
to either dry-dock gates with cofferdams or remove
the gates and maintain them on dry docks on the
side. This may result in highmaintenance costs, and
in the case of decoupling gates, it means that the
barrier does not have its full protection level. The
removal of gates for maintenance will mostly take
place inperiodswhen there is a less chanceof a storm
surge. In addition, maintenance works can hinder
navigation, and hence may lead to additional costs.
Table 5.1 shows the range inmaintenance cost for
different barriers, varying from $0.5 mln/yr for a
small barrier in Providence tomore than $20mln/yr
for large storm surge barriers in the Netherlands.
Nicholls et al. (2007) suggest that the maintenance
costs for movable barriers can be estimated at ap-
proximately 5–10%of the invested capital. Applying
this rule would result in minimum operation and
maintenance costs of between $3 mln/yr and over
$100 mln/yr, which are relatively high when com-
paring historical cost figures from existing barriers
in Table 5.1. The total maintenance costs of the new
storm surge protection system in New Orleans are
estimated to be $18.2 mln/yr, of which $4.6 mln/yr
is for the operation andmaintenance of the two new
storm surge barriers (SLFRA, 2011).
5.3 Contingencies of the costs of storm
surge barriers
Evaluations of mega engineering projects show that
construction costs are often difficult to estimate pre-
cisely. This can be explained by several factors. First
of all, the techniques used in these projects are often
new, never used before, which often leads to un-
expected additional costs. Secondly, owing to the
length of the projects, many historical projects, as in
Table 5.1, have suffered insecure financing regimes
because of political changes or national (or global)
financial fluctuations (Munarreto et al., 2012; Goe-
mans and Smits, 1984). Arcadis (2011) lists several
financial uncertainties that may cause an upward
deviation from the original estimated costs: (1) in-
creased time to acquire environmental permitting,
(2) increased costs related to real estate acquisition,
and (3) design changes through additional and un-
foreseen requirements.
Table 5.1 shows that the duration of the construc-
tion works varies between 4 years and decades. The
St. Petersburg barrier project, for example, has been
suspended for several yearsbecauseof fundingprob-
lems, and total construction time lies in the period
1984–2014. During the Oosterschelde surge barrier
project, Goemans and Smits (1984) advised to bud-
get at least for anadditional 30%contingencies at the
start of the new (similar) projects. However, when
reviewing the INHC barrier construction process,
Arcadis (2011) state that the original budget esti-
mates have been increased by 25% from an initial
estimated $1 bn to $1.25 bn. Thus, despite the orig-
inal calculation, already 25% of contingencies were
included in each of the cost categories (except for
management and administrative activities).
5.4 Cost estimates of storm surge barrier
strategies for NYC and NJ
The engineering companies that made the concep-
tual designs for the barriers during the barrier con-
ference in 2009 (Hill et al., 2013) made an estimate
of the costs of the barriers. Some of these costs are
mentioned in the design reports, and some pro-
vided the price estimation during additional pre-
sentations. These estimations range from $1.1 to
6.4 bn for the different barriers and are presented in
Table 5.2. The costs for the Jamaica Bay barrier were
not provided. Note that the costs of the East River
barrier originally was presented as $1.5–1.7 bn (Ap-
pendix 2b). However, during specialist interviews
with the designers (Appendix H), it appeared that
an additional 25% must be included over the 100
years lifetime of the barrier to replace the hydraulic
cylinders of the flap gates. The costs, hence, rise to
$1.9 – 2.1 bn.
If we apply the historical unit cost prices derived
from Table 5.1, we arrive at the following calcula-
tions. For the Arthur Kill barrier we apply the unit
prices of $1.9–$2.18 mln/m, based on the unit cost
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Table 5.2. Construction and maintenance costs for storm surge barrier strategies for NYC (in $ 2012 values)
Cost estimation Cost estimation based on
Engineering firms historical analyses (Table 5.1)
Total Span nav. Construction Maintenance Construction Maintenance
Barrier span (m) parts (m) (US$ bn) (US$ mln/yr) (US$ bn) (US$ mln/yr)
Strategy 2a:
‘Environmental
dynamics’
Arthur Kill 500 500 1.1 0.6–1.1 5.5
Verrazano Narrows 1820 1820 6.4 75 4.3–6.4 41
East River 1360 1360 1.9–2.1 2.6–3.0 31
Total 9.4–9.6a 7.5–10.5a 77.5a
Strategy 2c:
‘NY-NJ Connect’
East River 1360 1360 1.9–2.1 2.6–3.0 31
Outer Harbor 9540 2500 5.9 72 6.5–9.4 72
Total 7.8–8.0a 9.1–12.4a 104a
Strategy 2b:
‘Bay Closed’
Arthur Kill 500 500 1.1 0.6–1.1 5.5
Verrazano Narrows 1820 1820 6.4 75 4.3–6.4 41
East River 1360 1360 1.9–2.1 2.6–3.0 31
Jamaica Bay 1730 1730 4.1–6.1 39
Total 9.4–9.6a 11.6–16.6a 116.5a
aAll summary cost tables are in US$ 2012 values. Indexing was applied using the Construction Cost Index and the
Skilled Labor Index from ENR (Engineering News-Record, http://enr.construction.com/economics).
price of both vertical lifting gates derived from his-
torical data (Table 5.1). For the East river barrier,
we apply the higher unit price of $1.9–$2.18 mln/m
based on the historical construction costs for flap
gates. For the Jamaica Bay, Verrazano Narrows and
theOuter harbor barriers, we apply higher unit costs
prices of $2.37–$3.53 mln/m, as they include more
complex designs (party) with sector gates. Note that
for the Outer harbor barrier, this range only applies
to the span of themovable parts (2000m).However,
the outerHarborbarriermayhave the largest impact
on environmental values and may largely disturb
tidal flows, water quality and sediment budgets. In
this context, Padron and Forsyth (2009) write ad-
ditional ‘studies would examine the size, number
and location of navigable gates and control sluices’
(p.226, Hill et al., 2013). This means the length of
movable parts of this barrier might increase, which
will increase the costs of this barrier dramatically.
We, therefore, add 25% in length of movable parts
to a total length of 2500 m (high costs: 2.5 × 3.53 =
$8.8 bn). For the remaining span of the levee (7040
m), we apply the maximum unit cost price for hur-
ricane levees by Dijkman (2007) of $85 mln/km,
resulting in $0.6 bn total construction costs to be
added to the costs of the movable parts of the Outer
Harbor barrier.
When examining Table 5.2, it appears that over-
all, the original cost estimates of the engineering
companies are all within or close to the costs ranges
based on the historical estimates. The Arthur Kill
barrier costs were estimated at $1.1 bn, which lies
at the upper end of the historical range. The costs
for the Verrazano Narrows barrier were originally
estimated at $6.4 bn, which is also at the upper
end of the historical range. For the East River bar-
rier, we added cost for a one time replacement of
the hydraulic cylinders based on a meeting with
the responsible engineering firm Parsons Brinck-
erhoff (Appendix H). They estimate the replace-
ment of the cylinders at 25% of the initial con-
struction costs of $1.7 bn (see Appendix B), lead-
ing to a total cost between $1.9–2.1 bn. However,
such replacement could be needed twice during the
100 year lifetime of the barrier, which then would
lead to a total cost price of $2.3–2.5 bn. This is
partly within the range of the estimations based on
historical cost numbers. The costs estimations for
the Outer Harbor barrier by the engineering com-
pany are well within the range of estimations based
on historical data.
Given the rough estimations, the global design
and the very preliminary stage of this process, the
estimates seem overall reasonably robust. However,
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the number must be treated with care and are sur-
rounded by large uncertainties. For example, the
cost number for the East river barrier can increase
when re assessing the tons of structural steel needed
for constructing the gates. For example, in the cost
calculationused for theEastRiverbarrier (Appendix
B), 5000 tons of structural steel were used at a unit
price of $12,000. This is would cover the material
required for 90 flap gates that span the East river
(see Section 5). However, for the IHNC barrier in
New Orleans, 8,500 tons of steel was used at a unit
price of $10,000 for only 2 sector gates (ARCADIS,
2006).
Maintenance cost
Only Jansen and Dircke (2009) estimate the main-
tenance costs for the Verrazano barrier to be about
$75 million annually. This confirms the number
provided for the existing St Petersburg barrier of
$72 mln, which can be applied to the NY–NJ outer
harbor barrier. The Outer harbor barrier and the
Verrazano barrier consist for a large part of mov-
able elements and will probably have relatively high
maintenance cost. If we, however, look at the histor-
ical maintenance costs per unit km, it appears that
those costs are lower. For example, the maintenance
costs for the Thames barrier are about $13 mln/yr
(Appendix C) with 80 full-time employees, which is
23 mln/yr/km. In addition, the maintenance costs
for the IHNC barrier in New Orleans are about
$10 mln/yr. These differences can be explained by
the complexity of the design, the numbers of mov-
able parts, and the span of the barrier.We, therefore,
apply a lower estimate of $11.5mln/yr for themain-
tenance of the relatively small Arthur Kill barrier as
50% of the maintenance costs of the Thames bar-
rier, and $23mln/yr per km ofmovable parts for the
other barriers. For the NY–NJ outer harbor barrier,
we apply the number from the St Petersburg barrier
of $72 mln/yr
Cost of additional measures
Closing NYC’s waterways from New York City is
not enough to protect NYC against high water lev-
els. Some parts of the coast, because they are too
low, will still be exposed after the construction of
the barriers and floodwaters may bypass the bar-
riers. For these areas, beach nourishment, levees,
dikes and other additional measures will need to be
installed. Or, existing protectionmeasures will need
to be retrofitted to attain the required design water
level height of 25–30 ft. In addition, discharge of
the Hudson River and other freshwater sources will
raise water levels behind the storm surge barriers
in case the barriers are closed during a storm surge
event. Thewater levelmay rise by∼1 ft; thus, coastal
areas behind the barriers in each strategy will need
to be raised until they at least reach a height that is
1 ft higher than the current height of the coastline.
Based on analyses of the current length of coastal
morphological types and current protection mea-
sures, we may estimate the additional costs of flood
protection measures. These measures and associ-
ated costs are needed to complete each of the
two surge barrier strategies (Table 5.3). Figure 5.3
shows the stretches of coastline where the differ-
ent additional measures are possibly needed for
Strategies 2a, b, and c.
Total costs storm surge barrier
Strategies 2a, b, and c
Table 5.4 Shows the total construction and mainte-
nance costs for the storm surge barrier strategies 2a,
b, and c. Strategy 2c, NJ-NYConnect, is the least ex-
pensive strategy with about $11–14.7 bn. The most
expensive barrier Strategies are 2a and 2b, with esti-
mates between $15.9 and $21.8 bn. Although Strat-
egy 2b comprises four barriers as compared to three
barriers in Strategy 2a, the cost of additional pro-
tection measures required in Strategy 2a are con-
siderably higher compared with those in Strategy
2b. Maintenance costs for all strategies vary roughly
between $98.5 and $126 mln/yr.
These numbers must be treated with care and are
very rough estimates with a lot of uncertainty. It
appears that the cost estimates by engineering com-
panies are close to the lower ranges of cost estimates
made on the basis of empirical unit cost prices.
However, cost estimates are likely to be higher,
since contingencies were not always included in
preliminary estimates. Furthermore, surcharges on
labor costs, which are generally higher in the NYC
compared to other locations in the US, can add an
additional 10–30% to labor cost (see also Section 2
on building codemeasures). Finally, there is still sig-
nificant uncertainty in the designs themselves, for
example on the required tons of steel needed in the
EastRiver barrier andon the lengthofmovable parts
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Table 5.3. Overview of additional costs for the different storm surge barrier Strategies 2a, b, and c. (all in $ 2012
values)
Unit Total Unit Total
Length costs costs Maintenance Maintenance
[Km] [$/km) [$ bn] Costs [$ mln /km//yr] Costs [$ mln/yr]
Strategy 2a:
‘Environmental
dynamics’
1 Floodwalls 19 30–50 0.6–0.94 0.1 4
2 Earth Filled dike 87 27 2.3 0.1 3
3 Retrofit low
bulkheads inside
50 41 0.09 0.1 4
5 Mix Levee/landfill 71 50 3.5 0.1 5
6 Dike in low urban
density
3 10 0.03 0.05 0.5
7 Beach Nourishment
/levee
56 30–45 1.6–2.5 0.1 4
8 Nature restoration 0.9 0.5
10 Flood proofing 16
Total 389 km $9.4 – 10.6 bna $21 mln/yra
Strategy 2b:
‘Bay Closed’
5 Mix Levee/landfill 54 50 3.5 0.1 5
6 Dike in low urban
density
3 10 0.03 0.05 0.5
7 Beach Nourishment
/levee
56 30–45 1.6–2.5 0.1 4
10 Flood proofing 16
Total 129 km $4.3 – 5.2 bna $9.5 mln/yra
Unit Total Maintenance Total
Length costs costs Costs Maintenance
[Km] [US$ mln/km) [US$ bn] [US$ mln /km/yr] Costs [US$ mln/yr
Strategy 2c: ‘NY-NJ
Connect’
6 Dike in low urban
density
3 10 0.03 0.05 0.5
5 Mix Levee/landfill
Bronx
20 50 1 0.1 5
3 Retrofit low
bulkheads inside
50 41 0.09 0.1 4
7 Beach
Nourishment/
levee Rockaways
& Sandy H.
45 30–45 0.8–1.2 0.1 4
Total 67 km $1.9 – 2.3 bna $13.5 mln/yra
aAll summary cost tables are in US$ 2012 values. Indexing was applied using the Construction Cost Index and the
Skilled Labor Index from ENR (Engineering News-Record, http://enr.construction.com/economics).
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Figure 5.3. Location of flood management measures in Strat-
egy 2a, Environmental Dynamics.
in the Outer Harbor Barrier. For example, the total
length of movable parts in the Outer Harbor barrier
in Strategy 2c is 2 km. However, in the conceptual
design, as well as in a recent expert meeting, the
required length of sluices was suggested to be longer
to reduce flow disturbances of tide.
5.5 Additional issues for storm
surge barriers
Permitting and legislation
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the
agency that evaluates projects in navigable water-
ways or in wetlands that eventually drain into nav-
igable waters (Scarano, 2009). In order to manage
the program, USACE applies administrative pro-
cesses listed in the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR). The proposed surge barrier projects would
need to address major regulatory issues, including
construction in navigable waterways and the effects
on water quality, aquatic habitat, and endangered
species. These regulatory issues are summarized in
threemain statutory instruments—Section10of the
Rivers andHarbors Act of 1899, which deals primar-
ily with construction and dredging; Section 404 of
the CleanWater Act, which deals with the discharge
of dredged and fill materials; and Section 103 of the
Ocean Dumping Act, which deals with the trans-
port and discharge of dredged material. In the New
York metropolitan area, the regulatory program ad-
ministration is handled by the Regulatory Branch of
USACE’sNewYorkDistrict. Its jurisdiction includes
Northern New Jersey, Long Island, and the eastern
portions of New York State. In New Jersey, however,
most regulation under Section 404 is administered
by the State of New Jersey.
There are two basic types of permits issued
by USACE—individual permits and general per-
mits. Individual permits are required for the more
Table 5.4. Total cost estimates of barrier Strategies 2a, 2b, and 2c (all in $2012 values)
Construction Maintenance
Construction Construction costs Main. Costs Main. Costs
costs Barriers Additional measures Additional measures Additional measures
[US$ bn] [US$ bn] [US$ mln/yr] [US$ mln/yr]
Strategy 2a: ‘Environmental dynamics’
7.5–10.5 9.4–10.6 77.5 21
Total $16.9–$21.1 bna $98.5 mln/yra
Strategy 2b: ‘Bay Closed’
11.6–16.6 4.3–5.2 116.5 9.5
Total $15.9–$21.8ba $126 mln/yra
Strategy 2c: ‘NY-NJ Connect’
9.1–12.4 1.9–2.3 104 13.5
Total $11.0–$14.7 bna $117.5 mln/yra
aAll summary cost tables are in US$ 2012 values. Indexing was applied using the Construction Cost Index and the
Skilled Labor Index from ENR (Engineering News-Record, http://enr.construction.com/economics).
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complex projects and require themost coordination
with other agencies as well as public notification.
General permits are less complex. The regulation
of permitting is covered through the USACE Dis-
trict Offices. Each District Office administers the
program in accordance with the above mentioned
Code of Federal Regulations. However, there are lo-
cal variations across regional USACE offices, which
stress the need for a permit seeker to consult with
these offices. When permitting activities take place
within the State of New York, a joint application
has been developed for both a USACE permit and a
NewYork StateDepartment of Environmental Con-
servation (DEC) permit. This does not result in a
joint permit and separate permits will be issued by
USACE and DEC.
For the proposed barrier designs and their lo-
cations, the permit application will involve a com-
plex review by partner federal agencies, state and lo-
cal governments, and other local stakeholders. The
public notification process will certainly allow for
public concerns to be addressed. In addition, the
project would be subject to a rigorous environmen-
tal, wildlife, and historic properties review, accord-
ing to the above-mentioned regulations.
Maintenance and institutional issues
In addition to maintenance costs, the daily opera-
tional costs of the storm surge barriers are impor-
tant. Also, forecast andwarning systems are required
when implementing a movable storm surge barrier,
whichmay require significant institutional capacity.
Operational costs include the joint operation of 2–4
barriers according to different operational protocols
thatwill be designed during the planning phase. The
choice for a specific operational system depends on
the direction and track of a storm surge that ap-
proachesNYC. In such a system, the order of closing
the barriers will be an important aspect. However,
these operational costs (expressed in man-hours)
are very small compared with the construction and
maintenance costs, and are, therefore, not taken into
account in the total costs.
An important question, however, concerns who
is responsible for bearing the operation and main-
tenance costs. For example, the City of Providence
is expected to save as much as $500,000 annually
after transferring the Fox Point Hurricane Barrier
to the US Army Corps of Engineers in 2010. After
over 50 years during which the City was responsible
for maintenance costs, the Army Corps took over
operations andmaintenance costs of the barrier. An
open question is, therefore, who will bear the O&M
costs for the NYC barrier system?
Environmental issues
Apart from the potential negative impacts of a storm
surge barrier on themarshlands of Jamaica Bay area,
positive environmental effects are also described in
several studies (e.g. Hill, 1994; Padron and Forsyth,
2009). With the proper opening and closure regime
of barriers, the flushing of the NYC harbor can be
increased, thereby alleviating costly dredging activ-
ities and improving water quality.
Barrier failure or partial closure
When evaluating the effectiveness of barriers for
reducing flood risk, (partial) closure or construc-
tion failure of the structures should be addressed.
Bowman et al. (2005) simulated the effects of par-
tially closed barriers assuming synthetically boosted
Hurricane Floyd (year 1999) conditions (Table 5.5).
Such a theoretical operational scheme can be seen as
a closure failure. The effects were inconsistent. For
example, when 1/4 of the span of each of the indi-
vidual barriers was closed, the water levels in some
areas were 0.6–0.8 m higher than in the case with-
out barriers. In the case of 3/4 closure, water levels
at some location increased, but dropped at the East
River.
Table 5.5. Peak water levels inside the 3- barrier system (Narrows, East River, Arthur Kill) at various locations, with
full closure and partial closure regimes
Location No barriers 1/4 closed
1/2 closed 3/4 closed Fully closed (outside level)
Perth Amboy 1.2 2 1.5 1.7 1.2
East River 1.7 1.6 0.9 1.2 2
Narrows 1.05 1.6 1.1 1.4 1
Battery 1 1.6 1.1 1.3
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In addition to closure failure, construction failure
due to unexpected loadings may lead to the collapse
of the protection system. Gaslikova et al. (2011) de-
scribed several failure probability curves which can
be used to simulate these circumstances in a risk
analysis. The available barrier designs were not pro-
vided with any failure probabilities.
Optimum design heights
Furthermore, note there are several studies that
showhow to calculate the economic optimal protec-
tion level for an area (e.g. Jonkman et al., 2009). This
optimal protection level can be found by perform-
ing an optimization analysis of the relation between
the level of investments in flood protection and the
level of protection obtained. From this analysis, a
point can be determined where the sum of the in-
vestment costs and the reduced flood risk are min-
imal. The protection level that corresponds to this
point is the optimal safety level for an area. It has
not been investigated whether the assumed future
1/100 design level of 25–30 ft for storm surge barri-
ers or 20 ft for levees is the economic optimum for
NYC.
References
Arcadis (2006). Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Floodgates Con-
ceptual Study, June 2006.
Arcadis (2011). Overview construction works IHNC Lake
Borgne project. USACE Infrastructure Systems Confer-
ence, Atlanta, 2011. http://www.usace-isc.org/presentation/
Construction%20Mgmt/Project%20Controls%20for%20
New%20Orleans%20Surge%20Barrier_Stirm_Paul.pdf
Bowman, M.J., Colle, B., Flood, R., Hill, D., Wilson, R.E.,
Buonaiuto, F., Cheng, P. and Zheng, Y. (2005). Hydrologic
feasibility of storm surge barriers to protect the metropolitan
NewYork –New Jersey region.Marine Sciences ResearchCen-
ter, State University of New York, Stony Brook. Tech. Report,
pp. 99.http://stormy.msrc.sunysb.edu/phase1/Phase%20I%20
final%20Report%20Main%20Text.pdf
Dijkman, J. (2007). A Dutch perspective on coastal Louisiana
flood risk reduction and landscape stabilization. London:
United States Army -2007, 286. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/Get
TRDoc?AD=ADA466919
Gaslikova, L., Schwerzmann, A., Raible, C.C. and Stocker, T.F.
(2011). Future storm surge impacts on insurable losses for the
North Sea region. Natural Hazards and Earth System Science,
11(4): 1205–1216. doi:10.5194/nhess-11-1205-2011
Goemans, T. and H.N.J. Smits (1994). Costs control of a mega-
project, the Eastern Scheldt works. (Dutch: Kostenbeheersing
van eenmegaproject Oosterscjedle kering)Minsterie van Ver-
keer en Waterstaat, Directoraat -Generaal Rijkswaterstaat, ’s
Gravenhage, March 1994.
Hill, D. (1994). East River Tidal Barrage. Annals of the New York
Academy of Science, 742.
Hill, D., Bowman, M. and Khinda, J. (2013). Kindha, J.S.
(2013) Against the Deluge: Storm Surge Barriers to Pro-
tect New York City. ASCE Proceedings of the 2009
Seminar and Exibition, New York City 2009 (http://
www.ascemetsection.org/content/view/274/725/#2009)
Hillen,M.M., Jonkman, S.N., Kanning,W., Kok,M.,Geldenhuys,
M.A. and Stive, M.J.F. (2010). Coastal defence cost estimates:
case study of the Netherlands, New Orleans and Vietnam.
Delft University of Technology.
Jansen, P.L.M. and P.T.M. Dircke (2009). Verrazano Narrows
StormSurgeBarrier. Against theDeluge: StormSurgeBarriers
to Protect New York City, 119–127.
Jonkman, S.N., Kok,M., van Ledden,M. and J.K. Vrijling (2009).
Risk-based design of flood defence systems: a preliminary
analysis of the optimal protection level for the New Orleans
metropolitan area. Journal of Flood Risk Management, 2(3):
170–181.
Jonkman, S.N., Hillen, M.M., Nicholls, R.J., Kanning, W. and
van Ledden, M. (2013). Costs of Adapting Coastal Defences
to Sea-Level Rise—New Estimates and Their Implications.
Journal of Coastal Research In-Press. doi: http://dx.doi.org/
10.2112/JCOASTRES-D-12-00230.1
Munaretto, S., Vellinga P. and Tobi, H. (2012). Flood Protection
in Venice under Conditions of Sea-Level Rise: An Analysis of
Institutional and Technical Measures. Coastal Management,
40: 355–380.
Nicholls, R.J., Cooper, N. and Townend, I.H. (2007). The man-
agement of coastal flooding and erosion. In C.R. Thorne
et al. (Eds.), Future Flood and Coastal Erosion Risks. London:
Thomas Telford, 392–413.
Padron, D. V. and G. Forsyth (2009). NY-NJ Outer Harbor
Gateway. ASCE Proceedings of the 2009 Seminar Against
the Deluge: Storm Surge Barrier to Protect New York City,
137–151.
Scarano,M. (2009). RegulatoryChallenges to aNewYorkHarbor
Storm Barrier System. In: Against the Deluge: Storm Surge
Barriers to Protect New York City. New York, 2009.
SLFRA. (2011). Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Author-
ity. Flood Risk Management Local Perspectives. Presen-
tation by Robert Turner. http://www.nafsma.org/pdf/2011-
annual-meeting/NAFSMA_neworleanslocal_turner.pdf
Van der Meer, J.M. (2006). Stormvloedkering in de Wester-
schelde. MSc thesis technical University Delft, The Nether-
lands (in Dutch). http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%
3A318e5773-6787-4c48-82ec-a9fa4f221f7f/
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–79 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences. 79

Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. ISSN 0077-8923
ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Issue:Cost Estimates for Flood Resilience and Protection Strategies in New York City
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6.1 Overview Sandy
Hurricane Sandy is the worst natural hazard to hit
the NYC region in its history. Due to her sheer size
(Blake et al., 2013) and rare angle of approach (Hall
and Sobel, 2013), Sandy caused record high water
levels in NYC. The evolution of Sandy from the
Caribbean up to the northeast coast of the US was
far from straightforward. Sandy hit Jamaica as a cat-
egory 1 hurricane, strengthened to category 3 hurri-
cane inCuba, and thenweakenedquickly to category
1 over the Bahamas. Moving northeastwards, Sandy
merged with another weather system (giving it her
size), but retained hurricane force winds formost of
the time (NASA, 2012).Her path towards the north-
east then got blocked by a high-pressure system over
theNorth Atlantic (Blake et al., 2013), forcing her to
make a turn to the left, straight towards New Jersey
and New York. Despite this complex evolution, the
path and size of Sandy were forecasted exceptionally
well. Already five days before landfall, the National
Hurricane Center (NHC) projected Sandy’s track to
within a couple of tens of miles (The Washington
Post, 2012).
This accurate forecast enabled authorities to take
proper actions in preparation of the storm. Schools
were closed and evacuations orders (both volun-
tary as well as mandatory, depending on the city)
were issued for low-lying areas. Also the Metropoli-
tan Transportation Authority, which had learned
from events in 2007 (extreme rainfall) and 2011
(hurricane Irene), took many precautions; inform-
ing the public three days in advance that the system
could possibly be shut down. Buses and trains were
thenmoved tohigher ground, subway entrances and
ventilation grates were covered, staffing the inci-
dent command center, deploying emergency crews,
and preparing pump trains, portable pumps and re-
sponse vehicles. Because of these preparations, the
recovery went relatively fast, with the first bus lines
already back in service the day after the storm, the
first subway service three days after the storm and
within 5 days 80% of the subway system was back
in operation (Kaufman et al., 2012). Generally, the
actions of the MTA before and after the storm have
been widely applauded (NY1, 2013).
Despite all these efforts, the impact of Sandy on
the Eastern seaboard of the US, and in particular
the NYC–NJ area, was huge, a testimony to the ex-
treme nature of this storm. Preliminary analyses
show Sandy can be ranked as the second costliest
storm in terms of damage in the US, after Hurri-
cane Katrina of 2005 (Blake et al., 2013), and could
be the sixth-costliest storm, after normalizing (see
e.g. Pielke et al., 2008) its damages for inflation,
population, and wealth (Blake et al., 2013).
6.2 Damage caused by Sandy
There are various estimates for the losses associ-
ated with hurricane Sandy. These vary in terms of
area considered (i.e. New York City, New York State,
New Jersey), types of damage considered (i.e. dif-
ferent sectors, direct losses, insured losses, indirect
losses), and themomentof assessment.Quickly after
the storm, Zandi (2012) made a preliminary dam-
age estimate for the US East coast, arriving at a
total of $50 bn, including indirect damages. Using
storm surge and damage models, RMS estimated
the insured losses of Sandy in February 2013 (RMS,
2013), arriving at $20–$25 bn. By April 2013, the
Insurance Information Institute estimated the total
insured losses of Sandy at $18.8 bn, after 93% of
the claims were settled (I.I.I., 2013); making Sandy
the third costliest storm in the US in terms of in-
sured losses (after Katrina in 2005with $48.7 bn and
Andrew in 1992 with $25.6 bn).
Post-storm assessments have been made by var-
ious companies in the wake of Sandy, illustrat-
ing how they have been hit. The states of New
York and New Jersey have made comprehen-
sive damage assessments to substantiate claims
for the federal relief fund (Table 6.1). NYS re-
quested the federal government for $42 bn, from
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Table 6.1. Overview of the damage assessments by the
states of New Jersey and New York (NJ, 2012 and NY,
2012a)
New Jersey New York
(million $) (million $)
Government Response and
Repair
$529.4
Individual Assistance $702.7 $913.3
Housing $4,921.2 $9,672.0
Business $8,319.1 $6,000.0
Health $291.8 $3,081.0
Labor $760.1
Schools $2.6 $342.7
Transit, Roads and Bridges $1,351.0 $7,348.1
Parks and Environment $5,526.5 $793.9
Water, Waste and Sewer $3,012.7 $1,060.3
Government Operating
Revenue
$95.0 $461.5
Other Local Government
Revenue & Road
$737.5
Other Local Education $125.0
Atlantic City/CRDA $312.7
Port Authority $1,000.0
Utilities – Gas & Electric $1,797.3 $1504.0
Total repair and response
costs
$29,484.6 $32,804.1
Additional mitigation and
prevention costs
$7,422.7 $9,080.80
Overall total $36,907.3 $41,884.9
which $9.1 bn was for new flood adaptation
measures (NYS, 2012). New Jersey claims $37 bn
in total damage (HP, 2013), of which $7.4 bn is allo-
cated for additional adaptationmeasures (NJ, 2012).
Federal aid came with the Hurricane Sandy relief
bill, which requested 60.4 bn for aid in response, re-
covery and mitigation (EOP, 2012). This bill passed
the senate on January 4, and was signed into law on
January 6 by the president. This is lower than the
added funds requested by the states of NY and NJ
though.
Housing
The impact of Hurricane Sandy on residential prop-
erty was huge; at least 650,000 houses were damage
or destroyed, mostly because of the storm surge and
waves (Blake et al., 2013). It is estimated that in the
state of New Jersey 346,000 homes were damaged
or destroyed, and in the state of New York 305,000
homes (Blake et al., 2013). Even six months after
the storms, several tens of thousands of people re-
main homeless, living in hotel rooms with relatives
or in temporary homes (AP, 2013a). In New Jersey
especially, the communities along the Jersey Shore
(counties of Monmouth, Ocean and Atlantic) were
hit hard, with some of the most devastating images
of the storm coming from areas like Mantoloking.
In addition, the interior of New Jersey was hit, in-
cluding Jersey City and Hoboken. In New York state
Nassau and the counties of NYC suffered badly (NY,
2012b). Several communities in Long Island, such
as Fire Island and Long Beach, were particularly
severely hit. Striking are the events in Breezy Point,
at the tip of the Rockaways (Queens), where a blaz-
ing fire sparked by contact between electrical wires
and seawater destroyed over a 100 homes (Table
6.2).
Power utilities
Hurricane Sandy has had a huge impact on the
power and gas utilities of the NYC–NJ region.
Overall, it is estimated that over 8.7 million cus-
tomers were without power due to the devastating
effects of Sandy (WRN, 2012). Many were still af-
fected by power outages more than a week after
the storm: about 150,000 in New Jersey, 174,000
in Nassau/Suffolk/Westchester, and 28,000 in NYC
(WRN, 2012). For each of the main power util-
ity services in NY and NJ, PSE&G, Jersey Central
Power & Light, Long Island Power Authority and
Consolidated Edison, approximately a million cus-
tomers were affected at the height of the blackouts
(The New York Times, 2012; see also Table 6.3). Di-
rect damage to the grid power and related utilities
included the inundation of 58 substations (NJSpot-
light, 2013), flooding of underground equipment,
transformers, and downing of thousands of poles
and hundreds of miles of wires. Several repair and
flood protection projects were rapidly initiated.
InNew Jersey, for example, the projected costs for
restoring the impacted utilities of PSE&G are esti-
mated to be $250–300 mln (NJ Spotlight, 2013).
Large problems arose when switching- and sub-
stations flooded near Newark Bay. Because of
Sandy, PSE&G is planning a $3.6 bn infrastructure
overhaul over the next 10 years, including $1.7 bn to
raise switch- and substations (NJ.com, 2013). The
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Table 6.2. Overview of properties hit by Sandy in the states of New York and New Jersey
# properties # properties Property # businesses Description
hit destroyed damage ($) impacted
New York State 305,000a,c 9,7 bna 265,300a
NYC 4,7 bna
Breezy point (Rockaways) ∼500e Over 100 homes destroyed
due to fire c,d,e,g
Long Island ∼100,000c,f 2000 >0.5 bnc 80% of homes on fire Island
damaged. Also Long Beach
severely damagedf
Staten Island 14,000f >87f Particularly communities of
Midland, New Dorp, and
Oakland Beachc
Manhattan Hundredsc
New Jersey 346,000c 22,000c 4.9 bnb 19,000 with
severe damc
Severe damage relates to
$250,000 or more
Hoboken >1,700c 0.1 bnc ∼ 20,000 residents affectedc
1000–5000f 0.8 bnf 1 bn damage in Hoboken,
80% by residential
buildingsf
Jersey Shore 1 bnf Especially Seabright,
Mantoloking, Lake Como,
Seaside Heigths, Belmar,
and Long Beach Islandf
aNY, 2012a; 2012b.
bNJ, 2012.
cBlake et al., 2013.
dHuffington Post, 2012.
eUPI, 2013.
fThe Real Deal, 2012.
gGothamist, 2012a.
estimated flood damage to Jersey Central Power &
Light is $630 to $680 mln (NJ.com, 2012; FirstEn-
ergy, 2013). In the whole of New Jersey, power and
gas line repairs are expected to cost roughly $1 bn
(Blake et al., 2013).
In New York, the damage to Con Edison is es-
timated at $350–450 mln (Reuters, 2012), and the
company is planning a 1 bn dollar investment over
the next four years to create flood protection works,
make some equipment submersible, and bury some
wires of the grid (AP, 2013b). The damage costs
for the Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) are es-
timated of between $900 and 950 mln, roughly a
quarter of their annual revenue (WNYC, 2012a). In
bothNew Jersey andNewYork the damage by Sandy
has a sparked a lively discussion on the height of
electricity bills (FirstEnergy, 2013; WNYC, 2012a),
which are expected to increase to pay for some of the
storm damage, as governmental bodies (like LIPA)
typically receive amaximumof 75%reimbursement
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to cover the costs of repair (WNYC, 2012a).
Transportation systems
The transport system of the NY Metropolitan Area
was hit hard by Hurricane Sandy (see Table 6.4 for
an overview). Seven subway tunnels under the East
River flooded and Metro-North lost power on mul-
tiple lines. The Metropolitan Transportation Au-
thority (MTA) has assessed the infrastructure dam-
age fromHurricane Sandywill cost $4.8 bn to repair.
Additionally, $265 mln is needed to cover overtime
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Table 6.3. Overview of damage to some of the main power and utility companies in NJ and NY
Name of Utility Max customers Damage
company State affected [$ bn 2012] Damage description, repair
PSE&G NJ ∼1,400,000a 0.25–0.3b Excluding costs of electric-generating
facilities and shortened life-span of
equipment
Jersey Central Power &
Light
NJ ∼925,000a 0.63c–0.68f Repairing substations, replacing 6700
poles, 3600 transformers, 400 miles
of wire
Consolidated Edison NY ∼800,000a 0.35–0.45d Flooded underground equipment,
100,000 downed wires
Long Island Power
Authority
NY ∼900,000a 0.9–0.95e 2100 transformers, 4500 poles, repair of
400 miles of wire
aThe New York Times, 2012.
bNJ Spotlight, 2012.
cFirstEnergy, 2013.
dReuters, 2012.
eWNYC, 2012a.
fNJ.com, 2012.
and lost revenue (NY1.com, 2013; MTA, 2012). The
most costly items on the repair list of the MTA in-
clude (MTA, 2012) $600 mln to restore the South
Ferry/Whitehall subway stations in lower Manhat-
tan; $650 million to repair the train service to the
Rockaways; and $770 mln to repair flood-damaged
signals in Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan. Also
the repairs of the Hugh L. Cary and Queens Mid-
town tunnels are expected to cost $350 mln and
$400 mln, respectively. The MTA estimated that it
lost 49.7 million trips because of Hurricane Sandy
(43.8 million in NYC Transit, 2.4 million on the
LIRR, 1.8 million on Metro-North Railroad, 1.6
million on the MTA Bus Co., and 100,000 on the
Staten Island Railway (MTA, 2013). The MTA ex-
pects FEMA and insurance will cover most of the
costs, but anticipates it will have to raise around
$950 mln (MTA, 2012), likely by cutting back on
internal costs (Gothamist, 2012b). The MTA states
it will not only repair broken systems but will also
improve flood resilience while repairing them.
The total damage to roads and infrastructure
in New Jersey is estimated at $2.9 bn (Blake et
al., 2013). The PATH tubes between New Jersey
and New York were entirely filled with seawater,
and the Hoboken PATH station was entirely inun-
dated. Damages to the PATH system are approxi-
mately $0.3 bn (HobokenPatch, 2012). The damage
to NJ Transit Rail is estimated at $400 mln (Blake
et al., 2013;WNYC,2012b).Of the$400mln, around
$100 mln is from damage to trains and equipment
and$300mln is due to repair tracks,wires, signaling,
electrical substations and equipment, for emergency
services, and lost revenues (Rail News, 2012). Over-
all, nearly a quarter of their locomotives (62) and
a quarter of their train cars (261) were damaged in
yards in the Meadows complex and Hoboken (CBS
New York, 2012). On top of this damage, NJ Transit
Rail believes around $800 mln is necessary to make
the transit system more resistant to future storms
(Rail News, 2012). By comparison, the damage to
Amtrak was relatively low, $30 mln in repairs and
$60 mln in lost revenues. Amtrak is also looking to
improve the resilience of its system, especially re-
lated to Penn station and the tunnels (Rail News,
2012).
Besides PATH other units of the Port Authority
of New Jersey and New York suffered badly. Over-
all, the damage to the Authoritiy is estimated at
$2 bn. This includes the damage to PATH, as well
as damage to airports (LaGuardia), the WTC site,
tunnels, and electrical equipment damaged or cor-
roded by salt water (App.com, 2013). BoatUS esti-
mates that 65,000 boats were destroyed by Sandy,
with a total damage of roughly $650 mln (Blake
et al. 2013). Also, about a quarter of a million
cars were damaged, of which 150,000 were in NYC
(Autoblog, 2013).
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Other infrastructure
Besides energy systems and transportation, other
infrastructure was hit hard by Sandy. Preliminary
estimates show that Hurricane Sandy will cost
broadband, telephone, and cable companies, such
as Verizon and AT&T, around $600million in repair
and cleanup expenses (about.com, 2012). Medical
infrastructure was also hit hard. Various hospitals
were affected, including the NYU Langone Medi-
cal Center, which had to be evacuated because of
power outage, the Bellevue Hospital (FierceHealth-
care, 2012), and Coney Island Hospital (The Hill,
2013). Costs for hospitals in NYC after Sandy total
to about $800 mln (The Hill, 2013). A large portion
of this relates to permanent reconstruction works to
the hospitalsmore resilient in future situations. This
includes, for instance, the relocationofConey Island
Hospital’s emergency department to the first floor,
the relocationofmechanical gas systemsout of base-
ments, retrofitting elevators, and creating floodwalls
(The Hill, 2013). Also $207 mln of the federal relief
funds have been allocated for the renovation and
repair of key departments and systems at the VA
Manhattan Medical Center (EOP, 2012).
Wastewater treatment, drinking water, and
contaminated sites
In the aftermath of Sandy, the EPA assessed the
quality of the drinking water and wastewater fa-
cilities, and supported the repair and maintenance
of damagedwastewater treatment plants inNew Jer-
sey (EPA, 2012a). Problems of contamination may
arise when the wastewater plants get filled by sea-
water water, which may cause sewage water to mix
with the hydrological system, bypassing the treat-
ment facilities of the plant. Initial reports from the
Rockaways show leakage of the Bay Park sewage
treatment plant, leading to only partial treatment of
waste (MSNBC, 2012). However, additional drink-
ing water analyses at water wells located on Shin-
necock Nation showed water quality from the wells
met New York State drinking water and groundwa-
ter standards (EPA, 2012b). The EPA also assessed
possible pollution in the Gowanus Canal and New-
town Creek in Brooklyn. Although the Gowanus
Canal did overflow, there were no significant health
risks (DN, 2012).
Furthermore, The EPA assessed 40 drinking wa-
ter facilities and 23 wastewater treatment plants in
New Jersey (EPA, 2012a). Of these 23 facilities in NJ,
two wastewater treatment plants requested further
assistance from the EPA (the Passaic Valley Sewerage
Commission in Newark, New Jersey, and the Mid-
dlesex County Utility Authority in Sayreville, New
Jersey). The Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission
was flooded and lost electricity during the storm,
and the EPA removed wastewater from the plant
until the plant was back in operation. The Mid-
dlesex County Utility Authority lost power during
the storm to its water utility intake pumps and the
EPA assisted in fixing damaged equipment. Further-
more, in preparation for Hurricane Sandy, the EPA
secured contaminated sites in the federal Superfund
program in New Jersey and New York to protect
against potential damage. Since the storm, the EPA
has been assessing these 105 sites and it appears they
do not pose an immediate threat to public health or
the environment. In thewhole ofNew Jersey, repairs
to the wastewater and sewer services are estimated
to cost about $3 bn (Blake et al., 2013).
6.3 Damage and risk of NYC
and surrounding region
In order to evaluate flood risk management strate-
gies for New York City, it is important to have
insights in both the costs and benefits of such strate-
gies. The costs have beendescribed in detail in previ-
ous chapters of this report. In order to gain insights
into the benefits, the risk reduced by installing storm
surge barriers and/or levees need to be understood.
In order to do so, detailed risk estimates for build-
ings and vehicles in NYC (De Moel et al., 2013)
are used. De Moel et al. (2013) use data from over
500 synthetic hurricanes (from Lin et al., 2012) and
a damage model based on the HAZUS MH model
(FEMA, 2009) to calculate the flood risk of buildings
and vehicles in NYC. This risk estimate is used as a
base and scaled up to include also other sectors at
risk (i.e. infrastructure, public space, etc.), indirect
effects (after the flood event), and risk in parts of NJ
that are protected by the barrier strategies. Scaling
up this risk is done by using damage assessments of
Hurricane Sandy.
Damage NYC
The state administration of New York estimated the
total damage in the state at $32.8 bn; it also disclosed
amore detailed summary of the damage assessment
(NY, 2012b). This detailed summary shows that
damages to NYC are estimated at roughly $15 bn.
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Table 6.4. Overview of damage to some of the main transportation companies in NJ and NY
Transport
Name of Transportation Lost rips Damage
company State [mln] [$ bn 2012] Damage description, repair
MTA NY 49.7a 5.0b 7 East River tunnels flooded, Stations of
South Ferry and Whitehall, damaged
signals, etc.
PATH NY–NJ 0.3–0.8e,h Hoboken station, pumps, electrical
equipment
NJ Transit Rail NJ 0.4c Damage to all 12 rail lines; flooded cars
and locomotives d
Amtrak NJ 0.18 0.09f Reparing signals, pumps, tunnels,
stations (30 mln)f; operating losses
(60 mln)g
aMTA, 2013; bMTA, 2012; cWNYC, 2012b; dCBS New York, 2012; eHobokenPatch, 2012; fAP, 2013c; gRail News, 2012;
hApp.com, 2013.
However, this estimate excludes any damage to in-
frastructure, ofwhichmost inNYS can be attributed
to NYC. For instance, of the damage sustained by
the MTA, totaling $5.0 bn, 89% can directly be at-
tributed to NYC, 2% to counties outside NYC, and
9% to the system as a whole (MTA, 2012). Includ-
ing parts of the state-wide damage to infrastructure
in the NYC estimate brings the total up to roughly
$21.3 bn (Table 6.5).
The above estimate of $21.3 bn of damage to
NYC by Sandy only includes direct damages. Be-
sides direct damages, large disasters like Sandy also
affect the regional economy and result in indirect
damages due to loss of production after the event,
both in the area struck by the disaster and outside.
Such indirect costs can be calculated as the reduc-
tion in production of goods and services, quan-
tified in terms of value added (Hallegatte, 2008).
There have been several economic studies trying to
quantify this effect (e.g. Jonkman et al., 2008; Hal-
legatte, 2008; Li et al., 2013). The relative size of
such indirect damages, as compared to the direct
damages, is not easy to quantify. It is sometimes
stated, without proper argumentation, that such in-
direct losses can be roughly the same size as the di-
rect losses (Toyoda, 2008). Few empirical evidence
exists though. Toyoda (2008) estimated the indirect
losses after the great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earth-
quake in 1995 using questionnaires and statistical
analyses of macro-economic data. Toyoda (2008)
arrived at indirect losses that were indeed roughly
the same as the direct losses, more than 10 years
after the event. Hallegatte (2008) created a input-
output modeling framework to assess the indirect
losses of Hurricane Katrina, and explore the ef-
fect of different sized events. Hallegatte concludes
that for very large disasters (direct damage roughly
$200 bn), the indirect costs can be just as large as the
Table 6.5. Overview of state-wide and NYC damage of
Hurricane Sandy, including estimates for infrastructure
damage in NYC
NYS NYC
(inM$) (inM$)
Gov’t response and repair 1627.3 486
Indiviudal assistance 913.3 530
Housing 9672 4738
Business 6000 4512.1
Health 3081 2799
Schools 342.7 300
Transit, roads and bridges 1484.40 1013
Parks and environment 793.9 300
water, waste and sewer 1060.3 117
Gov’t operational revenue 461.5 250
MTA 5022.6 4800a
Utilities 1504 1000b
Port Authority 841.1 500c
Total 32804.1 21345
aClose approximation 96% of total MTA damage.
bAssumed, roughly two-thirds of state-wide damage.
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Table 6.6. Aggregated FEMA housing assistance data for owners and renters at various spatial levels.
NY NYC NJ NJ – barrier 2c* NJ – barrier 2ab**
Owners
Valid Registrations 150582 66516 146294 57257 40596
Registratrions × avg. damage 1.82 × 109 0.83 × 109 1.22 × 109 0.26 × 109 0.13 × 109
Renters
Valid Registrations 113748 84221 108202 72003 62129
Moderate damage 44% 44% 47% 47% 53%
Major damage 24% 26% 14% 18% 17%
Substantial damage 32% 30% 39% 35% 30%
*Includes the counties of: Passaic, Bergen, Hudson, Essex, Union, Middlesex and (northern) parts of Monmouth.
**Includes the counties of: Passaic, Bergen, Hudson, Essex, Union, and parts of (northern) Middlesex.
direct losses. For smaller events, this ration is
smaller, however. For Katrina, direct damage esti-
mated at $107 bn by Hallegatte (2008), the indirect
losses are estimated at roughly 40% of the direct
losses ($42 bn). Given that hurricane Sandy was a
smaller event in direct losses as compared to hur-
ricane Katrina, we assume here indirect losses to
be about one-third of the direct losses. This would
result a total damage of about $28.5 bn for NYC;
17% of this damage can be attributed to damage to
housing (4.7/28.5).
Damage NYC vs. NJ
The barrier strategies described in this report do
not only prevent flood damage in NYC, but also
in parts of New Jersey. In order to get a grip on
this spatial dimension, the housing assistance data
of Hurricane Sandy collected by FEMA has been
used (FEMA, 2013). This database, generated 15th
of February 2013, provides the number of valid
registrations per zip-code, and the average damage
per house as inspected by FEMA inspectors. By
multiplying the average damage per house with
the amount of valid registrations an indication of
the total housing damage can be calculated at the
zip-code level. These data have been aggregated to
NYC and the parts of NJ that are protected by the
various barrier strategies (Table 6.6).
From Table 6.6, the fraction of housing damage
caused in parts of New Jersey as compared to NYC
can be calculated. For the area protected by the bar-
rier 2c strategy, this is roughly one-third of the dam-
age in NYC, whereas for the area protected by the
barrier 2ab strategy this is roughly one-sixth of the
housing damage in NYC.
Risk NYC and parts of NJ
To allow for a comparison of costs and benefits, esti-
mates of the flood risk of NYC and the surrounding
area are needed in terms of expected annual dam-
age (EAD). De Moel et al. (2013) have estimated
expected annual damage related to buildings and
vehicles in detail for NYC. They arrive at risk of al-
most $71 M/yr for NYC. Of this risk, about 41%,
or $29 M/yr, is risk resulting from residential build-
ings. This risk estimate excludes several important
factors that also constitute to the total flood risk, like
the risk to infrastructure, public areas, and indirect
losses. While building code strategies only reduce
the flood risk to buildings (as also estimated by De
Moel et al., 2013), protective strategies including
surge barriers and/or levees would also reduce the
risk to these other factors.We’ve seen with the dam-
age of Hurricane Sandy in NYC that approximately
17% of the total damage could be attributed hous-
ing. Applying this fraction of the total damage of
Sandy to the residential risk estimated by De Moel
et al. (2013), we arrive at a total risk of $174 M/yr.
To include also parts of New Jersey that would be
protected by barrier Strategies 2a/b and 2c, this risk
can then be increased by 1/6 and 1/3, respectively,
arriving at $203 and $232 M/yr.
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Appendix A. Locations of the barriers
Figure A1. Possible location of the Arthur Kill barrier.
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Figure A2. Possible location of the Verrazano Narrows barrier.
Figure A3. Possible location of the Long Island Sound Barrier.
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Figure A4. Possible location of the NY-NJ Outer Harbor Barrier.
Figure A5. Possible location of the Jamaica Bay barrier.
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Appendix B. Detailed cost estimates of East River Barrier
Figure B1. Cost estimates East River barrier (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2009).
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Appendix C. Results of the regression analysis
Figure C1. Results of the regression analysis.
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Appendix D. Letter Environmental Agency UK, March 2012
Annual operations and maintenance costs are approximately £8 million a year to maintain and operate.
In addition we also spend approximately £10 million on capital improvements to the defences (2008/2009
expenditure levels).
Table D1. Maintenance costs Thames Barrier, UK
5 Year
Maintenance
Year 2006-07 2007-08 2003-09 2009-10 2010-11 Cost
Thames Barrier 3,095,336.00 3,875,275.60 3,083,288.40 3,097,816.48 3,071,613.27 16,223,329.95
Maintenance Cost
As of February 2011, the Thames Barrier has now been closed 440 times, 119 of which have been to protect
London from flooding since the barrier became operational in 1982. Of the closures, 78 were for tidal surge
conditions and 41 were to prevent rainfall/fluvial flooding. In addition to these, one closure was to assist
with salvage work on theMarchioness and one for repair works following the Sand Kite incident. The other
occasions were monthly closures, for experiments and tests.
With regard to estimates of the value of the barriers, based on the cost of damages prevented or lives
saved, the Thames Estuary 2100 Report provides some information on what is at stake in the tidal estuary
in its entirety. Information can be found in Chapter 1 on Page 12: http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/
research/library/consultations/106100.aspx
The following link is to the Thames Barrier information pack that can be found in the Thames Barrier
website:
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Leisure/Thames_Barrier_2010_
project_pack.pdf
And answers to your remaining questions can be found at the following website link;
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/floods/38353.aspx
If I can be of any further help, please contact me.
Yours sincerely
Annette Smith
External Relations Officer
Direct dial 01707 632301
Direct fax 01707 632 610
Direct email NETenquiries@environment-agency.gov.uk
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Appendix E. Storm surge water levels with and without storm surge barriers
Table E1. Maximum Water Elevations Projected at Different Locations in New York
Harbor Under Different Future Sea Level Rise Scenarios (Unit: meters) (Kim et al., 2009)
Without Storm Surge Barriers With Storm Surge Barriers
Current 2020s Sea 2050s Sea 2080s Sea Current 2020s Sea 2050s Sea 2080s Sea
Sea Level Level Level Sea Level Level Level
Level Rise Rise Rise Level Rise Rise Rise
9.4 cm 24.6 cm 45.2 cm 9.4 cm 24.6 cm 45.2 cm
(3.7 inch) (9.7 inch) (17.8 inch) (3.7 inch) (9.7 inch) (17.8 inch)
Sandy Hook 2.85 2.94 3.10 3.31 3.06 3.16 3.31 3.53
Willets Point 2.89 3.00 3.15 3.39 3.01 3.11 3.29 3.53
Jamaica Bay 2.65 2.75 2.92 3.16 1.17 1.37 1.63 1.99
Elizabeth, NJ 2.83 2.91 3.07 3.30 1.14 1.37 1.70 2.11
Battery 2.64 2.73 2.90 3.12 1.01 1.21 1.55 1.96
Hunts Point 2.76 2.87 3.02 3.26 1.12 1.24 1.41 1.61
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Appendix F. Vertical datum and NYC DEM information
Figure F1. NYC 2010 DEM. November 2011.
This three-foot bare earth Digital Elevation Model (DEM) for New York City was produced in November
2011 from 2010 NYC LiDAR data to support the production of updated hurricane surge (SLOSH) inun-
dation area and depth data for NYC OEM and NYS OEM. The data are in feet, referenced to NAVD 88. No
additional quality assurance or control was performed on the final DEMother than that already performed
on the source .las data.
NYC DoITT provided the source 2010 LiDAR (.las) tiled data which was collected from April 14 to May
1, 2010, by Sanborn and reviewed for quality assurance and control by the Center for Advanced Research
of Spatial Information (CARSI) lab at CUNYHunter College. Accuracy of the source LiDAR data: 9.24 cm
RMSE vertical accuracy, 33 cm horizontal accuracy, and 8–12 points per square meter point density.
The U.S. Army Corps’ CRREL (Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory) in Hanover, New
Hampshire, produced this data at the request of the USACE New England District to meet the hurricane
SLOSH data production schedule. Only class 2 (bare earth) points from the source .las tiles were used for
production. No additional quality assurance or control was performed on the final DEM other than that
already performed on the source .las data.
98
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences.
de Moel et al. Flood management strategies for New York City
Appendix G. Jamaica Bay surge height simulations
Figure G1. Jamaica Bay surge calculations by Panuzio, F. L (1976).
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Appendix H. Expert interviews
Name specialist Company Subject
Piet Dircke Arcadis Verrazano barrier
Hessel Voortman Arcadis Verrazano barrier
Graeme Forsyth Halcrow Outer Harbor Barrier
Mike Abrahams, Parsons Brinckerhoff East River Barrier
Phil Girandola Parsons Brinckerhoff East River Barrier
John Taylor Parsons Brinckerhoff East River Barrier
John Clifford Perkins Eastman Building code & flood proofing
Joseph Ackroyd NYC-DOB Building code & flood proofing
James Colgate NYC-DOB Building code & flood proofing
Sean Woodroffe Karl Fischer Architecture Building code & flood proofing
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Appendix I. Shoreline typology and associated flood management measures
Table I1. Based on draft methodology by Mary Kymball, NYC-DCP, 2012
Land use/density
High- Mid- Mid- Mid- Low-
density density density density Mid- Low- density
Mixed Residential/ Commercial/ Residential/ density density Industrial/
Use Commercial Industrial Industrial Residential Residential Commercial
Geomorphology
Rocky bluffs on
sheltered waters
North Shore Staten
Island
Upper Manhattan
and the Bronx
West Shore Staten
Island
Sandy bluffs on
sheltered waters
Randalls Island Throggs Neck, City
Island
South Shore Staten
Island
Oceanfront barrier
beaches
Coney Island Far Rockaway Breezy Point, Sea
Gate
Marshes on
sheltered waters
Hardened Bays and
straits
Lower Manhattan East Harlem South Bronx, Sunset
Park
DUMBO, Long
Island City
Canals and small
rivers
Gowanus, Newtown
Creek
Bronx River
Geomorphology
Rocky bluffs on
sheltered waters
Floodwall Land fill/floodwall Floodwall
Sandy bluffs on
sheltered waters
Floodwall Flood proofing Nourishment/
hidden levee/
Oceanfront barrier
beaches
Nourishment/build
up levee/
Nourishment/
hidden levee/
Nourishment/
hidden levee/
Marshes on
sheltered waters
Hardened Bays and
straits
Land fill /Elevate
highway
Floodwall/Elevate
highway
Floodwall/Elevate
highway
Levee/Land fill
Canals and small
rivers
Small barrier Floodwall/levee
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Appendix J. Preliminary damage estimates by Hurricane Sandy
Adapted from Zandi (http://www.moodys.com/Pages/Hurricane-Sandy.aspx?WT.mc_id=home_banner_
sandy).
Table J1. Overview of preliminary damage estimates by Hurricane Sandy for the US East
Coast (adapted from Zandi, 2012)
Lost Output $ bn Damages $ bn
Transportation/utilities 0.7 Households 11.0
Retail 0.2 Housing 10.5
Prof./business services 4.6 Vehicles 0.5
Information 1.8 Businesses 10.0
Financial activities 7.0 Infrastructure 9.0
Education/healthcare 1.7
Leisure/hospitality 0.9
Other services 0.5
Government 2.6
Total net loss 19.9 Total 30.0
Table J2. Overview of economic indicators for the region affected by Sandy
Nominal GDP, Employment, Households, Value of housing Average household Unemployment
Region bil $ ths ths stock, mil $ income, ths rate, %
Bridgeport 65.5 416.7 340.3 86,452.7 211.3 8.1
New York City 1,217.6 8,525.0 6,973.3 1,332,910.3 159.5 9.3
New Jersey ex 53.9 483.9 329.9 228,960.5 483.3 11.4
New York City
Philadelphia 325.0 2,711.5 2,280.4 396,970.1 130.9 8.8
Washington 416.6 3,036.3 2,145.9 533,994.3 162.5 5.6
Total of all 2,078.6 15,173.4 12,069.8 2,579,287.9 229.5 8.5
regions
US 15,775.7 133,376.7 119,736.4 16,079,067.0 112.3 8.1
%of US 13.2 11.4 10.1 16.0 NA NA
102
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences.
de Moel et al. Flood management strategies for New York City
A
pp
en
di
x
K
.L
an
d
co
v
er
hi
tb
y
Sa
nd
y
in
u
n
da
tio
n
pe
rc
o
u
n
ty
in
N
J
an
d
N
YC
(in
km
2 )
D
ev
el
op
ed
D
ev
el
op
ed
D
ev
el
op
ed
E
m
er
ge
n
t
O
pe
n
D
ev
el
op
ed
lo
w
m
ed
iu
m
h
ig
h
B
ar
re
n
D
ec
id
u
ou
s
Ev
er
gr
ee
n
m
ix
ed
Sh
ru
b/
H
ay
/
C
u
lt
iv
at
ed
W
oo
dy
h
er
ba
ce
u
ou
s
W
at
er
O
pe
n
in
te
n
si
ty
in
te
n
si
ty
in
te
n
si
ty
la
n
d
fo
re
st
fo
re
st
fo
re
st
Sc
ru
b
H
er
ba
ce
u
ou
s
pa
st
u
re
cr
op
s
w
et
la
n
ds
w
et
la
n
ds
St
at
en
Is
la
n
d
2.
7
4.
0
5.
5
3.
7
2.
4
1.
5
1.
8
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
3
3.
2
6.
1
4.
6
0.
0
0.
0
B
ro
ok
yn
1.
7
1.
0
1.
7
6.
1
12
.7
0.
5
0.
4
0.
0
0.
0
1.
1
0.
2
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
1.
2
0.
0
0.
0
Q
u
ee
n
s
4.
3
3.
3
6.
9
15
.5
24
.3
2.
1
1.
0
0.
0
0.
1
1.
8
0.
4
0.
0
0.
0
0.
8
5.
9
0.
0
0.
0
M
an
h
at
ta
n
20
.1
0.
7
1.
4
3.
0
5.
4
0.
1
0.
1
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
1.
5
0.
0
0.
0
B
ro
n
x
0.
6
0.
9
1.
6
3.
1
3.
0
0.
1
0.
3
0.
0
0.
0
0.
5
0.
2
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
1.
5
0.
0
0.
0
B
er
ge
n
0.
1
0.
4
0.
5
0.
8
0.
5
0.
0
0.
1
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
H
u
ds
on
37
.1
4.
9
14
.2
25
.7
30
.0
0.
1
0.
4
0.
0
0.
0
0.
3
0.
0
0.
3
0.
1
17
.2
4.
1
0.
0
0.
0
E
ss
ex
0.
3
0.
4
1.
3
6.
3
8.
1
0.
2
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
0
0.
0
U
n
io
n
0.
9
1.
6
3.
5
5.
9
3.
7
0.
2
0.
2
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
7
0.
7
1.
8
0.
0
0.
0
M
id
d
le
se
x
9.
3
4.
6
6.
3
5.
9
2.
5
0.
6
4.
2
0.
2
0.
1
0.
0
0.
0
0.
3
6.
9
11
.1
5.
6
0.
0
0.
0
M
on
m
ou
th
13
.6
3.
2
6.
6
5.
2
0.
9
3.
7
1.
1
0.
6
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
6
2.
3
4.
2
4.
8
0.
0
0.
0
N
Y
C
29
.5
9.
8
17
.1
31
.4
47
.9
4.
2
3.
6
0.
0
0.
2
3.
5
0.
8
0.
4
3.
2
7.
0
14
.7
0.
0
0.
0
N
J
61
.2
15
.1
32
.4
49
.9
45
.6
4.
8
6.
0
0.
9
0.
1
0.
3
0.
0
1.
3
10
.1
33
.5
16
.4
0.
0
0.
0
N
J/
N
Y
C
ra
ti
o
1.
54
1.
89
1.
59
0.
95
N
J/
N
Y
C
ra
ti
o
u
rb
an
1.
33
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2013) 1–104 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences. 103
Flood management strategies for New York City de Moel et al.
Appendix L. Cost estimates for Hybrid Strategy 1c.
The total cost for Strategy 1c are depicted in Table L1. Only free board building code levels (maximum
+4 ft) for new buildings are required in the 1/100 A zone ($154 mln). Higher freeboard levels for new
buildings (maximum +6 ft) will be applied in the 1/100 V zone ($4.6 mln). These building codes only
pertain to new structures the 1/100 flood zone and not the 1/500 flood zone. In addition, we apply wet
flood proofing of+2 ft to existing buildings in the 1/100 A zones ($384 mln). The total building code costs
for S1c is $542 mln.
For the additional no regret protection measures, we take the low range of unit cost in Table 6.2 of
$10-$20 mln/km for a total length of 80 km of coastline (80 * 10–20 = $0.8–$1.6 bn), since the protection
measures do not yet have tomeet the extreme 25–30 ft design water levels. Only the coastlines of Rockaways
and Sandy Hook will be protected to a design water level of 25–30 ft ($0.8–1.2 bn, see Table 7.2), since
these areas lie outside the protection of any barrier strategy. Local scale infrastructure enhancement of $0.3
bn will be limited to those locations where levees are too costly (e.g. low urban density areas in the Bronx
and Staten Island). As in the barriers strategies, the marshlands in Jamaica Bay, finally, will be strengthened
to prevent erosion. Maintenance costs, finally, are estimated on $13.5 mln/yr, the same as the costs for all
protection costs in the Strategy 2c
Table L1. Overall costs for Strategy 1c, Resilient Open City: A Hybrid Solution (all in
$2012 values)
Measure type Costs Description
Building code 1/100 flood zone $0.4 bn This is the cost range of upgrading buildings in
1/100 areas. This cost range is lower than
Strategy 1a, since (1) buildings in the 1/500
flood zone are not considered and (2) parts of
the flood zones are protected by levees
Moderate Protection Manhattan,
the Bronx, Brooklyn /Red
Hook
$0.8 – $1.6 bn These measures include: Retrofit low bulkheads,
(e.g. Brooklyn, Manhattan); Mix Levee/landfill
(e.g. retrofit FDR drive Manhattan,).
Beach strengthening Rockaways $0.8-$1.2 bn Beach Nourishment (e.g. Rockaways).
Local scale infrastructure
enhancements
$0.3 bn Only to infrastructure objects in low urban
density areas in the Bronx and Staten Island
Env. measurement Jamaica Bay $0.9 bn Marshland stabilizing through nourishments
Infrastructure $3.2 bn Costs of adaptation measures are estimated at
only 50% of the infrastructure costs in Strategy
1b, since additional protection measures in
Manhattan, Brooklyn and the Rockaways will
protect infrastructure
Total $6.4 – $7.6 bn
Total adaptation costs NJ $4 bn 1
Grant Total (NJ-NYC)
Strategy 1c A Hybrid Solution
$10.4 – 11.6 bn
All summary cost tables are in US$ 2012 values. Indexing was applied using the Construction Cost Index from ENR
(Engineering News-Record, http://enr.construction.com/economics). The CCI annual escalation rate was set to 2.4%,
on May 2nd 2013.
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